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Authors’ Note
This eighteen-month study is based on a comprehensive survey of more than two thousand discrete Chinese-language sources published over the past five years. It also draws
on discussions with Chinese experts in China and the United States, including one
former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) official and one PLAN officer. The most
important of these sources are cited herein. Sources that were examined systematically
include the official PLAN publications 人民海军 (People’s Navy), 当代海军 (Modern
Navy), 海军医学杂志 (Journal of Navy Medicine), and 中华航海医学与高气压医学杂
志 (China Journal of Nautical Medicine and Hyperbaric Medicine); the official PLA publication 解放军报 (Liberation Army Daily); and such official state media sources as 中国
日报 (China Daily), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), and 中央电视台 (China Central Television/CCTV)—particularly the program “军事报道” (“Military Report”) on China’s
official military channel, CCTV-7. In selected instances, particularly cases in which
translations are especially substantive, lengthy, or have required significant adjudication
between literal rendering of Chinese and expressions that would be most intelligible to
an English-speaking audience, the original Chinese is appended in an endnote. Every
effort has been made to communicate to an English-reading audience in nuanced fashion what Chinese sources themselves are expressing, even when English readers might
differ conceptually or substantively. Where possible, such potential ambiguity is noted in
endnotes. The one major exception is the widespread description by Chinese sources of
ships seized by pirates as having been “hijacked”; from an international legal perspective,
“pirated” would be the correct term.
The authors thank Bernard Cole, Gabriel Collins, Peter Dutton, Glen Forbes, William
Murray, two anonymous reviewers, and one operational specialist for their insightful
comments concerning previous drafts of this study, as well as military operators from
multiple nations for sharing their insights. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors alone and not those of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S.
government.
All photographs obtained with permission from China Defense Forum.
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09 GREECE
Crete
7 March 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
Piraeus
9–13 August 2010, Friendly Visit

08 FRANCE
Toulon (off map)
23–27 April 2013, Friendly Visit

07 EGYPT
Alexandria
26–30 July 2010, Friendly Visit

06 DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
24 January 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
3 May 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
13 September 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
22 September 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
24 December 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
21 February 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
5 October 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
24–29 March 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
14 May 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
13–18 August 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
1–6 December 2012, Replenish/Overhaul

05 BURMA/MYANMAR
Rangoon
29 August–2 September 2010, Friendly Visit

13

12

03 BAHRAIN
Manama
9–13 December 2010, Friendly Visit

04 BULGARIA
Varna
5–10 August 2012, Friendly Visit

11

02 AUSTRALIA
Sydney
18–22 December 2012, Friendly Visit

7–10 November 2011, Replenish/Overhaul 25 SOUTH AFRICA
21–24 February 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
Durban
1–3 July 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
4–8 April 2011, Friendly Visit
9 July 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
26 SRI LANKA
ISRAEL
28–29 March 2013, Replenish/Overhaul
Haifa
Colombo
18 PAKISTAN
13–17 August 2012, Friendly Visit
5–7 January 2010, Friendly Visit and
Karachi
Replenish/Overhaul
ITALY
5–8 August 2009, Joint Drills and Friendly
7–12 December 2010, Friendly Visit
Taranto
Visit
2–7 August 2010, Joint Drills and Friendly
7–13 March 2010, Joint Drills and Friendly 27 TANZANIA
Visit
Visit
Dar es Salaam
13 March 2011, Joint Drills
26–30 March 2011, Joint Drills and
KUWAIT
8 September 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
Friendly Visit
Shuwaikh
28 THAILAND
27 November–1 December 2011, Friendly 19 PHILIPPINES
Visit
Manila
Sattahip
13–17 April 2010, Friendly Visit
16–21 August 2011, Joint Drills and
MALAYSIA
Friendly Visit
Port Kelang
PORTUGAL
21–25 April 2012, Friendly Visit
6 December 2009, Friendly Visit
Lisbon
29 TURKEY
15–19 April 2013, Friendly Visit
MALTA
Instanbul
20 QATAR
26–30 March 2013, Friendly Visit
5–8 August 2012, Friendly Visit
Doha
30 UKRAINE
MOROCCO
2–7 August 2011, Friendly Visit
Casablanca
Sevastopol
21 ROMANIA
9–13 April 2013, Friendly Visit
31 July–3 August 2012, Friendly Visit
Constantsa
31 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
MOZAMBIQUE
31 July–3 August 2012, Friendly Visit
Maputo
Abu Dhabi
22 SAUDI ARABIA
29 March–2 April 2012, Friendly Visit
24–28 March 2010, Friendly Visit
Jeddah
32 VIETNAM
OMAN
27–31 November 2010, Friendly Visit
Muscat
3 September 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
Ho Chi Minh City
1–8 December 2011, Friendly Visit
17 June 2012, Replenish/Overhaul
13 January 2013, Friendly Visit
Salalah
1–6 January 2013, Replenish/Overhaul
33 YEMEN
21 June–1 July 2009, Replenish/Overhaul
23 SEYCHELLES
14 August 2009, Replenish/Overhaul
Aden
2 January 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
Victoria
21 February 2009, Replenish/Overhaul
1 April 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
14 April 2011, Friendly Visit
25 April 2009, Replenish/Overhaul
8 June 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
23 July 2009, Replenish/Overhaul
24 SINGAPORE
10 August 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
28 September 2009, Replenish/Overhaul
19 January 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
Changi
5 February 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
28 January 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
5–7 September 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
16 May 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
10 April 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
and Joint Drills
26 July 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
23 June 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
18–20 December 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
1 October 2010, Replenish/Overhaul
8–11 August 2011, Replenish/Overhaul
and Friendly Visit

10 INDIA
Cochin
8 August 2009, Friendly Visit

01 ALGERIA
Algiers (off map)
2–5 April 2013, Friendly Visit

Introduction: Why Antipiracy in the Gulf of Aden?

T

he twenty-sixth of December 2012 marked an important date in Chinese military
history—the fourth anniversary of China’s furthest and most extensive naval
operations to date, the ongoing antipiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden. In the
first-ever simultaneous three-fleet public display, China’s North Sea Fleet, East Sea
Fleet, and South Sea Fleet all held “open day activities.”1 The guided-missile destroyers
Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen and guided-missile frigate Zhoushan, together
with their associated helicopters and personnel, were visited by more than eight
thousand people “from all sectors of the society” at the port cities after which they
are named.2 Over the past four years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has deployed
nearly ten thousand personnel on thirty-seven warships with twenty-eight helicopters
in thirteen task forces.3 Over the course of more than five hundred operations, these
forces have protected more than five thousand commercial vessels—Chinese and
foreign in nearly equal proportion, the latter flagged by more than fifty nations.4 They
have “successfully met and escorted, rescued and salvaged over 60 ships.”5 Ships saved
from pirates by PLAN ships include four transports loaded with World Food Programme cargo.6
Beijing has rightly been recognized for this contribution: “The escort in the Gulf of Aden
provided by the Chinese naval task force is a strong support in cracking down [on] Somali piracies [sic] for the international community” Ban Ki-moon, secretary-general of
the United Nations (UN), has been quoted as declaring, “which reflects China’s important role in international affairs.”7 In a new era of international interaction, the PLAN
has cooperated with counterpart vessels from over twenty foreign countries “to exchange
information regarding piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali sea area.”8
Undertaken primarily to safeguard China’s economic interests, the operations also
stimulate interagency coordination with the PLAN in a vital position, provide irreplaceable naval training, catalyze the development of naval skill sets often taken for granted
but absolutely critical for long-distance operations, and offer tentative indications of
Beijing’s approach to maritime governance as a great power. The results thus far are
largely positive, albeit modest. China’s navy is increasing its out-of-area capabilities, but
it would require tremendous improvements in force structure, human capital, training,
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and experience to translate present resources into an ability to engage in high-intensity
combat operations in what Chinese strategists term the “Far Seas” (远海). Still, antipiracy operations serve as a modest springboard by which China can achieve the international status and influence that it covets, since they allow China to be seen providing
public goods and cooperating to defend the global system. Whatever the ultimate trajectory of China’s maritime power, its escort missions are likely to persist for some time
and hence will continue to offer a valuable window into the future of China’s naval role
beyond East Asia. Indeed, they offer the first major insights into China’s Far Seas operations and its approach thereto. Four years on, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission is highlighted by ten Chinese naval breakthroughs, all of which underscore China’s
most significant lesson learned through its antipiracy mission: there is no substitute for
experience, and the PLAN has had to learn many things by doing them.
•• The mission’s greatest organizational value is its forcing and facilitating of real-time
interagency coordination of a scope, duration, and effectiveness rarely seen in Chinese civil-military and security affairs.
•• The PLAN has been empowered and required to coordinate directly with civilian
organizations such as the Ministry of Transportation (MoT), transcending traditional
bureaucratic and civil-military stovepipes and bringing the service out from under
the People’s Liberation Army’s organizational shadow.
•• The transformation in organizational coordination is aided by the application of new
technology to the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden mission, which serves as an invaluable venue
for testing Chinese satellites and new communications technology away from home.
•• As a result of antipiracy operations, the PLAN is carving out a niche role in Chinese
diplomacy, as Chinese antipiracy warships increasingly work with other navies and
call on foreign ports for resupply and exchanges.
•• Chinese ships and their crewmen deployed to the Gulf of Aden have no choice but
to master the logistical skills and concepts associated with protracted, long-distance
naval operations, including balancing underway and in-port replenishment and
maintaining crew morale for extended periods amid rigorous conditions.
•• Perhaps the mission’s greatest operational value is forcing personnel to face unscripted, unpredictable situations—the most intense operational experience presently
available to China’s navy.
•• The PLAN has traversed a steep learning curve with impressive speed and resourcefulness, enhancing both specific escort protection techniques and associated supporting capabilities.
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•• The operations have already yielded significant procedural, training, and operational
improvements and may influence maintenance procedures and even ship design.
•• Having taken these challenges in stride, China’s navy is gaining confidence.
•• By contributing useful public goods, antipiracy operations offer Beijing increased
global maritime influence.
Propelled by both domestic and international interests, antipiracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden thus bring China into a more rewarding yet more difficult realm in which
expectations are rising in both respects.
On close examination, however, the PLAN’s unprecedented actions raise an important
foundational question: Why did China’s leaders decide that antipiracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden provided the right opportunity for the nation’s first regularized overseas
naval deployments? A confluence of several specific factors was involved.
Antipiracy operations avoid ideological sensitivities. Unlike acts of terrorism, which are designed to further political or ideological agendas, contemporary piracy is a unique maritime phenomenon whose perpetrators are driven by purely economic factors.9 Piracy is
generally defined as “an illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g., plundering, robbing, or
pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for private ends by the
crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.”10 The fact that piracy is a private,
apolitical act is convenient for the leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The
regime stakes its popular legitimacy on developing China as an economically dynamic
world power with increasing global interests, but it remains wedded to a policy of “noninterference” (互不干涉) in other nations’ domestic affairs. However more complex
in practice this policy may already be than in theory, Beijing faces a delicate balance in
safeguarding its interests and engaging more fully in the international community while
avoiding political assertiveness that could be risky and off-putting. Antipiracy operations
thus represent a low-risk opportunity to test Beijing’s policy preferences.
Piracy imposes direct economic costs on all states, including China. By disrupting flows of
critical resources and destabilizing vital waterways, piracy affects all states with stakes in
maritime commerce. The growing connectivity between China’s massive economy and
the international economic system has made threats to the stability of important sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) particularly worrisome to China, whose trade relies on
more pirate-infested waterways than that of any other country.11
International cooperation is necessary to address piracy. At the same time, pirates’ ability
to disguise themselves as innocent civilians and to disperse their activities makes piracy
an expensive and complex problem for modern naval forces to address. International
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cooperation is therefore the natural response, and China desires to be seen as a cooperative, nonbelligerent state as it grows in power.12 Thus, China has joined other naval
powers proactively as they deploy naval forces to the Gulf of Aden in response to this
growing and serious threat.
Chinese leaders face both internal and external pressure to exert international leadership.
Acts of piracy often create undesired international and domestic political consequences
for states whose legitimacy and influence rest on perceptions of how they handle security threats to economic, environmental, and human security. This is certainly a form of
domestic pressure to which the Chinese leadership is not immune. Internal and external
security developments clearly drove both China’s original deployment of antipiracy
forces in the Gulf of Aden and, thereafter, Beijing’s growing focus on employing nontraditional security operations to protect China’s maritime interests.13 China’s economic,
political, and military rise over the past thirty-five years has prompted growing levels
of scrutiny by international observers with respect to China’s contribution (or lack
thereof) as an interested party in the global commons. The PLAN’s antipiracy mission
has provided a highly visible vehicle by which China can respond to this challenge in a
way that allows Beijing to balance concerns over international law and internal policy
making. Of course, there are significant domestic sources of pressure as well, pressure
that requires leaders to demonstrate capability within the Chinese bureaucratic system
to gain confidence and resources and to show the populace the strength of the country
under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership.14
China’s military has been directed to broaden its missions beyond territorial defense.
China’s leaders have emphasized the need to address nontraditional security concerns as
part of fulfilling the “new historic missions” (新阶段我军的历史使命) first laid out by
former president Hu Jintao at an expanded Central Military Commission (CMC) conference on 24 December 2004. These new missions require the PLA to ensure military
support for continued CCP rule; defend China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
national security; protect China’s expanding national interests; and ensure a peaceful
global environment and promote mutual development.15 The last two missions reflected
new emphases for the PLA, and the fourth was completely unprecedented. The persistence and complexity of modern piracy has therefore created a learning opportunity for
China’s navy, which is particularly unproven in such out-of-area maritime regions as the
Indian Ocean region (IOR).16 However, representing as they do the only major Chinese
military effort to date that addresses all four missions, antipiracy operations are critical
for demonstrating to the international community the Chinese military’s ability to execute these contemporary missions and protect Chinese citizens abroad, especially as the
PLAN is growing into a pillar of China’s modern armed forces.
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In 2007, Hu elaborated, “As we strengthen our ability to fight and win limited wars under informatized conditions, we have to pay even more attention to improving noncombat military operations capabilities.”17 That same year, a CCP constitutional amendment
codified these missions further.18 In attempts to transform Hu’s general guidance into
more specific policy, articles in state and military media have argued that the People’s
Liberation Army (or PLA, meaning the Chinese military generally) must go beyond its
previous mission of safeguarding national “survival interests” (生存利益) to protecting
national “development interests” (发展利益)—that is, economic growth.19 In March
2009 Hu exhorted military delegates of the National People’s Congress (NPC) to emphasize not only “building core military capabilities” but also “the ability to execute military
operations other than war” (非战争军事行动).20 Finally, on 8 November 2012 at the
Eighteenth National CCP Congress, which concluded Hu’s term in office, Hu reinforced
these themes: “We should attach great importance to maritime . . . security. We should
[undertake] active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and
intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range
of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information
age.” He placed unprecedented emphasis on Chinese maritime development: “We should
enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy,
protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights
and interests, and build China into a maritime power.”21
High-level PLA officers are now conducting a sophisticated analysis of the “nonwar
military operations” needed to promote these interests, and antipiracy operations seem
to have provided an important test case for carrying out the “new historic missions.” As
the PLAN’s official journal Modern Navy explained in 2011, “Navy officers have adapted
positively to the needs of expanding responsibilities for national interests and naval missions, the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters have become new battlegrounds for carrying
out naval diversified responsibilities. [The navy] constantly explores new channels for
conducting noncombat operations through escort practice.”22 Or, as the acting party
secretary of the fourth escort task force, Gu Likang, stated, “Wherever national interests
expand into, so too will the navy’s mission extend to there. Escort task forces must adjust
to the maritime environment for which they are responsible as quickly as possible, and
expand military training according to local conditions, toughen the force on all sides,
[and] conscientiously raise the ability to fulfill missions [and] responsibilities.”23
Thus, countering piracy allows China’s navy to accumulate experience and operational
achievements on the Far Seas unprecedented in its history and to enhance the nation’s
political image by performing successful missions in cooperation with other states. Also,
it offers China itself excellent opportunities to protect its economic interests abroad and
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to participate meaningfully—if, thus far, modestly—in the construction of twenty-firstcentury global governance architecture.
This study begins by exploring the complex issue of modern piracy, including piracy’s
transformation into a serious nontraditional security threat and the implications that
modern piracy poses for all states in the international system. Chapter 1 discusses the
economic, political, and military challenges and opportunities created specifically for
China by contemporary piracy, and the factors that catalyzed its Gulf of Aden deployment. Chapter 2 analyzes the institutional foundations of Beijing’s escort-task-force mission and the domestic policy issues and debates within China surrounding the PLAN’s
continued deployments of escort task forces. Chapter 3 adds context by surveying the
other multilateral and national naval forces fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In doing so, it highlights the extent to which a series of factors facilitate—or, in many cases,
restrict—cooperation between China and other actors. These factors include Beijing’s
perspectives on the prevailing international maritime laws and norms, its views of the
other countries and coalitions involved, the impact of Chinese domestic laws, and the
objectives of China’s foreign policy. Building on this comparative foundation, chapter
4 details the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden mission from December 2008 to the present in key
dimensions—the naval platforms used, methods of logistical support, types of interaction with other navies, and the PLAN’s operational performance. Using evidence from
this discussion, chapter 5 probes the most likely future development path of the PLAN’s
antipiracy operations and concludes that Beijing has many strategic decisions to make
with respect to deploying naval platforms for and addressing the logistical challenges of
Far Seas missions. Chapter 6 offers tentative assessments of how the Gulf of Aden mission has shaped the way Beijing views its potential contribution to twenty-first-century
global governance and of what the prospects are for more meaningful U.S.-Chinese
cooperation, as both great powers continue to face in common the new nontraditional
maritime security threats.
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(Part 1)], 特别策划 [Special Column], 当代海
军 [Modern Navy] (January 2011), pp. 8–11.
Original text: “海军官兵积极适应国家利益和
海军使命任务扩展的需要, 亚丁湾, 索马里海
域, 成为海军执行多样化任务的新战场. 在护
航实践中不断探索执行非战争军事行动的
新途径.”
23. 朱宁 [Zhu Ning] and 李义保 [Li Yibao], “海
阔天高任驰骋--亚丁湾独特的气象海况成为
练兵的好操场” [Enjoying Free Rein to Act at
Will on the Great Stage of the Vast Sea and High
Skies: The Gulf of Aden’s Unique Climate and
Maritime Conditions Become a Good Arena for
Training Troops], 综合新闻 [General News],
人民海军 [People’s Navy], 13 March 2010, p. 2.
Original text: “国家利益拓展到哪里, 海军的使
命就 延伸到哪里, 护航编队必须以最快的速
度适应任务海区环境, 并因地制宜开展军事
训练, 全方位摔打部队, 切实提升旅行使命任
务的能力.”

C HAPTER O N E

Modern Piracy and Its Relevance to China

M

odern piracy has flourished for more than two decades. The period from 2005 to
2010 saw piracy attacks worldwide increase substantially every year. According
to a report by Zhongxing News Network citing European Union (EU) naval officials, the
number of pirate attacks rose threefold in 2010.1 Reported international pirate attacks
peaked at 445 in 2010;2 of 439 attacks reported by the International Maritime Bureau
during 2011, 275 occurred either off the coast of Somalia or in the Gulf of Guinea off
West Africa.3 Moreover, attacks originating off the coast of Somalia have had a much
higher success rate than in other regions. For example, in 2010 successful Somali pirate
attacks accounted for over 90 percent of total ship seizures worldwide.4 Chinese writers
have noted patterns in Somali pirate attacks, such as a rise in both number and intensity during the spring.5 A February 2012 article in the official newspaper of the PLAN,
People’s Navy, stated that the Gulf of Aden area covers roughly 530,000 square kilometers, reflecting the wide operating space within which pirates choose and engage targets.6
Reports in late 2012 that worldwide pirate attacks had “plummeted” reflected the success
of antipiracy operations by navies throughout the world. During a solo escort exercise by
the supply vessel Qiandaohu of the twelfth escort task force performed in October 2012
to enhance the PLAN’s vigilance, Cdr. Fu Junqing commented that pirates were increasingly “making reckless moves in desperation” (铤而走险).7 CNTV reported, “According
to the International Maritime Bureau, by October 2012 pirate attacks had dropped to
a six-year low. Only one ship was attacked in the third quarter compared to thirty-six
during the same period in 2011.”8 But this reduction is certainly not perceived by China
and other states as signaling the eradication of this nontraditional security problem.9 As
Zhou Xuming, commander of the PLAN’s twelfth antipiracy task force, remarked during a July 2012 interview on board ship, “Despite all these efforts, the present antipiracy
situation still allows no optimism. The region in which the Somali pirates conduct
their criminal activities is gradually extending outward: north to the Gulf of Oman and
east to waters off the southwestern coast of India. In addition, the pirates have become
even more seasoned and diversified in their employment of criminal means and these
circumstances have presented us with new challenges in this ship-escorting operation.”10
He further affirmed, “We still dare not relax our vigilance and continue to conduct
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considerable relevant preparation work based on the situation and characteristics of the
pirates’ activities.”11 Similarly, in December 2012 Li Xiaoyan, commander of the PLAN’s
thirteenth task force, stated, “The pirates may stage a comeback after a short period of
peace. The escort mission may face new challenges in the coming months.”12 Liberation
Army Daily reported in November 2012 that the coming six-month period could see a
significant rise in piracy attacks because of relatively favorable sea conditions and the
extension of tactics by pirates, who now operate both day and night.13
Other navies also remain concerned about Somali piracy. In September 2012 Australia
decided to reroute the heavy-lift ship Blue Marlin, carrying HMAS Canberra from its
builder in Spain to Geelong, in Australia, around the Cape of Good Hope rather than
through the Gulf of Aden. Canberra, an amphibious assault ship, is larger than a standard aircraft carrier and will be the largest ship in the Australian navy. Shipping officials
worried that the enormous target would be vulnerable to pirate attack, which would
constitute a major embarrassment for all parties. The detour resulted in an extra twelve
thousand miles of travel and took over six weeks.14
It must be kept in mind, however, that although there is scholarly disagreement on the
general subject, piracy’s existence is largely rooted in the failure of domestic governance
institutions, which in such states as Somalia are still extremely volatile and unstable.15
The deputy permanent representative of China to the United Nations, Wang Min, emphasized in 2011 his nation’s view on that point: “Military action can only mitigate the
scourge of Somali piracy.”16
Somalia’s centrality to modern piracy, then, is no coincidence. The former British and
Italian colony is perhaps the world’s most ungoverned state today; in recent years the
central authorities have controlled only several city blocks in the capital, Mogadishu.17
Collapse of governance in 1991 ended Somalia’s ability to patrol its own waters, allowing
rampant illegal fishing and dumping that harmed its once-important marine economy.18
Illegal poaching by foreign fishing fleets in Somali waters, in turn, stimulated a nationalist response.19 As they were operating in a political vacuum, Somali fishermen soon
discovered that threatening (and sometimes using) force to extort fines was far more
lucrative than their erstwhile conventional profession.20 At the national level, Somalia’s
case provides overwhelming evidence that absence of domestic governance in coastal
states can spawn unbridled piracy. Indeed, of the 439 attacks that occurred worldwide in
2011, 236—or 54 percent—were at the hands of Somali pirates, who operate freely along
the unmonitored coastline.21
Modern Navy typifies Chinese sources in stating that these pirates are difficult to counter
in part because they are hard to locate and identify:
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They conceal weapons and ladders in the ship cabin and fishing nets, darting back and
forth within the escort zone. [Upon] encountering warships [they] pick up fishing nets
and fish, [and upon] running into commercial ships, [they] rob [them] using weapons.
These ships are no different from fishing boats in external appearance, [there is] absolutely no way of distinguishing them. Also skiffs are very small in size, and often disappear
within the waves as waves rise and fall, [so] warships’ warning radars cannot easily detect
them.22

While the collective response of national navies and multilateral task forces in the Gulf
of Aden and parts of the Indian Ocean has contributed to a large overall reduction in
piracy, risk-taking pirate crews, utterly lacking domestic economic opportunities, are
willing to venture farther offshore in their small coastal skiffs to attack merchant vessels.23 The net result is an expanded maritime area that is vulnerable to pirate attack,
making pirates more elusive and control costs higher.24 Moreover, China’s leadership has,
on numerous occasions, learned that individual pirate attacks on commercial vessels that
generate media coverage have greater impact on Beijing’s domestic and international political image than do abstract statistical trends.25 As long as the threat of piracy remains,
states like China will be wary of taking formidable public-relations risks that carry major
economic and political implications.26
Whatever the debate about the root causes of modern piracy worldwide, its costs are
clear—pirates pose serious threats to the economic and political stability of states
throughout the world. One recent study has found that the cost of these disruptions
totals between seven and twelve billion dollars annually.27 Many of the world’s most
vital SLOCs and shipping routes—including the Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz,
the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Singapore, and the South China
Sea—regularly face destabilizing piracy threats.28 For example, approximately half of the
world’s container shipments pass through the Bab el Mandeb (“Gate of Grief ”) connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.29 Moreover, it is estimated that approximately 40
percent of global energy shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow body
of water between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that is considered a strategic
“choke point.”30 While most pirate attacks are limited in scale, even a temporary disruption of trade by pirates in any of these regions could produce a ripple effect, by forcing
companies to reroute shipments and thereby delaying critical energy and industrialsupply deliveries. For complex transnational production networks and just-in-time supply chains, with little spare capacity, the potential impact of such disruption would be
significant.31 Successful pirate attacks can also bring heavy scrutiny to the international
community for its failure to protect global shipping lanes adequately.
Some studies contend that rerouting is a relatively cheap and safe option for some ships,
especially the older, slower, and bulkier ships that are most vulnerable to pirate attack
and least equipped for protective measures.32 Indeed, rerouting is often preferable to
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hefty ransoms or more expensive insurance premiums. Nevertheless, the aggregate
costs of avoiding high-traffic waterways where piracy is rampant in favor of such less
convenient routes as the Cape of Good Hope are significant.33 For example, one report
estimates actual rerouting costs at between $2.4 and $3 billion annually.34 A more recent
study by Oceans beyond Piracy, an American nonprofit organization, estimates annual
rerouting costs at $486–$680 million.35 These costs stem from additional fuel and excess
wages to crew members, the primary direct expenses associated with rerouting. Of
course, the extra time required to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope rather than
transiting waterways near the Middle East—estimated by China’s MoT at six days—is
also very significant in terms of aggregate opportunity cost.36 Moreover, longer distances
increase shipping times and hence require more ships to accommodate the same volume
of trade. Rerouting to avoid pirate attacks thus imposes meaningful costs on the shipping industry. However, navigating waters affected by persistent piracy also raises the
costs of maritime shipping, by increasing insurance premiums.37 These economic forces
motivate greater regional and international cooperation.
China is no exception to the general vulnerability to piracy.38 Internal and external
security developments have driven both China’s original deployment of antipiracy forces
in the Gulf of Aden and Beijing’s growing focus on nontraditional security tactics to
protect China’s maritime interests. Chinese-led joint patrols in other crime-infested waters, such as the upper Mekong Delta, are a prime example. Specifically, the persistence
and complexity of modern piracy have created new challenges for the PLAN, which is
particularly unproven in such Far Seas as the IOR. These challenges are formidable and
perhaps even daunting for the CCP, for reasons explained in the introduction. Antipiracy operations thus represent a critical test for Beijing, not only operationally, but also
in terms of policy and symbolism. Yet the benefits are too compelling to ignore.
China, like other nations, has opted for direct naval involvement rather than relying
solely on private security initiatives to address an expanding piracy “industry.” However,
one Chinese observer, Li Ruijing of the PLA Academy of Military Science, asserts that
PLAN antipiracy operations alone are insufficient to protect completely PRC interests
endangered by pirates:
First, [one must] understand clearly the responsibilities of “military escorts” [军队护航]
and “civil protection” [民间安保]. Chinese overseas interests can only rely, [and even
then] not rely completely, on military escorts [中国海外利益只能依靠而非完全依赖
军队护航]. In recent years, despite major efforts by the government and military, heavy
spending on executing “Gulf of Aden escorts.” . . . [T]he government and military can only
protect the “main artery” [大动脉] of China’s core national interests, and clearly have no
way to satisfactorily protect many of the security demands of “small blood vessels” [小血
管] and “microcirculation” [微循环]. Because of this, as exemplified by [the] U.S. [company] “Blackwater,” by establishing and strengthening [the] Chinese “Red Shield” [红盾],
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thereby letting Chinese civil security go abroad, escorts can develop to the highest degree
and protect China’s overseas interests.39

Amid debates on how to integrate PLAN and civilian resources, Beijing is intent on
eradicating piracy by supporting Somali institutions of domestic governance that, if
sustained and fortified, could create domestic structures capable of discouraging piratical acts.40 For example, as of late 2011 China had given the African Union (AU) $2.2
million to use specifically for peacekeeping in Somalia and also $780,000 to the governments of Burundi and Uganda for supplies to be used in the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM).41 Wang Min, as deputy permanent representative to the UN, has
advocated a comprehensive strategy for Somalia based on extensive cooperation between
the Somalia Transitional Federal Government and the international community.42 In
mid-2012 China reportedly announced a grant of nearly $100 million to install security
cameras in neighboring Kenya, which had in October 2011 deployed forces on Somali
soil to eradicate the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.43 Nonetheless, piracy persists, and
PLAN antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden that began in December 2008 and have
continued uninterrupted for over four years were ongoing with no known plans for their
conclusion as this study went to press.44

Threatening the “Golden Waterway”: Piracy’s Economic Ramifications
for China
China relies increasingly on “SLOC security” (海上通道安全) for its economic development.45 China’s eleventh five-year guideline (2006–10) reiterated the goal of the tenth
five-year plan (2001–2005);46 it addresses environmental concerns and diversification of
energy supply by, first, increasing natural-gas consumption to 8 percent of total energy
use by 2015 and, second, finding new sources of oil to reduce China’s reliance on coal.47
To do this, China must increase significantly its imports of both oil and gas in the near
future, making secure SLOCs even more critical for safeguarding energy supplies to fuel
China’s economic growth. That growth was estimated at 7.5 percent during the National
People’s Congress in March 2012; the twelfth five-year guideline (2011–15) established a
target of 7 percent.48
China is indeed looking to the seas to address domestic energy security. Since China
became a net oil importer in 1993, its oil-import dependence has risen steadily, with
roughly half of China’s oil imported at present, 80 percent of it delivered by sea.49 This
means that China currently relies on maritime transport for 40 percent of its oil. Oil is
a vital resource for China that accounts for virtually all of the nation’s transportation
fuel—for which there is no immediately interchangeable substitute. It is also irreplaceable as a military fuel for the majority of China’s air and naval assets, not to mention
trucks and off-road machinery that help drive economic growth. The director of China’s
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National Energy Administration, Zhang Guobao, refers to transportation as a “major
consumer of oil” (用油大户) and believes mitigating the transport sector’s reliance on
oil is the starting point for reducing China’s overall oil dependence.50 The vice-governor
of China’s Everbright Bank, Dan Jianbao, predicts that China’s reliance on imports as a
percentage of total oil consumption may increase to 80 percent by 2030.51 Meanwhile,
Tong Xiaoguang of China’s Academy of Engineering has suggested that import dependence would reach approximately 65 percent during the same period.52
However divergent in specifics, overall these estimates suggest that the stability of
SLOCs will continue to grow in strategic importance.53 Moreover, China became a net
natural-gas importer in 2007, and imports of shipborne liquefied natural gas (LNG)
have begun to compete with traditional fuels in coastal China, both for residential use
and in the booming shipping industry.54 Besides energy security trends, the increase in
Chinese port traffic further demonstrates China’s economic dependence on the sea. As
Ju Chengzhi, Department Head, Department of International Cooperation, Ministry
of Transportation, explains, China must, given its tremendous maritime interests,
focus on the big picture of long-term benefits and not get lost in the details of shortterm costs:
Currently, China has over 260 ship companies involved with international shipping. . . .
Right now our development trend is definitely increasingly open, trade volume ever larger,
[and] maritime transportation certainly has greater development. This kind of trend has
given us a problem, not just the protection of the safety of the Gulf of Aden and Somali
waters, [but] also the Strait of Malacca and all shipping lanes. [This is] not a one-time
problem, but is a long-term problem. Warship escorts should be [considered in terms of
long-term benefits, not preoccupation with short-term costs]. . . . [I]f these Far Seas shipping companies are affected [by piracy] and shut down, [this] will produce an enormous
loss in national tax revenues. So, [the issue of a] warship escort task force concerns far
more than just the problems of how much money should be spent and how large costs will
be. The larger benefits are much more significant than [immediate] costs and prices; they
are long-term [in nature].55

Similarly, Ju declared in 2009, “China has become a ‘Maritime Shipping Power’ (海运
大国), with a national shipping fleet containing over 3,300 vessels with an aggregate
carrying capacity of 84,880,000 tonnes, ranking fourth in the world.”56 During the same
interview, Ju said that China, at the time, relied on maritime shipping for 90 percent of
its international trade in goods.57 Ju added, “Now Chinese vessels may be seen at ports
throughout the world. We have 40,000 crewmen [working] on the oceans. We are also a
‘seafarer power’ [海员大国]; the government has a responsibility to protect them.”58
Statistics on Chinese port traffic further demonstrate its growing dependence on maritime commerce. A 2000 PLAN study estimated that aggregate port throughput would
grow from 1.8 billion tons to three billion tons by 2010.59 By 2009 total throughput had
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already reached seven billion tons.60 While the recent global recession may have moderated this activity to some degree, it is nevertheless likely to remain high. As a maritime
commercial power, China is here to stay.
China not only relies broadly on stable SLOCs but also depends heavily on sea-lanes
that are some of the world’s busiest and most vulnerable to pirate attacks.61 China relies
on five SLOCs for 86 percent of its foreign trade, the Strait of Malacca being the most
important; 80 percent of China’s oil imports pass through it, and over 60 percent of
the ships that transit the strait daily are Chinese.62 “Maritime transportation lines have
already lived up to their name of becoming national survival and development ‘lifelines’
[生命线],” states an article in Modern Navy. “Regarding economics, maritime transportation lines are important pillars and necessary prerequisites for the rapid development
of the national economy.”63 China’s Ocean Development Report 2010 states that China’s
overdependence on “a few passages and straits” for obtaining strategic resources is a
primary threat to its “sea-passage security.”64
Many Chinese analysts appear gravely concerned about China’s strong reliance on goods
transiting vulnerable international waters and choke points, as well as China’s extensive
dependence on foreign transportation. For instance, Han Xudong, a professor at China’s
National Defense University (NDU), has written, “From the current situation, ocean
lifelines have already become a soft rib in China’s strategic security.”65 Han regards this
as a potential “bottleneck in China’s future economic development.”66 In 2011 a Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Research Center for Forecasting Sciences researcher,
Fan Ying, stated that 90 percent of China’s maritime-imported oil was transported in
non-Chinese ships, which makes China’s provision of SLOC security more difficult.67
During a May 2012 meeting between representatives of the eleventh escort task force
and the training ship Zheng He in the Gulf of Aden, political worker Tong Zhe stated
that 90 percent of China’s trade relied on secure passage through SLOCs.68 Similarly referring to strategic SLOCs such as the Gulf of Aden, military expert Liu Jiangping adds,
“Those who control these maritime strategic channels and gulfs would have their hands
put onto China’s strategic oil channels, and would be capable of threatening China’s
energy security.”69
Li Daguang, a professor at National Defense University and a PLA officer, goes so far
as to suggest that great powers are seeking to control vital Indian Ocean energy SLOCs
under the pretext of fighting piracy.70 Li emphasizes that presently more than a hundred
ships cross the Indian Ocean daily and that 70 percent of world oil flows transit the
Indian Ocean.71 He anticipates ship transits increasing to between 150 and two hundred
by 2020.72 He lists the three primary oil-shipping routes through the Indian Ocean:

16

china maritime studies

•• Persian Gulf 4 Cape of Good Hope 4 Western Europe 4 North America
•• Persian Gulf 4 Strait of Malacca 4 Japan
•• Persian Gulf 4 Suez Canal 4 Mediterranean 4 Western Europe 4 North America.73
On this basis, Li contends, “One after another, the great powers of the world are dispatching maritime power to the Indian Ocean to fight piracy, [but what is] actually
valued is the Indian Ocean’s strategic geographic location.”74
Disruption of SLOC security also poses a somewhat more complex challenge for China’s
economy, one related to China’s well-known role as chief financier of U.S. debt. China
officially held over three trillion dollars in foreign reserves in March 2011, almost half
of which was in the form of American Treasury bonds.75 Disruptions by pirates of trade
in the Gulf of Aden (termed the “Golden Waterway” [黄金水道] by Chinese reporter
Meng Yan) and the Indian Ocean threaten both the global supply and the resulting price
of oil, a commodity on which China relies.76 These factors, in turn, play major roles in
determining the value of the U.S. dollar, and hence both the value of China’s holdings
in U.S. Treasury securities and the ability of American consumers to purchase Chinese
goods.77 PLAN scholar Chen Chundi notes that given China’s estimated $1.3 trillion in
U.S.-dollar-denominated foreign reserves, if oil prices are driven up “China will face an
enormous loss with regard to both foreign reserves and U.S. debt.”78 For Beijing, SLOC
security is vital not only for guaranteeing safe delivery of China’s energy and material
goods but also for helping ensure the stability of the U.S. dollar, another critical pillar of
China’s economy.
A January 2009 Sanlian Life Weekly article stated, “Consistent with the flow of foreign
trade, the two ‘main roads’ [主干道] of China’s Far Oceans maritime transportation
run through the Suez Canal to Europe and through the Panama Canal to the U.S. The
only way to reach Europe is to transit the Gulf of Aden.”79 The burgeoning China-EU
trade further increases China’s dependence on safe passage through the Mediterranean
Sea, Bab el Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Malacca and Singapore Straits.80
Cargoes between China and European countries typically transit all these waterways, unless such circumstances as storms or elevated piracy risks compel vessels to take longer,
more expensive alternative routes. China’s aggregate trade with EU countries in 2010
was approximately $500 billion.81 Chinese reporter Meng Yan wrote in 2010 that two
thousand Chinese commercial vessels traverse the Gulf of Aden every year.82 Moreover,
a reported 80 percent of all ships transiting this strategic passage either are Chinese or
carry Chinese cargoes or crew members.83 Given these realities, MoT official Ju Chengzhi
declares the Gulf of Aden to be a vital transit area: “The Gulf of Aden is a route we take
to reach Europe. . . . The ‘Gulf of Aden–Red Sea–Suez Canal–Mediterranean’ line is the
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most convenient route chosen by everyone. . . . [T]his route is of course also the most
preferable for going to North Africa.”84
Adding to the strategic importance of these routes, about 20 percent of China’s imported
oil, over 2 percent of its national energy supply, is purchased from Saudi Arabia.85 Yemen’s instability following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings raises the specter of a Yemeni
collapse that could have major domestic economic and political consequences for Saudi
Arabia and subsequently threaten the stability of its oil exports, as Yemeni refugees
would likely pour into that oil-rich nation. Perhaps more significantly, an unstable Yemen could “worsen the risk of piracy or terrorist attacks in or near the [Bab el Mandeb]
strait.”86
These relationships demonstrate the growing connection between China’s domestic economic growth and external economic, political, and social forces that Beijing is unable
to manipulate directly. While China may not be able, or interested in trying, to control
many of these risks, SLOC security is a global-commons issue that has seriously threatened overseas Chinese interests. For example, as one Chinese scholar points out, “Somali
piracy has not only disrupted navigation security but has also inflicted grave harm on
China’s national interests. This is the fundamental reason for China’s escort operations
in the Gulf of Aden.”87 Further, Yin Zhuo—a retired PLAN rear admiral, a Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) national committee member, and
frequent commentator—has cited the Gulf of Aden mission as rationale for enhancing
the PLAN’s Far Seas capabilities to maximize protection of SLOCs and China’s overseas interests. Yin argues that the recent Libya evacuations were smooth and successful
because of China’s naval presence in the area, whereas during a 2000 coup d’état in the
Solomon Islands, Chinese nationals who were to be evacuated had to wait for a cargo
ship to be rerouted.88
China has come a long way since the Solomon Islands episode. Ethnic tensions there
threatened Chinese citizens, but because Honiara, the capital of the Solomons, recognized Taipei, Beijing had to run the noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) instead
out of its embassy at Port Moresby, in Papua New Guinea. Following its usual practice
of working with local Chinese organizations and federations to collect information and
disseminate advisories, diplomats obtained situational updates from local Chinese. Having obtained the telephone number of the local rebel leader and identified the section of
the city he controlled, they called him and negotiated safe passage before dispatching a
China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) ship to evacuate approximately 120 Chinese
and arranging flights out of the country. Apparently the PLAN was asked to send a vessel but was unable to do so (today things might be completely different). Subsequently,
China has organized a variety of NEOs, including from Fiji during the 2006 military
coup.89
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Professor Feng Liang of Nanjing Naval Command College and Capt. Zhang Chun, a
destroyer division commander in the South Sea Fleet, cite SLOC security not only as an
important component of China’s maritime interests but also as playing an increasingly
important role in China’s national security and development.90 Moreover, Chinese analyst Wang Tao, noting that approximately 60 percent of all vessels transiting the Strait of
Malacca are Chinese, argues that only a “powerful, defensive navy” (防卫性的强大海军)
armed with resources commensurate with China’s growing overseas footprint can ensure
the protection of Chinese interests abroad.91 Zhang Wenmu, a hawkish scholar, has gone
so far as to state, in 2009, “The most crucial conduit connecting China with the region
and with the rest of the world is the sea lanes, and therefore, China must have a powerful
navy.”92 China’s rapidly expanding maritime economy, evidenced by growing maritime
imports of resources and the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, thus provides tremendous incentives for the PLAN to expand its antipiracy missions and, more broadly,
“new historic missions,” in both the Near and Far Seas.

Piracy’s Political Ramifications for China
The antipiracy task forces have been a great success and have enhanced Beijing’s reputation significantly, both at home and abroad. As Beijing has quickly learned, incidents
involving Chinese citizens, companies, or military forces abroad offer excellent opportunities to portray China as a responsible stakeholder. As Rear Adm. (and former
PLAN escort task force commander) Zhang Huachen puts it, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden
antipiracy mission “established a good image” (树立了良好形象) of China and its navy
in other states’ eyes.93 Wei Xueyi, a commander in the sixth escort task force, declares,
“Warships are mobile national territory, the escort task force is a name card for China’s
image. While carrying out escorts in the Gulf of Aden, we not only need to guarantee
the safety of escorted ships, but need even more to display the elegance of the Chinese
navy, [and thereby] display an image of China being a responsible power.”94 In the words
of Senior Capt. Li Jie, a well-known analyst at the PLAN’s strategic think tank, the Navy
Military Studies Research Institute (海军学术研究所),
The PLAN’s power conforms with “favorable weather and geography” [天时, 地利],
appropriately grasping opportunities. [We] rapidly dispatched task forces to the Gulf of
Aden and Somali waters, not only adjusting to the needs of the powerful development
of international peace, [but] also in accordance with the morale of domestic troops and
citizens, [thereby] displaying China’s confidence and determination for peaceful development and global and regional protection through practical operations, [and] taking a step
forward in displaying the Chinese navy’s image of a “civilized and mighty force” [文明之
师, 威武之师].95

A special column in Modern Navy summarizes the image issue more generally: “Facing
severe challenges to the safety of global shipping, the PLAN escort task force has been
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persistent in adhering to legal escorts all along, [its] operations have displayed China’s
unremitting pursuit for the construction of harmonious seas, [and it has] given full
display of the image and heart of a great naval power.”96
However, nontraditional security contingencies present formidable political and public
relations challenges that are complex and risky for China’s externally cautious leadership
to address. For example, Africa specialist Wang Xuejun notes that China’s military activities in such areas as Sudan and Zimbabwe have stirred criticism that potentially detracts
from China’s international image as a responsible power.97 Specifically, antipiracy operations involve the risk of embarrassing failures at the hands of unprofessional, subnational militants. Additionally, the PLAN’s antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden has exposed
the inherent tensions between China’s traditional noninterventionist foreign policy
and mounting domestic pressure on the Chinese government to protect its citizens and
interests overseas within the context of poorly defined international maritime laws and
norms concerning piracy. But if failure brings serious repercussions, success breeds inflation of expectations. Thus Beijing’s recent forays into antipiracy operations have sparked
fundamental debates within China, with some policy makers eager to reap the benefits
of the mission and others hesitant to depart from a conservative foreign policy.
The deployment on 26 December 2008 of China’s first antipiracy task force was preceded by several Somali pirate attacks that threatened the lives of Chinese merchant sailors
and the profits of Chinese shipping companies, thereby magnifying domestic political
pressure to respond. In January 2009 MoT official Ju Chengzhi recalled,
Beginning last June Somali piracy became relatively rampant, September and October
being the most severe times. Chinese ships were attacked at a relatively high rate, [although] the percentage of [Chinese] ships [actually] hijacked was very low. . . . Sinotrans
[Limited]’s [ship] “Dajian” was previously hijacked, the problem was resolved by paying a
ransom. Currently there is also a fishing vessel, “Tianyu 8,” still being held [by pirates], the
seventeen crew members aboard it have been taken captive. China is still using diplomatic
channels to endeavor [to resolve the situation] in various ways.

Dajian, which sails “under the flag of Chinese-foreign cargo shipping” (中外运行旗下
货轮), was at the time captained by a Sri Lankan and had a twenty-three-man Chinese
crew, one member of which was from Hong Kong. Upon its release, the pirates, who
had not injured any crewmen, even distributed a hundred dollars to each crew member as compensation for their handheld phones.98 Two other Hong Kong–registered
commercial vessels, Stolt Valor and Delight, were also pirated by Somalis during this
period. When pirated in late 2008, Delight was crewed solely by non-Chinese. As attacks
mounted, shipping companies became obligated to provide extra incentives to sailors,
as stipulated in collective bargaining contracts negotiated with the Hong Kong Seamen’s
Union (香港海员工会). Roughly one thousand Hong Kong–registered vessels and
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foreign-registered vessels owned by Hong Kong shipowners were covered by these contracts. Sailors crewing Hong Kong–registered ships that transited high-risk waters such
as the Gulf of Aden were thereby entitled to double salaries and double reimbursements
in instances of injury for each day they spent there. In such “high-risk areas” (高危地
区), if a shipping company chose a route that would divert a ship from “internationally
designated safety corridors in the Gulf of Aden” (国际社会已在亚丁湾海域划出指定
安全航道), sailors were entitled to disembark beforehand, and the company would be
responsible for covering the cost of their “travel fees” (旅费).99
Pirate attacks on mainland Chinese vessels further highlighted the danger of piracy to
the nation’s maritime commerce. First, in mid-November 2008, Somali pirates seized the
fishing boat Tianyu and held its twenty-four-man crew hostage.100 Three months later,
following a variety of Chinese diplomatic efforts, they freed the vessel and captives. The
warship Haikou collected the crew members and cared for them on board but apparently had no direct interaction with Somali pirates.101 It took PLAN mechanics sent to
Tianyu six days to render it able to sail again.102 A month after Tianyu’s seizure, on 17
December, the Chinese tanker Zhenhua 4 came under attack from nine pirates. The crew
retreated to unusually inaccessible living quarters and attempted to resist with makeshift
“Molotov cocktails”;103 however, the pirates did not withdraw until a Malaysian military
helicopter arrived.104
These incidents exemplified China’s troubles with piracy during 2008. From January
to November of that year, of 1,265 Chinese ships, eighty-three were attacked;105 several
were pirated.106 Makeshift measures advocated by MoT—such as evasive maneuvering,
deployment of water cannons, and improvised explosives—were proving inadequate.107
While COSCO ships had avoided being pirated entirely, their model defense measures
and all-Chinese teams could not be extended completely to many China-connected
ships.108 In 2009, Ju Chengzhi of China’s MoT recalled that before China’s initial warship
deployment, “when encountering such problems [i.e., pirating of Chinese ships], we
relied primarily on foreign diplomatic channels, coordinating with local governments
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to seek solutions, but [this] was not
very effective.”109 Addressing the surging piracy problem effectively clearly required not
uncoordinated stopgaps but decisive, comprehensive action from Beijing.
For all these reasons, by 2008 the Chinese public was pressing its leaders to intervene.
The media outlet Eastday reported that a survey showed that 86 percent of Chinese
“netizens” (active Internet users) supported a Gulf of Aden mission.110 Another survey
was reported by People’s Daily on 24 December 2008, just two days before the inaugural
deployment.111 The survey apparently included over seventeen thousand participants,
91.2 percent of whom supported the mission and 6.7 percent of whom opposed it.112
Chinese social networking websites, such as Weibo, captured some of the discontent felt
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by Chinese citizens as a result of Beijing’s initially hesitant response to Somali piracy.
Many of these netizens criticized Beijing for its inability to protect citizens living abroad,
and China’s leaders surely followed these comments and blog posts.113 Paradoxically, a
long-entrenched, authoritarian regime like China’s must in some respects be unusually
responsive to short-term public-opinion trends, as it lacks either reserves of enduring
ideological affinity or the political release valves of periodic elections and alternation
of parties in power that democratic states typically enjoy.114 Domestic political pressure
thus seems to have played a major role in heightening Beijing’s prioritization of the
piracy issue and in strengthening its ultimate response.
In a landmark interview, MoT official Ju Chengzhi revealed the calculus behind the
interagency genesis of China’s Gulf of Aden mission. He explained why Beijing finally
had to act:
Piracy was relatively rampant in September 2008. By October, most of China’s large
maritime shipping companies felt that pressure was too great. [Yet while] facing the threat
of piracy, they had no other choice but to persist [in their current] routes. Otherwise, not
only would [they] breach [their] contracts, [but also competitors] would take their share of
shipping. Accordingly, maritime shipping companies reported emergencies one after another, making requests for the government to dispatch warships to escort ships as quickly
as possible.115

This perceived urgency set the stage for swift interagency coordination of a decisive
whole-of-government response:
After we raised this item, [it] commanded everyone’s focus. Agencies such as the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the military, as well as some
experts researched [the matter] repeatedly, because this is not a simple measure; [it] relates
to a series of weighty issues such as [requisite] capabilities, supply [logistics], and international law. Everyone [thus] shared unanimous understanding of the urgency and severity
of this issue.116

From an international political perspective, China’s announcement that it would dispatch an escort task force to the Horn of Africa came as a surprise to few, particularly
since several other nations had already undertaken, or were preparing to undertake,
similar actions. For example, Russia, NATO countries, and India all announced antipiracy deployments before China did.117 Of course, Chinese naval officials were extremely
cautious in announcing the PLAN antipiracy mission, stipulating that it would protect
specifically commercial vessels from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan,
the only addition being “ships of international organizations [such as the UN World
Food Programme] that are carrying humanitarian supplies to Somalia.”118 This posture
conveniently allowed China to end its status as the only permanent United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) member not contributing to global maritime security and
thereby to enhance its international résumé as a “responsible stakeholder” (负责任的利
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益相关者).119 As an article in Modern Navy articulates further, “This is the fine embodiment of the Chinese navy carrying out Far Seas international duties, establishing
the righteous measure of shouldering the mission of international peaceful development, and even more the style of a ‘responsible great power’ [负责任大国].”120 A newly
published book, an introduction to the PLAN, states that the mission “embodies China’s
image as a responsible large country actively fulfilling its international obligations.”121
China’s antipiracy mission has also facilitated bilateral dialogues between Beijing and
other countries invested in the security of the Gulf of Aden, by providing opportunities for interactions between the PLAN and counterpart navies. Through joint exercises,
official visits, and information sharing, PLAN officers are establishing with their foreign
colleagues ties beneficial to bilateral confidence building.122 An article in the Xinhuarun International Herald Leader cites the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden operations as one of the
most successful cases of projecting Chinese soft power.123 These relationships are forged
through activities and exchanges on board either Chinese or counterpart naval vessels.
As antipiracy deployments have become a regular PLAN duty, escort crews have begun
disembarking in selected ports, including some not necessarily central to global antipiracy operations, and spending several days ashore to rest and recuperate. The core message of these exchanges is that China shares manifold security interests both with other
navies and with littoral states in the region; Beijing is eager to maximize the broader
political benefits of cooperating with other actors vis-à-vis antipiracy operations.124
China has further enhanced the underlying political gains of fighting piracy by expanding the scope of its escort operations to include foreign-flagged ships. While initially
escorting only then-prioritized mainland China–, Hong Kong–, Macau- and Taiwanflagged vessels, a flotilla under PLAN escort at any given time may now include seven to
ten foreign ships, which can view escort schedules online and register for free protection.125 Since China’s February 2009 Spring Festival holiday, the PLAN and MoT have
established routine procedures for escort services, based on maritime traffic conditions,
posting announcements on the China Shipowners’ Association (CSA) website by the
fifteenth of every month.126 In recent years, several PLAN rescues of both Chinese- and
foreign-flagged vessels have been reported on heavily by the Chinese media.127
Of course, it is not always the PLAN that is rescuing commercial vessels of China or other nations. Occasionally Chinese vessels are rescued by others, in several instances in recent years after having been captured. Most recently, the Iranian navy freed twenty-eight
sailors from the Chinese vessel Xianghuamen, which had been seized forty-five miles off
Iran’s southern port city of Jask in early April 2012.128 Xianghuamen is owned and operated by the Nanjing Ocean Shipping Company.129 In May 2011 a Chinese-flagged cargo
ship was pirated.130 On that occasion, all of the ship’s twenty-four crew members having
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withdrawn to its “safe room,” forces from India and NATO (with American and Turkish
air support) expelled the pirates and ensured the safety of the Chinese sailors.131
As noted above, because international antipiracy operations take place on a highly visible stage, they could potentially expose shortcomings of either China’s policy makers or
its sailors. Yet antipiracy in itself is a low-intensity military operation, far short of traditional warfare, and so provides an expansive arena for enhancing both domestic political
legitimacy and international relations through successful bilateral and multilateral cooperation. More broadly, as Li Ruijing underscores, there are soft-power gains to be made
from Far Seas escort operations, in the broader context of China’s national interests:
Currently, China’s South Sea is facing the unfavorable situation of being split up by “small
groups” [群小]. Under the prevailing international situation, however, directly using the
South China Sea problem “as a precursor” [为牵引], and relying on a “bright muscles”
[亮肌肉] method to “intimidate” each “claimant country” [声索国], will undoubtedly
push them toward the embrace of the outside power. Rather, by borrowing from the “East
Wind” [东风] of escorts, [we] can lower the China threat theory, in order to develop a
military capable of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.132

As Li explains, PLAN antipiracy operations are indeed being undertaken amid a complex maritime environment, one that includes competitive aspects, such as territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, that threaten to harm China’s military image. The
political dimension of the PLAN’s antipiracy operations must therefore be understood
as contributing a cooperative element within this larger context, rather than in isolation.

Piracy’s Military Ramifications for China
From a purely military standpoint, widespread Far Seas piracy provides enormous incentives for PLAN intervention. Chinese naval officials and crews gain what is for them
unprecedented operational experience and tests of their equipment by participating in
antipiracy missions abroad. A December 2012 Global Times article described the PLAN’s
maturation process through four years of antipiracy deployments as one of going from
“maritime rookies to confident sea dogs.”133 Upon embarking in the eleventh escort task
force in late 2011, Senior Capt. Zhou Bo summarized the comprehensive experience
to be gained: “The experience definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers
and sailors, but also for the durability and function of the ships. . . . And also it’s a great
challenge to the officers and sailors, not only physically, but also psychologically.”134 The
value of Far Seas experience to the PLAN was manifest even in the first deployment.
As South Sea Fleet political commissar Huang Jiaxiang remarked in March 2009, “The
escort mission accumulated experience and provided revelations for our armed forces
in performing diversified military tasks.”135 More broadly, as an article in Modern Navy
documented at the two-year point of the Gulf of Aden mission, “Contact is increasingly
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frequent, areas of cooperation are rapidly expanding. For [PLAN] escort personnel, [this
is] undoubtedly a good opportunity for discovering their own weaknesses, practicing
and improving themselves, [and] studying ‘strong points’ [长技] of others.”136
At the four-year mark of PLAN antipiracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden, People’s Daily ran
an article suggesting that escort operations to date had been successful in executing diverse maritime tasks.137 “Through the ‘grindstone’ [whetstone] of escort missions in the
past four years,” it stated, “the PLA Navy has tempered its capabilities for using, organizing, commanding and projecting military forces, and carrying out tasks in open seas in
an all-round way, and fully improved its capability for performing diversified military
missions.”138
Additionally, from the PLAN’s perspective, the antipiracy mission also helps to secure
budget share and ensure that the service will receive some of China’s most advanced
weapons and information technology.139 The PLAN also garners noteworthy prestige by
enjoying the greatest exposure abroad, the greatest diplomatic responsibilities, and the
greatest potential for international interaction in peacetime of China’s three military
services—ground forces, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and PLAN—and one branch
(the Second Artillery Force). Perhaps most significantly, persistent piracy attacks afford
Beijing a rationale for expanding its Far Seas military operations and for projecting
sustained force farther. As Liu Yonghong and Tang Fuquan of the PLAN’s Dalian Vessel
Academy write, “The expansion of maritime security frontiers means the frontiers will
further expand according to the requirements of the situation and our mission as well as
available and pertinent support. Not only should the frontiers cover the entire ‘maritime
areas under China’s jurisdiction’ but also ‘push out beyond China’ to protect her rights
abroad.”140 In 2012, Global Times reported that “China’s anti-piracy initiatives in Somalia
were further extended by 50 nautical miles (92.6 kilometers) eastward starting from 1
January 2010 according to the Ministry of National Defense, and China will also increase
its level of cooperation with other nations to fight against crimes at sea.”141
Besides these benefits, the operational gains for the PLAN from antipiracy operations are
tremendously important, particularly for a navy that has little experience with modern
combat—in fact, none whatsoever since the Johnson South Reef Skirmish (赤瓜礁海战)
of 1988. Chinese escort task forces typically include two warships and one supply ship,
which require roughly two weeks to travel the ten thousand kilometers from China’s
coast to the waters near Somalia.142 The destroyers, frigates, and landing ships chosen
are among China’s newest, most advanced warships. The personnel of a given escort
task force total roughly eight hundred, about 10 percent of whom are special operations
personnel.143 By the end of 2011 over eight thousand PLAN sailors had participated in at
least one Gulf of Aden deployment.144
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The antipiracy mission imposes special crew requirements: “With regard to crewing,
according to the actual situation of many Far Seas escort responsibilities, long voyages
absolutely need large numbers of long voyage command and support personnel aboard.
Currently [this] includes helicopter support crewmen, special operations personnel,
task force commanders, political journalists, etc. In all [the number of] personnel had
increased by about 50 percent, following the normalization of escort responsibilities, in
the future there may be fewer personnel from outside.”145 These sailors are some of the
PLAN’s finest, a reflection of the careful personnel selection process and the imperative
that they perform with distinction on the world stage.146
Selectees enjoy the prestige of being part of China’s first sustained Far Seas military
presence, one that dignifies the PLAN and China.147 In December 2012 Li Jian, captain
of an escort medical unit, declared, “Not every warship can access the high seas. Our
vessel is authorized to do so by the United Nations. For me and many sailors, it’s our
dream to sail into the high seas.”148 (Li was referring to the rare opportunity for Chinese
sailors to deploy in the Far Seas.) An October 2012 article from Liberation Army Daily,
the PLA’s premier mouthpiece, reveals that at least one Gulf of Aden veteran was using
his antipiracy experience to further PLAN development.149 Wang Hongmin, captain of
the guided-missile frigate Xuzhou during a 2009 Far Seas escort deployment, in October 2012 commanded the frigate during a “20-day-and-night high-sea training” of
the North Sea Fleet (NSF).150 The training emphasized “comprehensive defense and
ship-submarine-airplane integrated confrontation.”151 The PLAN has also recognized the
participation of women in antipiracy operations. A February 2013 China Military Online
article showed eight female sailors on board the guided-missile destroyer Harbin, and
according to the article, “Since December 2008, many batches of female sailors of the
PLA Navy have participated in the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden. Previously, they
had mainly undertaken such service and support work as medical treatment, translation
and culture.”152
Once deployed, PLAN sailors have the opportunity to distinguish themselves further
from other escort participants by earning honors and awards. One of these honors is the
“Top Ten Escort Pioneer” (十佳护航尖兵) honor, which was conferred on more than
two hundred sailors over the first seven escort deployments.153
In a sign that the Gulf of Aden mission represents so new an experience for the PLAN
as to require fundamentally new thinking, crewmen participate in various appropriate
cultural activities, such as “writing escort diaries, telling escort stories, creating escort
epigrams, singing escort songs, testing escort knowledge, performing escort programs,
and being escort pioneers.”154 Being at sea for months at a time, while psychologically
challenging in many respects, provides an excellent opportunity to indoctrinate PLAN
personnel in a way that complements their actual military duties. Li Yanhe of Liberation
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Army Daily writes that task forces “generate combat power through culture” (文化出战
斗力) and “constantly push soldiers to be brave vanguards” (不断催生官兵勇当先锋),
thereby forging a “willing-to-lead-in-the-front-lines fighting spirit” (敢打头阵的战斗精
神).155 The emphasis on “Far Seas” cultural activities demonstrates the PLAN’s eagerness
to build foundational ideological capacity for long-range missions, a capacity that it perceives as lacking since essentially all previous PLAN operations focused on the Near Seas.
The vice-director of the South Sea Fleet (SSF) Political Department, Chen Yanfeng, has
said, “While doing a good job of escorting and training, we also need to build comprehensive capacity through self-cultivation [lit., create a high-quality cultural journey].”156
In addition to experience for their personnel, PLAN aviation units also gain invaluable
operational know-how and insights through their contributions to antipiracy operations. For example, the units of the North Sea Fleet aviation branch deployed to the
Gulf of Aden have set multiple records during their five escort deployments, “including
the shortest time spent on shifting from one degree of combat readiness to another, the
longest distance of forward movement, the longest duration of single flight, the first
instance of operating without ground crew support, and the first successful attempt to
touch down on a ship’s deck for refueling without engine shutdown.”157 Furthermore,
Chinese scholars Liu Wei, Wang Changqin, Wan Shuixian, and Wang Jiangqi observe the
role of what they describe as “‘devil’ drones” in U.S. contributions to antipiracy efforts in
the Gulf of Aden, and assert, “With the expansion of our country’s interests, our air force
should [also] have the capability to protect our country’s interests in areas far away from
our country’s ‘aerial territory.’”158
Deployed sailors also receive some of the PLAN’s best, most intensive operational training. While the challenge presented by pirates is different from and less formidable than
that of an organized navy, PLAN antipiracy task forces operate in a highly visible, highstakes environment and occasionally are tasked with using force to deter or disperse pirates. Given the current tempo—fresh two-ship escort task forces are dispatched roughly
every three or four months159—China would need four or five years to give every
destroyer and frigate a chance to participate. (The U.S. Department of Defense estimates
that the PLAN possessed a total of seventy-five such vessels as of 2013).160 According
to People’s Navy, antipiracy deployments have played a paramount role in encouraging
integrative Far Seas training among various PLAN platforms.161
More important, however, is the transfer of knowledge, skills, and perspective that occurs within China’s navy upon the return of each escort group, increasing overall competency and professionalism. As military expert Zhu Jiangming puts it, “The PLAN does
not have warfighting responsibilities right now, and can obtain precious experience from
escorts in the Gulf of Aden.”162 The Gulf of Aden service of Pan Zhiqiang, a deputy division commander, is a case in point. Pan participated in four separate escort deployments
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between 2009 and 2011, and he views the mission as vital for China’s SLOC stability:
“One of the requirements is the protection of our investments and strategic transportation channels. The escort missions are toward these ends.”163 Perhaps most impressively,
the commanding officer of Weishanhu, Chen Zailiang, has participated in the first, second, fifth, and sixth deployments, contributing over ten thousand hours of service over
550 days.164 The aviation units of PLAN escort task forces are also well represented.165
Many pilots are senior in rank and have logged thousands of hours of flight time—over
four thousand for Wenzhou’s helicopter commander, Guo Qingxing.166 Pilot Hui Sheng
has participated in three escort deployments.167 According to Professor You Ji of the University of New South Wales, “The hours and sorties of helicopter pilots in a four-month
rotation in the Gulf of Aden far exceed their whole year’s flight time at home.”168
More broadly, as People’s Navy reported in 2011, over 50 percent of all officers and sailors in the seventh task force were on their second deployment to the region.169 This suggests, first, that a single deployment may not offer sufficient experience to train crews to
the level desired by PLAN leadership, and second, that the PLAN may be using the Gulf
of Aden mission to forge an elite group of sailors. Participation in antipiracy operations
is apparently affecting promotion rates. As a general rule, all other things being equal,
with the PLAN not having fought a war for decades, individuals who have participated
in Gulf of Aden deployments (or major exercises, some of which occur in the Far Seas
during the antipiracy mission) enjoy better chances of promotion than those who have
not.170
The notion of spreading knowledge and operational expertise is highlighted by the
rotation of antipiracy deployments among China’s three naval fleets.171 Long weaker and
less developed than the North Sea Fleet or East Sea Fleet (ESF), the rapidly strengthening SSF sent all five ships that made the first two antipiracy deployments. The ESF sent
a ship in the third round and has since occasionally done so. The first ten escort task
forces were composed of vessels from the SSF and ESF, but the NSF deployed the eleventh, in early 2012.172 Since the NSF’s deployment of the eleventh task force, the PLAN
has rotated Far Seas escort duties among its three fleets to maximize distribution of
operational experience.173 Chinese military observer Zhu Jiangming explains, “From my
point of view, [the reason for] initially selecting a SSF force was because the SSF was a
relatively more experienced fleet, and also because the South China Sea maritime region
is more similar to the conditions in the Gulf of Aden. Now having [dispatched] multiple
escort fleets, [the PLAN task forces are] beginning to enter a cyclic battle state; allowing the ESF and SSF time to replenish, while simultaneously letting the NSF task force
obtain practice.”174
PLAN strategists also reap substantial benefits by studying the management and support
associated with the antipiracy mission. The logistical demands of these deployments,
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which typically last for four months at a time (sometimes substantially longer), are unprecedented in Chinese military history.175 The logistics and planning involved were so
complex, in fact, that officials in China took nearly a year to settle into a satisfactory approach. PLAN leaders faced questions they had never had to answer before, such as how
much and what types of food and medicine should be stored on board for a combined
crew of nearly a thousand at sea for so long.176
Chinese naval expert Wang Haiyun asserts that China’s global naval capabilities are trailing its stature as an international power severely, especially with regard to “technological
progress” (技术先进性), “operational architecture” (作战体系), “telecommunications”
(通讯), “combat teamwork” (协同作战), and “military ideology and training” (军事
思想与训练).177 These operations, however, will enhance the Chinese navy’s ability to
perform future power-projection tasks more reliably.178
For instance, as Maj. Gen. Jin Yinan of China’s National Defense University has written,
“For a military, the results of participating in this kind of action are not just about gaining experience at combating pirates. It is even more about raising the ability to perform
missions on seas far away.”179 In the Somali operation PLAN escort fleets have improved
their capabilities related to operations with foreign navies, communications with other
ships in crowded international waters, and sustainment by underway replenishment
at a great distance from traditional logistical sources and bases.180 This first extended
transoceanic operation will give the PLAN an opportunity to refine fundamentally its
doctrine and practices for “blue water” (深蓝) missions, which are widely perceived to
be in their infancy.181 Political commissar Tang Gusheng of the SSF landing ship Kunlunshan remarked in 2011, “By sailing out of our coastal waters, the operation in the Indian
Ocean serves as a live drill for us.”182
The PLAN’s most advanced ships, such as Type 052 Luyang I and Luyang II area-airdefense destroyers and Type 054 Jiangkai air-defense frigates, have been deployed in the
Gulf of Aden.183 To these ships are assigned the PLAN’s most decorated officers, who
have participated in previous escort deployments, thereby signaling the importance of
this mission to both the CMC and State Council.184 The NSF’s deputy commander, Yang
Junfei, led the eleventh task force, continuing the recent trend of sending quite senior
officers on these deployments. Under Yang, the eleventh task force evidently enhanced
intelligence collection and adopted a more preventive approach to mitigating pirate attacks.185 According to Liberation Army Daily, “the 11th naval escort task force of the Navy
of the Chinese PLA further intensified its efforts to collect intelligence on pirate activities and made various contingency plans, especially the countermeasures to be adopted
when the escort task force or the escorted ships are attacked by pirates.”186
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Moreover, the PLAN’s niche role as the vanguard of PLA international noncombat operations presumably gives naval officials a bargaining chip that will pay dividends in the
form not only of higher budgetary allocations but of praise in official media outlets. For
the past decade or so, the PLAN, like other non-ground-force services, has been growing
in representation and apparent influence in China’s highest military decision-making
bodies, such as the State Council, CMC, and various PLA administrative units (e.g., PLA
general departments and other central PLA institutions).187 There are indications that
China’s military as a whole aims to become more streamlined and may be planning to
reorganize its current regional setup in a more outward-focused structure, which would
likely further enhance the PLAN’s role.188
The PLAN also garners significant prestige from being China’s only military branch with
major diplomatic responsibilities, those associated with port calls, official exchanges,
and joint (i.e., “combined,” or multinational) onboard training in the Gulf of Aden.189
PLAN crews, more than units of any other Chinese military branch or service, personify
China’s military abroad. Indeed, from 2002 to January 2012 nineteen of the Chinese
military’s forty-one total joint training events and exercises were undertaken at sea by
China’s navy.190 That said, until recently PLAN sailors in the Gulf of Aden have been
highly reluctant to engage their foreign counterparts carrying out similar operations.191
Cai Qing, deputy captain of the frigate Yantai, acknowledged, “At first, when sailors on
foreign warships greeted us, we were so shy that sometimes we pretended not to have
heard them. . . . We gradually realized the importance of exchanges.”192 Li Daguang, an
NDU professor and naval officer, refers in a 2011 People’s Navy article to engagement
with other navies almost as if the PLAN were reluctant about it: “Facing greetings and
invitations, the Chinese navy, in accordance with the principles of active pragmatism
and autonomy, engages in exchanges and cooperation with navies of the world.”193
Nonetheless, through these exchanges PLAN crews take pride in, and are praised for,
presenting a powerful and competent China to the world.194 The escort mission has thus
helped realize the principle that “naval officials are one-half foreign diplomats” [海军军
官就是半个外交官].195 This ideal was embodied more broadly in a September 2012 Liberation Army Daily article, “Top Ten Firsts of Chinese Military Diplomacy from 2002 to
2012.” According to this authoritative tabulation, the PLAN was involved in five of them,
including China’s first “round the world” maritime voyage, in 2002 (ranked second); its
first launching of joint maritime patrols, with Vietnam in 2005 (fifth); its first deployment of ships for the international escort mission, in 2008 (eighth); its first organization of multinational naval and air force events, in 2009 (ninth); and its first dispatch of
troops to evacuate Chinese personnel overseas, in 2011 (tenth).196

30

china maritime studies

As Beijing’s military grand strategy transforms itself from an air- and sea-based regional
“counterintervention” (antiaccess/area-denial) approach to one that also increasingly
includes at least low-intensity Far Seas projection, China’s navy assumes a growing share
of China’s national security responsibilities. Far Seas piracy patrols provide an otherwise
largely unavailable vehicle for testing new platforms and bridging the gap between development and operational capacity. Some of the experience gained off the Horn of Africa
with platforms, intelligence and information-technology systems, and logistical arrangements would be transferable to a contingency around China’s maritime periphery,
such as Taiwan or in the South China Sea. For PLAN officials, this indeed is a welcome
opportunity to sharpen their service’s combat readiness during a relatively peaceful era
of national development, particularly with respect to personnel competence.197
Undergirding all the military benefits that the PLAN derives from Far Seas antipiracy
operations is the fact that they have allowed Beijing to establish a preliminary foothold
for future expansion into the Indian Ocean, the vast maritime area between China
and the African coastline. The antipiracy mission has served as an effective channel
for sustaining a presence in the IOR. PLAN task forces constantly transit the Indian
Ocean and have called in a wide variety of its ports. The PLAN presence in the IOR has
renewed concerns in many quarters, particularly among Indian officials and observers, over Beijing’s growing commercial presence in the region.198 For example, China
has contributed to commercial port development in such countries as Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and the Maldives.199 Yet cooperation between China and these states is purely
commercial at present.200 Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian (Ret.) of the PLA has cautioned
not only that China’s use of ports in IOR nations carries heavy political baggage but also
that converting facilities in such locations as Gwadar, Hambantota, or Chittagong would
require substantial expenditures.201 Amid speculation that China will develop military
facilities in such locations as Gwadar and Seychelles, China Ministry of National Defense
spokesperson Geng Yansheng declared in March 2013 that China currently possesses no
overseas military bases, and that the notion of a Chinese “String of Pearls” strategy is
“totally groundless.”202 Still, the deployment of escort task forces has allowed Beijing to
project military forces directly across the Indian Ocean without heavy scrutiny, at least
outside the immediate region.
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C HAPTER TW O

Institutional Underpinnings
Domestic Political and Policy Issues

T

he economic, political, and military dimensions discussed earlier help to clarify
Beijing’s motivations for intervening in the Gulf of Aden, yet they constitute an
incomplete account. Numerous additional institutional factors have either driven or
incentivized China’s participation in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Internal Drivers
A perceived lack of cost-effective alternatives for addressing piracy on the Far Seas
pushed Beijing to send PLAN forces to protect its interests. Furthermore, Beijing felt
compelled to prevent China’s being seen as impotent compared to other large—and not
so large—states. Finally, as viewed within China’s highest policy-making circles, deploying PLAN vessels implicitly allowed China to begin what many civil and military leaders
viewed as the next phase in China’s twenty-first-century military modernization.
Chinese scholars like Jiang Lei of Nanjing Navy Command College generally agree that
as China’s stake in the global economy grows and the number of Chinese citizens working overseas increases, China’s civilian and military leadership must devote the resources
needed to expand the PLAN’s overseas capabilities adequately to defend these interests.1
Deliberations concerning how to respond to piracy have fueled larger internal debates
over how, where, and to what extent China should project force overseas to protect
national interests.
Of course, at the time of the PLAN’s initial deployment, not all Chinese observers
were completely supportive. For example, Ma Xiaojun, a professor in the Central Party
School’s International Strategic Studies Institute, stated in reference to the Gulf of Aden
mission, “Another kind of objective is to do things in a sound and practical way, doing whatever we can according to our capability. If you truly have the capability to do
long-term escort duty off the east coast of Africa, why do you not first subdue the South
China Sea pirates? The international community, especially ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations], hopes more that China will make more effort to crack down
on pirates in the South China Sea region. This possibility is more realistic.”2
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The hesitancy with which CCP and PLA officials initially deliberated how to respond to
growing Gulf of Aden piracy is not surprising, given Beijing’s traditional stance of strict
nonintervention in other states’ affairs.3 One of the most thorough accounts available to
date of the genesis and initial stages of the mission documents that it took nearly a year
to decide finally to send PLAN forces through the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa.4
Ultimately, alternative approaches considered simply proved ineffective or infeasible.
Chinese merchants wary of pirates could not afford the premiums charged by private
security firms at international-market levels and had already begun rerouting around
the Cape of Good Hope. As a substitute for circumnavigating Africa, it is also possible
to hug the Indian coast; since late 2010 many vessels have done so.5 However, while that
option allows ships to avoid (narrowly) the rapidly expanding zone vulnerable to piracy,
it incurs significant excess costs, as detailed above. Further, Chinese inability to meet
the delivery dates of rigid shipping contracts negotiated far in advance would threaten
market share.6
Another dimension of the internal debates over piracy related to the aspirations of
China’s public and leadership to see their nation become a great power in the twentyfirst century. The “China dream” articulated by General Secretary Xi Jinping in early
December 2012 has resonated throughout Chinese society, reflecting official and public
desires for national rejuvenation.7 Indeed, for the past three years China’s “perfect rec
ord” of antipiracy patrols has been repeatedly celebrated in Chinese official statements,
scholarship, and media.8
The international and domestic legal issues associated with piracy also constituted
a key element of Chinese internal debates and continue to do so. Antipiracy operations exemplify the legal challenges that China’s military faces as it continues to fulfill
diverse military tasks. CMC Legal Department vice-director Wang Weihong drew a
direct connection: “Military operations, in reality, are also a type of legal warfare.”9
More specific expertise and interpretation were furnished by Capt. Xing Guangmei,
director of the World Naval Research Division, director of the Legal Research Office
(法律研究室), and a research fellow at the Navy Military Studies Research Institute.
A well-published, recognized, and influential expert on international military legal
issues, Xing helped her organization play a key role in determining the PLAN’s legal
approach for the Gulf of Aden task forces. An article from Southern Weekend described
her role and contributions:
In mid-October of last year (2008), China’s navy officially started discussion of and
preparations for operations to “send forces to Somalia [for] escorts.” At the time, at
closed meetings between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Transportation,
everyone unanimously called for sending naval forces for escorts. Xing Guangmei’s work
on the legal basis [for the mission] started from this point in time. . . . The Headquarters
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of the General Staff of the PLA began [discussion and due diligence] in mid-November,
[which continued] through the time when the navy officially set sail on December 26. Xing
Guangmei and her colleagues needed to [provide legal advice concerning] the following
questions: What kind of military operations are military antipiracy operations? [Is one]
able to dispatch troops [to conduct antipiracy operations]? What will military personnel
do [once] deployed? If during the voyage [warships] do not [successfully] save ships victimized [by piracy], [then] what kinds of responsibilities will warship commanders bear?
What to do if [Chinese forces] enter Somali territory?10

Xing believed that the mission was justified legally, but that “there exist [areas of
ambiguity] in the regulations of prevailing law. . . . The biggest shortcoming is [that]
a necessary condition for a crime to constitute piracy is based on [the actor’s] having
private goals.” She explained that if pirate-like activities had a political motive attached
to them—that is, if pirates and terrorists came together on the high seas—then unless a
new UNSC resolution were passed, nations would have no way to expand military operations against pirates in international waters.11 Xing’s “strict constructionist” approach
to interpreting international law is reflective not only of her other legal research but also
of Beijing’s approaches thereto in general.12
Similarly, referring to stipulations in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and in
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Meng Yan writes,
Looking from practical situations, Somali piracy certainly does not fully meet the abovementioned treaty regulations. First, Somali pirates differ from traditional pirates, they
are both citizens and pirates. Second, the location of Somali pirates’ criminal behavior
is outside of “the limits of the high seas and national jurisdictional waters,” and still is
conducted in territorial waters. Somali pirate behavior is different from the characteristics
regulated in international law, and presents a certain level of difficulty for naval ships of
every country with respect to distinguishing, pursuing and punishing pirates.13

Liu Jiehua of People’s Public Security University, however, asserts that the legal foundations do exist for China’s navy to punish Somali piracy behavior, through a combination
of international and domestic laws and regulations. She writes,
Based on a correct understanding of the crime of piracy, both international law or Chinese
domestic law provide a legal basis for our right to exercise jurisdiction over piracy crimes,
and also establish a firm legal foundation for China to better punish Somali acts of piracy.
According to related regulations of international treaties, [and] according to a series of
UNSC resolutions, under the agreement of the Somali Transitional Federal Government
[TFG], in accordance with regulations on the determination of jurisdiction and concrete
confirmations of criminal charges within Chinese criminal law, we can see that China’s
dispatching warships to Somalia to serve as escorts, and punishing Somali pirate crimes, is
a lawful act.14

PLAN officer Zhao Xiaobin raises an entirely separate issue, arguing that current
international laws for dealing with captured pirates are inconsistent and inadequate.
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He states, “Considering the dangers posed by pirates, evidence collection, prosecution
procedures and other problems, our navy mainly takes measures to drive them away or
disarm them.” Indeed, the PLAN has been notably hesitant to detain pirates, and this
defensive strategy is likely to persist until Beijing feels that an acceptable baseline of
international law has been established.15
PLAN lawyer Zheng Ren commented on the legal aspects of Chinese naval escort operations in a 2011 People’s Navy article.16 According to Zheng, the majority of legal questions surrounding China’s naval escort activities in waters outside China’s periphery are
largely unanswered as well as neglected. The article quotes her as saying,
There exist some empty spaces with regard to the systemic legal aspects of Chinese naval
escort operations. We should urgently research relevant international maritime laws and
the maritime laws of each nation, [and] sort out the rights and duties of Chinese warships
carrying out maritime military operations; simultaneously, [we] should actively research
and draft detailed rules for the authority and implementation of Chinese military participation in maritime operational law; for example, problems such as attacking, catching, detaining and extraditing pirates and terrorists, [as well as] defining the range of navigational
safety for Chinese warships, [and] how to exercise the right to undertake acts of rescue for
[Chinese] naval ships and aircraft in the territorial waters or ports of other countries.17

Jin Yongming of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) offered in late 2011
a different opinion, arguing that China in fact needs domestic law reform to punish
pirates more effectively. “China is facing problems with its domestic legal system that
should be improved quickly,” Jin wrote,
because international laws, including those within UNSC resolutions, cannot be directly
applied to Chinese domestic laws. [Rather, they] typically need to be turned into domestic
laws, or domestic standards that can be directly applied to international law need to be
drafted. China therefore needs to develop relevant laws banning piracy or add provisions
within Chinese criminal law for attacking pirate behavior aimed at Chinese naval escort
operations in waters near Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.18

More specifically, Chinese interpretations of exclusive economic zones have been
weighted in favor of coastal states’ parochial concerns.19 Generally Beijing would require
a coastal state’s consent to deploy military force in its jurisdictional waters before actually dispatching the PLAN to them; otherwise the PLAN’s actions might be seen as a
breach of the coastal state’s sovereign rights and interests and thus a hypocritical act.20
In keeping with this policy, Beijing went to great lengths at least to arrange the appearance that Somali authorities, such as they are, and the Somali people had consented to
and supported Beijing’s deployment of antipiracy forces.21 As Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian
(Ret.) points out, “In history, some nations that have executed global offensive strategies
have been enthusiastic about ‘new borders’ and ‘high borders’ and demarcated everywhere they have gone as their interest boundaries. China is different from them, and it
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does not need to apply any of these concepts.”22 The existence of internal disagreements
over the perceived legality of the Far Seas escort mission is suggested both by the time
it took Beijing to formulate a unilateral policy and thereafter by the reluctance (which
is ongoing) of the PLAN to risk capturing Somali pirates, and thus having to deal with
such prisoners. It has avoided that risk by following extremely restrictive rules of engagement (ROE).23
To be sure, PLAN ROE do permit some action. Pirates often ignore initial verbal and
visual warnings not to approach civilian vessels, thereby requiring PLAN personnel to
fire flares and sometimes even warning shots. According to You Ji, “by the end of the
first two years of the mission, the escort fleet had engaged pirates twenty-one times with
live fire and thereby saved thirty commercial ships.”24 The deputy head of the ninth task
force’s special operations unit, Yang Wu, reportedly “disclosed that his sailors were under
a three-second firing-readiness order.”25 A 2010 article in Modern Navy defended China’s
restricted approach: “According to international laws and relevant laws and regulations,
the Chinese navy’s operations are both practical and effective, as well as reasonable, measured, and backed by evidence; [while] driving away pirates, making ample preparations,
[developing] scientific policy, [having] effective command, and moving quickly [allow
the PLAN] to play an effective deterrent role.”26
It is important to note that Beijing did not deploy military units in the Gulf of Aden
until the UNSC adopted in 2008 three resolutions specifically authorizing the international community to intervene in Somali waters.27 The continuation of the PLAN’s Gulf
of Aden mission still rests legally on Security Council resolutions authorizing states to
combat piracy along the Somali coast.28 Col. Yang Yujun, deputy director of the Information Affairs Office and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, stated in
December 2012:
Regarding the question of escort operations in the future, in November of this year the UN
Security Council passed a resolution that once again extended by one year the authority
of the various countries and regional organizations to crack down on piracy and armed
hijacking along the coast of Somalia. Based on this resolution by the UN Security Council,
escort vessel formations by the Chinese Navy will continue to fulfill escort tasks in the Gulf
of Aden and the waters off of Somalia.29

Moreover, China publicly supports the UN’s authority to organize international efforts
against piracy, with Wang Min stating in late 2012 that “we support the coordination
role played by the UN in this regard. It is important to enrich and improve cooperation
mechanisms, enhance information sharing, effectively prosecute and bring those involved in piracy to trial so as to form synergy in our fight against piracy.”30 In a January
2009 article in Modern Navy, Capt. Xing Guangmei highlights three prickly legal issues
related to fighting piracy—using violence against Somali pirates, exhibiting antipiracy
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behavior in Somalia’s sovereign maritime space and airspace, and bringing antipiracy
operations into Somali continental territory. She cites three instruments of international
law in support of escorts and the use of violence against pirates: UNSC Resolution 1816,
UNSC Resolution 1838, and the 1982 UNCLOS. Xing criticizes several navies for not
abiding by international law when initially dispatching antipiracy forces. France, she
argues, did not obtain approval from Somalia’s TFG before entering its waters in April
2008. India, for its part, in November 2008, sank (killing fifteen sailors) a suspected
pirate craft that the IMO subsequently verified was a Thai fishing vessel that had lost its
way.31
These factors, combined with the domestic preoccupation of Chinese policy makers with
the Wenchuan earthquake, which devastated Sichuan Province in 2008, help to explain
further why Beijing was determined to finalize a course of action quickly and decisively.
In addition, Beijing’s reluctance to work within the framework of existing international
piracy law, which Chinese officials view as weak and underdeveloped, probably helped to
spur consensus that China’s navy should act on its own and not under a coalition’s aegis.

Policy Processes
The confluence of the internal and external drivers outlined above catalyzed China’s
decision to participate in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. These factors also
dictated the political process of translating plans into practice. As has been pointed out
by Erik Lin-Greenberg, “the driving forces behind China’s decision to participate in antipiracy operations can be categorized as either realist or idealist.”32 Realist motivations
include “a desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide
opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLA’s capabilities in military operations other than war,” while idealistic forces include China’s wish to protect regional
and global security.33 Lin-Greenberg also offers evidence that China’s mission may prioritize image building over operational performance at times, reasoning, “While China’s
anti-piracy operation safeguards Chinese shipping vessels, it offers little protection to
Chinese fishermen sailing off the coast of Somalia. The lack of protection in these fishing areas is surprising given that the first Chinese ship hijacked by Somali pirates was the
Tianyu 8 fishing vessel with its 24-member crew in November 2008.”34
Practically speaking, Chinese leaders were likely reluctant to join any of the three multilateral antipiracy coalitions—Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), NATO, or European
Union Naval Forces Somalia / Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR)—because all of
them were under Western command, whereas the UN had no multinational antipiracy
mechanism in place.35 In any case, Chinese leaders may have feared that operating under
the umbrella of one of these organizations would risk exposing China’s naval capabilities
to an uncomfortable degree.36 It is also worth mentioning that China was the last of all
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permanent UNSC members to commit forces to the Gulf of Aden.37 It faced considerable pressure from the international community and from its domestic populace to act.38
Beijing nevertheless was uneasy about integrating itself into one of the prevailing transnational mechanisms. This policy bind may explain the surprisingly quick and effective
coordination observed among China’s MoT, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the
PLAN, all of which cooperated with unusual alacrity in late 2008 to craft a framework
for the PLAN’s antipiracy mission and thereby establish an operational foundation.39 A
symposium held by these three entities, as well as the Ministry of Commerce, in early
December further formalized the policy process.
Notwithstanding this appearance of being hurried or even rushed, however, the policy
process settled on represented in fact the culmination of longer-term planning by Chinese naval officials. Scholars such as Li Jie and Huang Li suggest that China’s navy had
been assessing the prospects of such an unprecedented mission for some time and was
simply waiting for a favorable environment to take action.40 You Ji offers the following
interpretation of the decision making behind the PLAN’s mission:
Soon after the first pirate attack on Chinese ships in the Gulf of Aden in May 2008, strategists in the [Navy Military Studies] Research Institute . . . and the PLA National Defense
University began discussing the feasibility of an escort mission there. After the completion
of various new ship designs, the PLAN could not wait to test its new “teeth.” A naval consensus on escort was discussed by Maj. Gen. Jin Yinan (金一南) in an interview broadcast
in November 2008. The Central Military Commission (CMC) quickly approved the navy’s
plan. In the meantime, Chinese diplomats worked frantically to acquire an invitation
from the Somali government for the escort mission. Beijing announced on 20 December
2008, only four days after UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1851 was passed, that
a three-ship detachment would be dispatched to the Gulf of Aden. The rapid decision
process reflected the navy’s eagerness to grab this opportunity, with unprecedented CMC
support.41

From the first deployment, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden mission has been managed jointly
by the MoT, the MoFA, and the PLAN.42 This sharing of responsibility among government organs requires considerable coordination.43 The MoT essentially plays the important role of coordinator, matching foreign commercial vessels with PLAN warships,
otherwise unavailable to them.44 It solicits applications from foreign merchant vessels
desiring PLAN escort services and proposes an escort to the task force.45 Once the PLAN
has finalized its plan, the MoT guides the merchant ships to the point at which they are
to meet the PLAN escorts.46 It also helps coordinate and plan port visits for refueling and
replenishing in foreign countries, as well as official onboard exchanges between Chinese
crewmen and their counterparts.47 MoT official Ju Chengzhi emphasizes the interagency
nature of escort command:
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As for the [coordination] mechanism, the Navy is in primary command of the escorts; the
MoT coordinates and cooperates with the Navy. The largest characteristic of these escorts
is “civil-military cooperation, military-political cooperation.” [To] conduct effective
escorts, it is necessary to ensure that a relatively smooth, high-efficiency command system
is formed during this process. This command system is not a unidirectional command
model, but rather an information chain cycle: between the MoT and Navy, between the
Navy and warships, between warships and commercial ships, and between commercial
ships and the MoT.48

There is also evidence that the MoT plays also a role in stimulating antipiracy cooperation between China and other states, as well as in handling press releases. In August
2011 it cohosted with the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore a conference
entitled “Partnerships against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.”49 Several Chinese and
foreign media outlets have cited announcements by MoT spokespeople of the departures and return journeys of escort task forces.50 MoT officials are typically present
during videoconferences between escort task forces and military leaders in China, such
as when in January 2011 Wu Shengli and other naval officials thanked the PLAN escort forces in the Gulf of Aden for their service.51 In any event, since the first deploying
PLAN vessels—Wuhan, Haikou, and Weishanhu—left Sanya Port in Hainan Province
for the Gulf of Aden in late December 2008, arrangements for successive PLAN escort
task forces have become increasingly institutionalized and provide an unusual example
of well-coordinated Chinese government action across ministries.
Escort formations have comprised roughly eight hundred personnel on two warships and a supply ship, and each has been away from home port between four and
six months.52 China’s 2008 national defense white paper made no explicit mention of
antipiracy deployments, despite a 26 December 2008 announcement that China’s navy
would be sending three ships to the Gulf of Aden. The 2010 white paper reviewed the
first two years of China’s antipiracy mission. The most recent biennial report, released in
April 2013, provides the most comprehensive coverage of China’s antipiracy operations
in the series thus far.53

The economic, political, military, and institutional factors that led the Chinese government to participate in Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations catalyzed as well China’s
first sustained overseas naval mission. This has brought the PLAN a measure of welldeserved pride, reflected in Liberation Army Daily’s 2011 report that Chinese naval
vessels would fly larger, brighter ensigns by the year’s end to reflect the perpetually
expanding role the PLAN is playing in security throughout the world.54 That symbolic
upgrade reflects the heightened status of the PLAN, which is enjoying, as a result of the
Gulf of Aden mission, more opportunities for international exposure via official visits
and joint exercises than do either the ground forces or PLAAF. The emphasis attached
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to the flags also reflects China’s commitment to joining the ranks of great powers at sea.
According to maritime specialist Ni Lexiong, “The flag change is not only part of the
PLA’s modernisation, but also indicates its determination to be a sea power, because all
its new standards have been learned from Western maritime powers like the US.”55
Developments within China further demonstrate that the Gulf of Aden mission is a
major source of Chinese pride. For example, as mentioned earlier, the missile destroyers Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen and frigate Zhoushan were opened for public
visits in ports throughout the NSF, ESF, and SSF in late December 2012.56 Spectators at
the overwhelmingly popular events, who obtained free tickets “through companies and
institutions,” were able to watch antipiracy drills and videos on PLAN escort operations
since 2008.57
The same factors that initially compelled Beijing to deploy PLAN escort forces to the
waters off the coast of Somalia have continued to guide China’s antipiracy operations for
the more-than-four years since. The following chapter surveys the antipiracy efforts of
other navies in the Gulf of Aden, as well as how China perceives and interacts with these
forces.
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C HAPTER THREE

China’s Views on Multilateral Coordination

G

iven the transnational economic and political damage that piracy wreaks, the vast
area of the western Indian Ocean in which pirates attack, the large number of
merchant ships traversing these waters, the diversity of flag states responsible for them,
and the resource-intensiveness of naval response options, it is most beneficial for navies
around the world to act in unison to protect vulnerable maritime regions. Accordingly,
numerous regional and international antipiracy mechanisms have been established in
key strategic areas on the basis of this principle. These systems have achieved important
gains in reducing pirate attacks in such areas as the Gulf of Aden. Nonetheless, the Chinese government has chosen that the PLAN is to act unilaterally, albeit in parallel with
international efforts.

Collective Action against Piracy: Groups and Authorities
Dozens of states in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa have joined the collective
fight against pirates in the Gulf of Aden.1 The navies of countries providing support for
antipiracy activities in the region—save for China, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, and Russia—have primarily operated directly under one of several multilateral coalition forces.
These are the U.S. Navy–led Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO’s Operation
Ocean Shield, and the EU’s Operation Atalanta, sometimes referred to as the “three
forces” operating in and near the Gulf of Aden. A voluntary coordination mechanism
called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), which is now reported to be
cochaired rotationally by CMF, NATO, and EU NAVFOR, has recently enhanced interaction among independent actors like China and the above-mentioned organizations.
Besides operational actors, various multilateral agencies, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia created after UNSC Resolution 1851, are involved in the fight against piracy. These entities
regularly engage with navies fighting piracy through SHADE.
Coalition Maritime Forces. CMF, the first sustained military presence in the Gulf of Aden,
is headed by the U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT) and consists of
Combined Task Forces (CTFs) 150, 151, and 152.2 It is tasked with safeguarding maritime security in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and
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Indian Ocean. A twenty-nine-member multinational coalition, CMF’s presence as an
antipiracy force off the Horn of Africa can be traced to 2008, when CTF-150, which has
a much broader, post-9/11 national-defense and regional-security mission than piracy
alone, helped outline a maritime security patrol area in the Gulf of Aden to facilitate safe
passage for commercial vessels. In January 2009, CTF-150’s piracy-combating function
was taken over by CTF-151 (CTF-150 still conducts other operations in the region, such
as counterterrorism; CTF-152 operates in the Persian Gulf).
CTF-151 and its members have helped to lower pirate attacks dramatically. CTF
members often help patrol the “internationally recommended transit corridor” (IRTC)
which was established by the Maritime Security Center—Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
of EU NAVFOR in 2009. The IRTC is designed to minimize maritime congestion of
international vessels and Somali and Yemeni fishermen. The United States has advised
all American-flagged merchant shipping to travel through the IRTC established by CMF.
NAVCENT’s command headquarters in Bahrain serves as the base for CTF activities.
Other major contributors to CMF include Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and Yemen.3 CTF-151 has been commanded by naval officers from Denmark,
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Pakistan, which at this
writing heads the task force.4
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO’s antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden have
undergone three stages. Initially, NATO action was a response to calls in late 2008 from
Ban Ki-moon, secretary-general of the United Nations, to provide escorts for World
Food Programme vessels. These escorts, which were combined with NATO deterrence
patrols in the waters off Somalia, were followed by Operation Allied Protector (OAP),
which assumed a broader mission set involving antipiracy operations around the Horn
of Africa. Allied Protector was under way from March to August 2009;5 the third phase,
Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) (Task Force 508), began that month, replacing OAP. 6
NATO’s relevant forces in the region had preexisting mandates and thus its initial focus
was not to monitor ships transiting the IRTC.
European Union. The EU’s Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR Task Force 465) was
operationally established in December 2008 as the first operation of the European
Union Naval Force; it was tasked with promoting maritime security off the coast of
Somalia by protecting humanitarian vessels and suppressing piracy.7 EU NAVFOR’s
initial mandate was reportedly limited to protecting World Food Programme shipping of humanitarian aid, while commercial shipping protection was of secondary
importance. This eventually changed as Somali piracy continued to spread outwards.
To date, France, Spain, and Germany have contributed the most ships and equipment
to the mission. While it has not always maintained a warship helping to monitor the
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IRTC, the United Kingdom contributed the location of the EU NAVFOR headquarters
and provided the majority of its staff, and hence has had a constant presence in EU
antipiracy efforts since their inception. In early 2012 the EU reaffirmed its commitment to suppressing piracy off the Horn of Africa by extending the Atalanta mandate
through December 2014.8 Moreover, the EU has recently made progress in developing
systems for cross navy cooperation in antipiracy operations. At a two-day symposium
in early 2012 it showcased the Mercury Network–based system created in 2009 that
allows by-the-minute assessments of piracy conditions.9 On 14 May 2012, EU NAVFOR
helicopters fired on a Somali beach at Haradheere, 220 miles north of Mogadishu. According to an EU military official, this night raid was meant to “make life as difficult
for pirates on land as we’re making it at sea.” It was the first time that the EU’s antipiracy mission had attempted to suppress Somali pirates onshore. The assault reportedly
destroyed pirate speedboats, fuel supplies, and an arms depot.10
The United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence and Security Review and China’s 2010 defense
white paper, taken together, suggest that European nations and China are both eager to
enhance cooperation against emerging nontraditional security threats.11 This willingness is reflected in the increasing number of official visits and cooperation agreements
between Chinese and European military officials. The United Kingdom, for its part, has
been particularly receptive to China’s growing role in UN peacekeeping.12 In early November 2012, China’s twelfth task force hosted the EU NAVFOR commander on board
the guided-missile frigate Yiyang for an exchange of views on antipiracy operations.13
The “three forces” combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and adjacent waterways collectively operate an average of nine ships at any given time and complete ninety maritime
patrol and reconnaissance aircraft sorties monthly.14 Increasingly, these task forces interface through SHADE, which seats the “three forces” and various independent deployers,
such as China, at the same table.
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction. SHADE, which has gained recognition in recent
years, meets quarterly in Bahrain. All naval ships or convoys fighting piracy are considered affiliated members. SHADE is not an organization but a facilitating venue. SHADE
meetings were initially cochaired by CMF and EU NAVFOR. With NATO also having helped cochair more recent meetings, SHADE seeks to avoid redundancies within
naval-task-force and independent-deployer operations. SHADE was originally established by EU NAVFOR, NATO, and CMF because they all recognized the “benefits of a
loose confederation of the willing.” After writing SHADE’s Terms of Reference, which
explains its mandate and functions, the three parties decided that a tri-chairmanship
was most suitable. SHADE is funded by the United States; however, it is not simply
American led, as U.S. Central Command and U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command do
not assign any tasking and all involved navies maintain sovereignty and vetoes over their
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participation.15 SHADE meetings, often attended by manifold antipiracy stakeholders—
including representatives from navies, governments, businesses, and nongovernmental
organizations—are reported to be marked by a collegial atmosphere based on the common goal of eradicating piracy.16
SHADE’s core mission is to “ensure effective coordination and de-confliction of military
resources and operations in combating piracy.”17 The “success formula” for eradicating
piracy, according to SHADE officials, is a combination of joint military and industry
responses to piracy and socioeconomic development in the pirates’ countries of origin.18
SHADE’s twenty-third meeting was held in March 2012, hosted by CMF and chaired by
Capt. Phil Haslam of the Royal Navy, representing EU NAVFOR; it met again in Bahrain
in June, September, and December of that year.19 The March meeting brought together
approximately 150 delegates from navies, international organizations, and the shipping industry.20 Most recently, representatives from thirty-one countries met in Bahrain
on 19 March 2013 for the twenty-seventh SHADE Conference.21 One expert testifying
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2012 praised
SHADE for bringing CTF-151, NATO, EU NAVFOR, and China closer to meaningful
cooperation, even suggesting that a SHADE-type model of multilateral coordination
could be applied to various land-based counterterrorism operations.22
Parties involved appear unanimously to perceive SHADE’s efforts as positive and successful. For example, South Korea’s Rear Adm. Anho Chung, who held alternating duties
as Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden Coordinator for CTF-151 (CMF), CTF-465 (EU
NAVFOR), and CTF-508 (NATO Ocean Shield) between June and September 2012,
stated that “out of 5,500 merchant vessels that transited through the Gulf of Aden during
this period there were a total of 3 piracy attacks and none successfully hijacked,” and
that the “efforts of CMF, EUNAVFOR, [and] NATO as well as other independent nations
including Japan, Republic of Korea, China, Russia, Malaysia and India all contributed
to safeguarding the high risk areas by providing a naval presence and leading convoys
through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor.”23
According to U.S. naval officials, media reports that China was to assume chairmanship
of SHADE are erroneous. China reportedly lobbied to chair SHADE as early as November 2009 but was unsuccessful.24 While English-fluent Senior Col. Zhou Bo has attended
all twenty-seven SHADE meetings thus far, Chinese chairmanship would mean giving
an independent state, rather than a multilateral organization, a leading role in SHADE.25
While all independent deployers have seats at the main table during SHADE meetings,
no representative of an independent navy has ever chaired the mechanism. According
to SHADE’s Terms of Reference, “In order to be eligible to chair SHADE, a nation or
coalition must provide enduring assets available for task allocation within the IRTC
(patrol boxes) and actively coordinate in accordance with the provisions of the IRTC
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Coordination Guide.”26 That said, China’s navy has been welcomed to the Gulf of Aden
by the United States and other navies with a long-standing presence there. The former
commander of CTF-150 wrote a letter to the commander of China’s first antipiracy
escort task force, Rear Adm. Du Jingchen, notifying him that CTF-150 has a robust presence in the Gulf of Aden and would seek to coordinate with the PLAN at every opportunity.27 As of March 2009, CTF-151 had Chinese linguists on board and, in addition to the
aforementioned onboard exchanges, exchanged routine pleasantries with the PLAN.28
China has made genuine contributions to the collective effort in parallel with Western
navies, such as adjusting its escort convoy route five miles north to avoid coverage overlap with CMF.29 China has likewise participated actively in SHADE.
SHADE meetings offer a forum in which to address internavy coordination issues that
persist as a result of various multilateral and independent naval forces conducting complementary but separate antipiracy operations in the same arena. For example, during
the September 2012 SHADE meeting, Chinese lieutenant colonel Chen Peiling presented
on the PLAN’s postrelease efforts and escort of the Taiwan fishing vessel Shiuh-fu 1.30
Subsequent discussion revealed that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had alerted the
MoT and CSA. EU NAVFOR had also been contacted and requested to assist Shiuh-Fu 1.
This raised concerns among SHADE members that all requests and agreements to provide assistance to ships in the Gulf of Aden should take place over Mercury so as to avoid
duplication of effort.31 In general, the PLAN engages in routine communications with
other navies in the Gulf of Aden such as bridge-to-bridge radio and the Mercury chat
room, which it watches regularly.32 Reportedly, PLAN task forces were quick to incorporate Mercury into their communication efforts with CMF, EU, and NATO forces because
it is more secure than commercial e-mail providers that navies were previously using.
Moreover, Mercury served as a window for the PLAN to learn NATO-based procedures
and nomenclature, including code words that have been used openly on Mercury to
increase communication efficacy.
While SHADE remains chaired by Western naval forces, Beijing may prefer such a
cooperation model, since participation is voluntary and does not place any navy under
the authority of another, whereas multilateral forces such as CTF-151 are commanded
by the U.S.-led CMF. Moreover, in the unlikely event that China did wish to integrate
into CTF-151’s antipiracy mission in principle, it would probably not adopt membership prerequisites in practice. To participate in CTF-151, one must first be a member
of CMF, which requires navies to install Combined Enterprise Regional Information
Exchange System (CENTRIXS) software, a classified platform that allows internavy
cooperation through encrypted channels. CENTRIXS provision hinges completely
on stable trust among CMF forces. Non-Western navies such as China and Russia
remain unlikely to allow the installation of U.S. communications infrastructure on
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their surface platforms, which is one reason why Mercury has successfully facilitated
internavy communication among diverse parties. The U.S. reportedly attempted to
create a support tool to aid internavy coordination under SHADE called “SHADE-t,”
but other navies proved uncomfortable with installing U.S. equipment. Furthermore,
SHADE-t’s bandwidth requirements were far more taxing than the relatively agile
Mercury system.
Nevertheless, the active participation by China (as well as other non-CMF states, such as
Russia) in SHADE activities already represents a breakthrough in terms of integration
into preexisting security mechanisms that the United States has played a central role in
establishing and leading. In March 2013 Lt. Col. Chen Peiling, during a report for the
twenty-seventh SHADE meeting, stated that PLAN vessels had deployed units south
of the Bab el Mandeb following the completion of their escort duties to help the “three
forces” fill patrol gaps.33 He also reported that in September 2012 the frigate Yiyang
delayed its replenishment stop at Saudi Arabia and spent twenty hours assisting the U.S.
containership President Polk, which was having engine problems.34 During the twentysixth SHADE meeting, in December 2012, it was revealed that China was continuing to
work positively with the “three forces,” including the sharing of maritime patrol craft
imagery during recent operations.35 It must be emphasized, however, that cooperation
within SHADE and the forum it provides are not equivalent to internavy cooperation
that occurs in mechanisms that are able to capitalize on secure communications.36
Moreover, engagement between multilateral and independent naval forces vis-à-vis
SHADE has elucidated key differences in the nature of everyone’s contributions. For
example, while China’s operations are limited in scope as they are focused on IRTC
security and commercial escorts, the “three forces” conduct active patrols throughout
the Indian Ocean.37 As one SHADE participant put it, “In SHADE and in other aspects
of antipiracy operations, China is trying to validate its own contributions, but not to
change the status quo.”38 Such contributions are certainly welcome, though the “three
forces” still desire deeper cooperation. For example, EU NAVFOR has attempted to
persuade the PLAN to adopt underway replenishment doctrine compatible with its own,
albeit unsuccessfully.39
Placing SHADE in the historical context of naval relations between powers, a seat at the
SHADE table reflects the broader positive shift in maritime power interactions, at least
in the Gulf of Aden. For example, in December 2008, at the time of SHADE’s creation,
Royal Navy lieutenant commander Dave Bancroft remarked,
The great achievement in the SHADE is the fact of who sits at the table. I started my time
at sea chasing Russian submarines. If you would have told me that in five years the Berlin
Wall would come down then, I would not have believed you. But if you said before I
retired from the sea, I would be seated at a table in the middle of an American base with
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a Russian admiral and his staff to my left, and a Chinese brigadier general and his staff to
my right, then I would have thought you insane—but it happened and is still happening.
Seafarers have a code: we are all one family and we always help each other. Politicans build
the barriers, but the seaman finds a way around them.40

Coordination among Independent Antipiracy Forces: Chinese Perspectives
China has actively coordinated its escort operations with other navies, particularly
with other independent deployers through the Convoy Coordination Working Group
(CCWG), which meets the day before SHADE’s quarterly meetings. China, India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their antipiracy operations as early as 2011.41 A SinoJapanese-Indian escort coordination, with recent formal and informal participation by
the Korean and Russian navies, respectively, reportedly assigns countries in rotation to
act as the “reference” country, responsible for formulating a monthly escort schedule.42
As the Indian navy’s Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Adm. Monty Khanna, explained
in February 2012, “Earlier what was happening was that the convoys of all these three
countries would be spaced by [only a] few hours and there would be long hours in a day
when no convoy was available for escorting the vessels.”43 Now this disparity is being rectified, and these independent escort forces are reporting their progress during quarterly
CCWG meetings.
January through March 2012 was considered a trial period for coordinating escort
schedules among China, India, and Japan. They did so twenty-nine times with China
acting as the coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and Japan for nine.44 By July
2012 Korea was set to join the third cycle of the coordination mechanism, China having completed the first three-month coordination cycle as a reference navy. Japan and
India worked to “plug the gaps,” and India acted as the reference navy for the second
cycle, which began in April 2012.45 It appears that by September 2012 Korea had begun
formally participating in escort coordination with China, Japan, and India; early in that
month India, China, and Korea all announced escort services for commercial ships during September.46 China, India, Japan, and Korea successfully completed a coordinated
convoy schedule between June and September 2012.47
CCWG participants have agreed that the coordinated escort schedules can be published
on the MSCHOA website.48 During a September 2012 SHADE meeting, CCWG’s operations were described as “established, working and sufficient.”49 SHADE has several other
functioning groups or elements that do not have tasking authority but help coordinate
antipiracy operations, including the Air Coordination Element.50
With respect to Sino-Indian military relations, recent coordination under SHADE represents the first instance of a “working relationship on the high seas” between the PLAN
and the Indian navy.51 While the efforts between China and India have been welcomed,
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they certainly do not signal a major shift in Sino-Indian military or bilateral relations.
Recent actions by both countries suggest that both the South China Sea and the Indian
Ocean will remain contentious between the two navies. Antipiracy coordination between
the PLAN and the Indian navy in the Gulf of Aden region may represent, more than
anything else, a relationship of convenience—both sides acknowledge the importance of
coordination to minimize the negative economic impact of subnational piracy. In any
case, coordination with other independent states allows China to enhance its image as a
cooperative stakeholder without having to operate under CTF-151 and does not require
China’s navy to make policy adjustments that could be sensitive and undesirable for
Beijing.52
Generally speaking, China’s navy has publicly lauded cooperation with the abovementioned antipiracy forces, but in practice China’s response has been measured, with
the exception of SHADE. Since the PLAN’s initial deployment, Chinese official statements have welcomed international cooperation. In January 2009 the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, stated, “In the course of Chinese naval ships
providing escort, the Chinese side, in light of the situation, is willing to exchange information and conduct cooperation with various countries’ naval ships, including [those
of] the United States, and, if necessary, to participate in humanitarian rescue efforts.”53
A SASS researcher, Zhang Ming, states that China needs not only to play an active role in
discussions on security of the global commons but also to accompany its verbal diplomacy with concrete contributions in areas such as maritime security and cybersecurity.54
But while Chinese scholars like Zhang acknowledge the importance of the global commons, their work reflects major conceptual divergences from the views of other states
regarding what actually falls under the umbrella of the “global commons.” In Zhang’s
opinion, emerging powers like China differ from Western powers in their views concerning both maritime sovereignty and cyberspace;55 also, as Zhang states, the conflicting
strategic interests of both Western and emerging powers may make impossible universal norms and principles to govern the international system. China is not inclined to
achieve consensus with Western states about such practices unless it determines that
such agreements would serve its own interests, not buttress an international order that
it views as catering to Western interests and serving as the foundation of American
hegemony.56 From this perspective, it is understandable that Beijing remains highly reluctant simply to join existing multilateral antipiracy mechanisms. Rather, states Zhang,
resources within the global commons should be exploited in a way that considers all
states in the global commons.57
In a May 2011 article, Zhang Wenzong of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations further outlined Chinese views concerning Beijing’s role in the
global commons, including maritime security operations such as antipiracy escorts.58
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“What worries people,” Zhang states, is that “America has not changed its biased view of
China as an outlier while establishing ‘global commons’ hegemony and strengthening
its hegemony through the process of international cooperation.”59 Such views remind us
that optimism for greater cooperation with China in such zones as in the Gulf of Aden
must be tempered by consciousness that Beijing is quite uncomfortable with U.S. views
on and behavior in the American-termed “global commons.”
That said, Chinese scholars like Zhang Wenzong do share one common ideal with their
American colleagues: a desire for better U.S.-Chinese policies concerning issues of
common concern in the global commons. Zhang writes, “Just as a war in a globalized
era between great powers will have no winners, an arms race in the ‘global commons’ is
doomed to be a loss-loss and multiple-loss game. Perhaps China’s and the U.S.’s intersection and deep binding of interests in the ‘global commons’ can provide a new angle for
U.S. policies towards China and for China-U.S. military relations.”60
While engaging in numerous highly publicized confidence-building activities with counterpart navies and multilateral antipiracy forces, the PLAN has preferred that its escort
task forces operate largely on their own, treating exchanges with other navies as bilateral
diplomatic sweeteners, added bonuses to its core piracy responsibilities. This behavior
comports with China’s official approach, which advocates “striving to make independent, self-derived, peaceful foreign policy” (坚持独立自主的和平外交政策).61
The PLAN is not alone in deploying independent forces to the Indian Ocean and the
Horn of Africa to mitigate the effects of piracy. States such as India, Iran, Japan, and
Russia have also deployed substantial naval capacity outside multilateral structures.
Japan typically operates two warships in the area tasked with antipiracy support at a
time, and Russia and India typically one each. All four independent operators have taken
part in official exchanges with multilateral mechanisms, but they have not operated
under CTF-150 or CTF-151, nor have they adopted policies identical to those of any of
the multilateral task forces in the Gulf of Aden.62 As Chinese scholars Liu Jingsheng and
Shao Guoyu point out, China, Japan, India, and Russia generally have preferred to carry
out “accompanying escorts” (伴随护航), while other navies use “zoned escorts” (区域
护航).63 The latter approach has been a key facilitator of the coordination mechanisms
among these navies. This viewpoint was reiterated by Col. Yang Yujun, deputy director
of the Information Affairs Office and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense,
during a press conference in December 2012:64
At present, the naval forces of multilateral organizations such as NATO, the EU, and a
number of countries have launched escort duty by zones, while independent escort countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea (ROK), etc., have adopted a cooperative
approach involving shipping-schedule coordination. . . . Beginning in January this year,
by coordinating their respective escort schedules with one another and balancing escort
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resources, independent escort countries such as China, India, and Japan have improved
their escort efficiency.65

See exhibit 1 for a comprehensive representation of unilateral approaches to Gulf of
Aden counterpiracy and a representation of the potential gains to the international community were the independently operating countries to integrate fully into international
mechanisms to fight piracy.
Beijing’s “Zoned Escorts” Proposal. In mid-October 2009, Beijing suggested officially that
waters around the Horn of Africa be apportioned into discrete zones in each of which a
participating nation would exercise responsibility for security. The idea was a response
to the unexpected broadening of Somali pirate attacks beyond the sixtieth meridian
toward the south and east.66 At least one Chinese analyst has stated that while China’s
proposal would reduce costs and increase effectiveness, relative gains concerns on the
part of other nations may well preclude its implementation.67 In November, China convened a conference to promote the proposal.68
But what were Beijing’s underlying reasons? Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo (Ret.), described as the
“director of a naval expert committee,” explains that China lacks formal relations with
NATO.69 Closer cooperation “would involve the sharing of intelligence codes, which is a
sensitive military and political issue.”70 Lack of experience and preparation (that is, reluctance to risk exposing these shortcomings to counterpart navies) is no longer a major
factor in Beijing’s promotion of the “zoned escort” approach, but others remain, such
as sensitivity regarding sovereignty and concerns about revealing Chinese capabilities.
There appears to be concern that Chinese vessels would be subjected to scrutiny; Rear
Adm. Yang Yi reports that “some secretive reconnaissance does take place.” In any case,
as Senior Capt. Li Jie of the Navy Military Studies Research Institute adds, “as long as all
parties keep their activities to a minimum, military powers will not engage in disputes.”71
A number of factors, however, limit the appeal to others of China’s “zone” approach.
First, because some sea areas are much busier than others, it would result in an inefficient distribution of forces. Second, the zones assigned to nations whose navies are
relatively less capable or experienced might be less secure than others. (That could be
very difficult to solve, as any nation would be reluctant to acknowledge that its forces
were not able to perform adequately.) Third, such a distributed unilateral approach
seems regrettable in principle when there is support in the international community
for a genuine cooperative multilateral arrangement. Perhaps because of such problems,
China is not promoting zoned escorts in SHADE.72
Most Chinese mentions of multilateral mechanisms imply that the current Chinese participation on a largely bilateral, case-by-case basis is sufficient, and that little if anything
else is required beyond incremental improvements. As one Modern Navy article put it,
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“While insisting on ‘focusing on self ’ [以我为主] [when] conducting escorts, China’s
navy [also] is actively expanding international maritime military exchanges and cooperation, [and] gradually establishing and exploring escort methods and mechanisms
with relevant countries.”73 Another Modern Navy article suggests a desire to “free ride”
on international resources, on an ad hoc basis, rather than helping to build multilateral
capacity in peacetime.74
Exhibit 1. Notable Antipiracy Operations outside CMF, NATO, and EU NAVFOR
Country

Date of First Task Force Dispatch

Total Ships Escorted

China

26 December 2008

5,000+ (as of 26 December 2012)

Japan

14 March 2009

2,805 (September 2012)

India

23 October 2008

1,870 (2 December 2011)

Iran

20 December 2008

1,400+ (28 February 2012)

Russia

October 2008

700+ (17 October 2012)

a

b

Notes:
a. A cable from 2009 stated, “(C) Summary: Two Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) destroyers departed Japan
on March 14 bound for the Horn of Africa (HOA) region on an anti-piracy mission. The vessels will operate independently from
CTF-151 and other multi-national efforts in the region, but will interact closely with other navies on logistics and communications.
Although initially bound to protect only Japanese vessels or ships carrying Japanese goods, strong public support for the mission
bodes well for passage of a new law broadening the JMSDF’s mission. While operations experts continue to finalize logistical
in-theater arrangements for the deployment, JMSDF vessels steam towards what is one of their most significant operations since
their establishment. End Summary.” “13 MAR 2009 Embassy Tokyo Daily Activity Report,” 13 March 2009, www.cablegatesearch
.net/cable.php?id=09TOKYO610#para-231331-1.
b. This is a summary of operations by the largest states that pursue Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations unilaterally. Other states
such as Pakistan and Malaysia also have limited independent operations. It is important to note that statistics provided by independent deployers vary in their reliability, Iran’s particularly so. Iran has occasionally deployed a tanker and frigate to contribute to
antipiracy operations; however, they reportedly spend considerable time at anchor. In fact Iran’s only actual IRTC escorts involve
Iranian security forces boarding and protecting specific ships traveling to and from Iran via the Gulf of Aden. As such, these
statistics are offered simply to convey a rough sense of independent deployer operations and should not necessarily be appraised
at face value.
Sources: China: Cao Jinping and Mo Xiaoliang, “Review of Chinese Navy’s Escort Missions in Gulf of Aden in Past 4 Years.”
Japan: “Japan’s Actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2012, www
.mofa.go.jp/; “Record of Escort Operations Performed by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Units Dispatched for Antipiracy
Activities,” Japan Ministry of Defense / JSDF, 7 February 2012, www.mod.go.jp/. India: “Navy Role in Anti-piracy Fight Has
Grown Steadily: Officer,” The Economic Times, 2 December 2011, articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/; indiannavy.nic
.in/sites/default/files/Content_DNO_AntiPiracy_05-06-12 .pdf. Iran: “Iran Navy Escorts 1,400 Ships in 4 years,” PressTV,
28 February 2012, www.hellenicshippingnews.com/; “Iran Joins Fight against Piracy,” CNN, 20 December 2008, articles
.cnn.com/. Russia: “Russian Navy Develops Plan of Its Regular Presence in Gulf of Aden,” Naval Today, 17 October 2012,
navaltoday.com/; “Somalia: Russian Destroyer Escorts Commercial Vessels in Gulf of Aden,” Horseed Media, 22 January
2012, horseedmedia.net/.

Indicators of Openness to More Proactive Approaches? In one of the few examples of
Chinese government–affiliated individuals calling for further cooperative antipiracy
mechanisms, Cha Changsong has proposed the following in Modern Navy:
First, a maritime military mutual trust mechanism should be constructed. Maritime
military mutual trust is the foundation of maritime military cooperation, [and] is the precondition for the establishment of all other cooperation mechanisms. A maritime military
mutual trust mechanism entails establishing various measures directly involving improvements [to] the security environment; mainly increasing the transparency and predictability of military activities, undertaking military activities within controllable specifications;
[and] reducing the uncertainty of maritime military safety areas, mutual suspicion, mutual
misjudgment and misunderstanding. [This] can clarify the military security intentions of
both sides, [thereby] lowering the probability of deliberate confrontations.75
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Cha also advocates a “maritime military security discussion mechanism” (海上军事安
全磋商机制) founded on the basic principles of “respect, mutual trust, equality, and
reciprocity” (尊重, 互信, 对等, 互惠). Next, Cha calls for an “emergency intelligence
sharing mechanism” (海上安全应激情报共享机制). Cha says China and Russia already
have a mature mechanism of this type, but one limited to antipiracy escorts. Other
recommendations from Cha include a “maritime warning mechanism” (海上预警机制)
and a “mechanism for joint escorts” (联合护航机制).76
A speech by Gen. Chen Bingde, chief of the PLA General Staff—delivered on the sidelines of U.S.-Chinese naval talks in Washington in May 2011—represented a noteworthy
departure from traditional Chinese foreign policy, a departure that suggested China
might be more willing to adopt more proactive measures while cooperating with others
in Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations.77 Chen advocated cooperation among international militaries against pirate bases within Somalia, arguing on the grounds that Somalia was no longer a sovereign state and pirate ransoms were fueling broader terrorist
activities.78 He went so far as to declare, “For counter-piracy campaigns to be effective,
we should probably move beyond the ocean and crush their bases on the land.”79 On the
same trip, during a speech at NDU in Washington, D.C., Chen stated,
As I discussed with Secretary Clinton today and Admiral Mullen yesterday, as for counterpiracy operations I personally believe that we should not only fight with pirates on the sea,
but also on the ground; because those pirates operating on the sea are simply low-ranking
ones, and the true masterminds are on the ground. All the ransoms and treasures they
obtained were all later handed over to their chiefs of organizations. Countries must work
together in fighting against pirates.80

Whatever their genesis or congruence with the government’s line, Chen’s comments
underscored an evolution of official Chinese views on piracy. Ideologically, if not operationally, the PLAN is gradually departing from its conservative policy of defense-based
deterrence of piracy and appears to be considering the suppression of specific sources
of Somali piracy. Average ransoms have risen from $150,000 to well over seven million
dollars, as pirates take advantage of the political pressure that their attacks can generate
to influence the governments of merchant seamen held captive.81 Therefore, according to
Chen, “it is important that we target not only the operators, those on the small ships or
crafts conducting the hijacking activities, but also the figureheads.”82
China is facing major policy decisions, then, just as the larger international community inches toward a policy that involves antipiracy operations ashore on a larger scale,
a policy that could alter fundamentally how the international community addresses
subnational piracy in the future. It would not be surprising if Beijing remained content
simply to escort commercial vessels off Somalia’s coast, deterring attacks and magnifying its own contributions to their observed aggregate reduction. However, Chinese
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official commentary has echoed the international consensus that piracy is rooted in
systemic problems onshore and is not simply a matter of isolated groups of seafaring
bandits seeking easy profit.83 General Chen has voiced this notion. Nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that China’s military, as long as it continues to operate independently, will move
from offshore patrols and escorts to aggressive assaults on suspected pirate lairs on land.
Moreover, as an article in Modern Navy (in addition to that cited to similar effect above)
suggests, China retains a strong impulse to free ride on other nations’ “public goods”:
“Reconstructing Somali national order is the basic path to solving the piracy issue. It is
unrealistic to rely solely on Somalia’s own power to solve these problems. International
society, mainly Western countries, should relinquish self-interest and use good faith, in
order to conscientiously push forward the solution to Somali piracy and realize regional
peace and calm.”84
For Beijing to contribute to a continental deployment would be seen by many as a major
foreign-policy shift and could set an unhealthy precedent. But perhaps Beijing is closer
to such a change than previously believed.85 In August 2012, Angola extradited thirtyseven Chinese citizens back to the PRC on suspicion of “kidnapping, robbery, blackmail,
human trafficking and forcing women into prostitution,” according to the Ministry of
Public Security.86 This episode, combined with similar Chinese law enforcement activities in other regions, such as Southeast Asia, suggests that China may be increasingly
willing to intensify nontraditional security operations to protect its citizens overseas.
Regardless, several trends and decisions over the past two years signal that China is
considering deeper cooperation to minimize the expense of continuing to deter piracy
through naval operations alone. First, naval officers of the states that operate independently have been increasing internavy antipiracy dialogues as they interact through
SHADE with representatives of navies currently under the command of the CTF-151,
NATO, and EU antipiracy structures.87 Second, the PLAN has assigned one of its vessels to monitor the IRTC alongside CTF-151 ships. Third, the PLAN’s escorts of World
Food Programme supplies through the Gulf of Aden, highly publicized domestically
and internationally by state media, signal Chinese willingness to increase its international responsibilities for the stability of the world economy.88 Finally, as previously
mentioned, Somalia’s TFG has essentially invited Chinese presence onshore.89 This last
factor in particular could help surmount China’s major foreign-policy hurdles concerning sovereignty issues, since consent of the sovereign is the strongest authority under
international law for a country’s forces to act within another’s territory. This is especially
important in that when it made the initial decision to deploy naval forces to the Gulf of
Aden, Beijing emphasized that sovereign consent and UN imprimatur were key factors it
had considered.
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Chinese Official Views regarding Antipiracy Law and Related Maritime Laws
As is commonplace for Chinese leaders when discussing Gulf of Aden piracy, Wang Min,
China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, remarked in July 2012, “It is imperative for the international community to strengthen coordination and cooperation to
cope with these developments.”90 According to scholar Zou Ligang, China is a signatory
to over thirty-five international laws and treaties related to SLOC security.91 Zou states
that the complexity of international maritime law, as well as a lack of consensus regarding such issues as the fate of captured pirate suspects, often precludes decisive action.92
These characteristics of existing maritime law, coupled with Beijing’s supreme sensitivity
concerning sovereignty issues—still a cornerstone of its foreign policy—make differences in opinion and interpretation with regard to international law a potentially costly
bottleneck for the enhancement of China’s antipiracy cooperation with other states and
mechanisms.
It may therefore be most effective, in engaging Beijing vis-à-vis antipiracy, to focus on
China’s interests. Statements from its foremost leadership echelon clearly reflect the great
importance that Beijing attaches to the security of major international SLOCs.93 Official
Chinese views on antipiracy law, as well as rules associated with naval engagement in international waters, underscore the need for stronger legal institutions regarding SLOCs.
Official Chinese media sources have frequently challenged the international community
to be more proactive in this regard.94 Feng Xinhua asserts that the UN should form a
new entity tasked specifically with strategic SLOC security worldwide.95 The essential
claim is that UNCLOS, while exhorting countries to cooperate in the interest of general
maritime security, contains no specific provisions on how to address SLOC-related
security issues. Furthermore, Feng believes, regional agencies should be established both
to implement UN-mandated regulations on SLOC security and to serve as communication centers for states invested in the given region.96 Simultaneously, other scholars have
praised current multilateral and state-to-state partnerships that focus on ensuring safe
SLOCs.97
Official Chinese statements reflect the extreme degree of caution with which Beijing is
proceeding. China supported all four UNSC resolutions aimed at Somali piracy that
were passed in 2008, including declarations that states may intervene within Somalia’s
twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters (Resolution 1846) and even fight pirates on
Somali shores (Resolution 1851) if necessary. Since the passage of these resolutions,
however, China has gone to great lengths to emphasize that Somalia remains a sovereign country. Its official statements, for instance, frequently note that all international
assistance and operations against piracy in Somali waters should take place only with
Mogadishu’s permission. They also repeat the appreciation expressed to it by Somalia’s
government on behalf of its people for Chinese assistance.98 China’s legal mandate for
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the PLAN antipiracy mission was initially confined to (with minor exceptions) defending Chinese commercial ships participating in PLAN escort flotillas.99 At the outset, task
forces escorted only vessels flagged by mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan,
but, as noted, the MoT has since allowed the commercial vessels of other flag states to
request China’s escort services in advance.100
Legal frameworks offer a platform for institutionalizing the Chinese navy’s antipiracy
operations, but perceived limitations to the legality of certain antipiracy activities are
also preventing more meaningful contributions by Beijing. While training has expanded
notably in the past three years and China’s antipiracy capabilities and confidence
have grown accordingly, PLAN ships and troops involved in antipiracy escorts do not
actively pursue suspected pirates; they simply deter them from attacking PLAN vessels
or merchant ships under escort. They also respond to rescue request calls from areas
sufficiently close to the Gulf of Aden.101 Moreover, despite the fact that China’s navy has
dispatched more escort task forces than any other independently operating navy, China,
unlike several other Western and Asian states, has not kept a single pirate in detention
on its own soil.102 As an article in Modern Navy explains, navies face “three main [legal]
problems” (三难) in this regard. The first is identifying and confirming pirate targets
accurately at sea. The second regards evidence, of which four types are required: “相关
物证 [related material evidence], 照录相证据 [photographic evidence], 行动证人证言
[witness evidence], [and] 受害船舶证据 [evidence from victimized ships].” Collection
is difficult, because pirates often discard materials into the ocean. Third, trying pirates is
problematic.103
Rather, as official statements by Chinese officials such as Wang Min suggest, Beijing
may prefer “Special Courts” (特别法庭) that would be universally agreed on and would
allow China to circumvent the thorny issue of trying foreigners on Chinese soil.104 This
preference is likely because, lacking specialized domestic judicial mechanisms for trying
pirates, China would be uncomfortable prosecuting a suspected Somali pirate in its own
courts. Beijing has repeatedly attempted to solve this complex issue by advocating the
establishment of such a court on Somali soil.105 No such formal courts have been opened
in Somalia, but in March 2011 a detention center designed especially for holding pirates
captured by international navies at sea was opened in Hargeisa, the capital of Somali
land, a relatively stable autonomous region in northern Somalia. As of May 2012, this
prison was already processing prisoner transfers from Seychelles and other countries.106
In addition, by early that same year roughly a thousand suspected or convicted pirates
were being detained in twenty countries throughout the world.107
In April 2011 the international community resolved to consider establishing specific
Somali courts for the purpose of trying suspected Gulf of Aden pirates. The resolution,
drafted by Colombia, France, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Ukraine, was approved by the
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fifteen-nation UNSC.108 A 22 November 2011, U.S.-drafted UNSC document mentions the need to “investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also
anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures
of criminal networks involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, or finance
and profit from such attacks.” Moreover, the official document reiterates the consensus
that piracy near Somalia funds the purchase of weapons and recruitment of individuals
that help sustain the piracy “industry” in the region, allowing it to continue to interfere
with global commerce flows.109
At present, the Hargeisa detention center either releases captured pirates or sends them
to regional states, which themselves have only limited prisoner capacity.110 Greater
capacity to hold prisoners on Somali soil would likely enable more active Chinese
antipiracy operations, as jailing suspects in Somalia under UN jurisdiction might
avoid uncomfortable sovereignty issues. Furthermore, Interpol, the United States, and
various other states are cooperatively constructing an antipiracy intelligence center
to track pirates’ financial flows. The agency, formally called the Regional Anti-Piracy
Prosecutions and Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (RAPPICC), is located at a
Seychelles coast guard base near that nation’s capital, Victoria, and reportedly opened
in March 2013.111 RAPPICC’s staff, including its director, Garry Crone, will initially
be provided by Britain’s Serious Organised Crime Agency.112 Beijing, if invited, may
be willing to cooperate with other nations at the center, which could make the PLAN’s
piracy contribution more meaningful; however, unless it were located on Somali soil, few
would likely see Chinese participation as a major breakthrough. Beijing’s unwillingness
to hold suspected pirates reflects not only its reluctance to confront the complex issues
involved in trying criminals from other states but also its view that prisons and court
systems in Somalia are no substitute for the stabilizing effects of comprehensive development of economic and social institutions in the failed state, a viewpoint that Wang Min
and PLAN officials emphasize regularly.113
Most countries on the UNSC share this stance, and in fact China has many more
similarities to than differences from other UN members with respect to piracy policies.
But it has yet formally to join a multilateral antipiracy organization, suggesting that its
leaders are simply unwilling to appear subordinate to a higher decision-making body
or another nation, such as the United States, even symbolically. Scholar Huang Li adds
that endorsing and pursuing policies that kill pirates could cause pirate groups to target
Chinese ships particularly, creating a self-inflicted problem and potentially undermining
the initial goal of protecting Chinese citizens abroad.114 Thus, despite earlier indications
that China’s navy may gradually adopt more assertive tactics to help eradicate Somali
piracy, one might still expect Beijing to maintain policies that avoid creating new sources
of political vulnerability for the regime. Similarly, at the central level, Chinese leadership
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may be unlikely to approve more aggressive approaches such as onshore attacks and
piracy trials in China, though China has signaled it will not oppose other countries in
such efforts.
Chinese official statements and scholarship on international antipiracy law largely reflect
the notion that cross navy cooperation should be enhanced to ensure economic benefits
for all states involved. People’s Navy has reported that President Hu Jintao first introduced China’s “harmonious oceans” (和谐海洋) concept in April 2009 as a basis for
Chinese cooperation in the global maritime commons, appealing to the values of shared
peace and prosperity achieved through meaningful cooperation among states.115 These
values should be pursued, Chinese leaders believe, by creating international sea-lane
security laws through building an international organization, specifically identifying
strategic SLOCs, and promoting regional cooperation through regional mechanisms that
pool resources.116
The PLAN will likely be open in principle to the possibility of greater cooperation in the
Gulf of Aden and in other regions where antipiracy operations remain nascent. There
are no signs, however, that China will decide to operate under the aegis of a multinational apparatus in the near future: Beijing does not perceive benefits in joining a collaborative effort as outweighing the costs. Independent operation avoids any situation in
which China would have to subordinate itself—even symbolically—to another state or
organization, and it provides the PLAN with considerable freedom to alter its operations
without having to notify its partners or undergoing lengthy multilateral consultations
and deliberations. For now it appears that while Beijing is eager to increase cooperation
quantitatively off the Horn of Africa, this cooperation is likely to be one of increased
basic coordination, low-level information sharing, navy-to-navy exchanges, and joint
operations—all of which China’s navy does already, and none of which would represent
a qualitative breakthrough.
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C HAPTER F O UR

China’s Recent Antipiracy Activities in the Gulf of Aden
and Indian Ocean

T

he PLAN’s first antipiracy operation took place in the Gulf of Aden on 6 January 2009 at roughly 11 am, when four Chinese-flagged vessels were taken under
escort.1 Later that day the PLAN faced its first challenge. Pirates closing in on one of the
escortees, Chinese motor vessel (MV) Zhenhua 25, failed to respond to two red flares
fired from helicopters deployed off a PLAN warship. The helicopters approached within
two hundred meters, closer to the ocean surface; “special operations soldiers had already
opened safety locks and aimed [at] the pirates[,] getting ready to pull the trigger.” The
helicopters, “the pirates’ bazookas and rifles . . . targeting” them, “flew over pirates’ heads
just against the sea surface” as “the explosive bombs fired by the special operations
soldiers exploded and clapped in the air in quick succession.” Minutes later the pirates
dispersed.2
Since the end of 2008 PLAN escorts, area patrols, and on-ship protection activities have
made substantial contributions to the safety of the Gulf of Aden and neighboring economic lifelines at sea. China’s navy has learned valuable lessons, and several of its warships have participated in multiple deployments. Occasional encounters with pirates and
dozens of exchanges with other navies have allowed the PLAN to exhibit its competence
in deterring piracy and have also helped identify areas for logistical and operational
improvement for future missions and, potentially, real combat.
Shortly after the first Gulf of Aden mission began, Li Daguang laid out several key performance criteria for China’s naval escorts:
•• Rapid reaction ability (迅速出动能力)
•• Far Oceans deployment ability (远洋部署能力)
•• Weapons supply (武器装备)
•• Logistical security ability (后勤保障能力)
•• Special operations combat ability (特种作战能力)
•• Regular training level (平时的训练水平)
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•• Joint war-fighting ability (联合作战的能力)
•• Emergency response ability (应对紧急情况能力).
By all accounts, the PLAN has met initial requirements in all these areas.3

Missions Details: December 2008–December 2012
The recent development of China’s naval order of battle demonstrates the rapidity with
which the PLAN is updating its maritime platforms. As of 2013, China’s navy possessed
twenty-three destroyers and fifty-two frigates, as well as newly commissioned aircraft
carrier Liaoning.4 It also had twenty-nine amphibious ships and twenty-six medium
landing ships. As Ronald O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service explains,
“[The Department of Defense] stated in 2011 that the percentage of modern units
within China’s submarine force has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 2004 to
about 47% in 2008 and 50% in 2009, and that the percentage of modern units within
China’s force of surface combatants has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 2004
to about 25% in 2008 and 2009.” Researchers at the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission offer even more detailed percentages for destroyers and frigates respectively. Based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies volume The Military
Balance: 1990 (0% each) and 1995 (5%, 8%). Based on their 24 June 2013 correspondence with the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence: 2000 (20%, 25%); 2005 (40%, 35%);
2010 (50%, 45%); as well as projections for 2015 (70% each) and 2020 (80% each). 5
Platforms Used
As noted previously, PLAN antipiracy task forces typically rotate every three or four
months and deploy (for the most recent deployments) about 170 days from departure
to return to home port. The total days spent at sea for PLAN ships increased steadily
between the first and seventh task forces, with the eleventh task force holding the record
of two hundred days away from home port.6 Similarly, the number of ships escorted in
both aggregate and per-escort terms also increased. Task forces usually consist of two
warships, either destroyers or frigates, and a replenishment ship. Thus at any given time
the PLAN typically has three naval vessels stationed in the Gulf of Aden.
The Gulf of Aden deployers are the first modern PLAN surface ships sent for sustained
periods outside the “second island chain”—that is, from the Kuriles westward around
the Marianas to Indonesia.7 Beijing appears poised to continue the trend of deploying some of its most advanced surface ships to the Horn of Africa. During antipiracy
operations, these platforms cover distances unprecedented for the PLAN. For example, the NSF Jiangkai II (Type 054A)–class guided-missile frigate Yantai sailed over
forty-two thousand nautical miles, or two times the earth’s circumference, during a
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two-hundred-day antipiracy deployment.8 Currently, PLA task force platforms usually consist of various combinations of Type 052 Luyang-class destroyers, Type 054
Jiangkai-class frigates, and amphibious landing ships that primarily function as support
and replenishment vessels. Assignment of these types reflects China’s naval aspirations
to deploy first-class, blue-water technology on a sustained basis. Exhibit 2 details the
twenty-five PLAN vessels employed in the first fourteen task forces.
Logistical Underpinnings
Crews undergo substantial predeparture training.9 This reportedly includes predeparture
instruction for PLAN officers, some of whom participate in antipiracy courses such as
the two-week classes reportedly held at Nanjing Naval Command College (南京海军指
挥学院) beginning on 13 February 2012.10 According to Liberation Army Daily, “This
training class will last for 14 days. 84 persons from the leading organs of the PLA Navy,
the 12th and 13th naval escort task forces, the North China Sea Fleet and the NCC attend the training class.”11 Aimed at high-level officers, “the training class will exert effort
to improve the capability of the naval commanders at all levels, the frontline commanders in particular, in executing the oceangoing diversified military tasks by ways of theory
lecture, experience exchange in groups, concentrated study and discussion as well as
commanding drill.”12
In addition to high-ranking officers, all crew members to be deployed conduct extensive
preparation. Prior to deployment, for instance, sailors of the eighth task force completed
specialized training updated for trends observed in the most recent escort operations.13
This targeted preparation included “72 action programs in four categories, 150 emergency plans in response to various scenarios, and 15 drill scenarios of various types,”
as well as training for heavy weather.14 Notable drills simulated rescue operations, live
firing, rappelling from “shipborne helicopters [舰载直升机],” and boarding of merchant
vessels.15 Similarly, the eleventh escort task force conducted three months of “prewar”
(战前) training after leaving its home port, Qingdao.16 It underwent over 260 hours of
training while passing through the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Miyako Strait, and northwest Pacific.17
More broadly, all newly enlisted servicemen in ESF brigades (大队) must reportedly
undergo special training to improve the fleet’s ability to fulfill Far Seas escort responsibilities.18 One aspect of this training is learning how to throw hand grenades accurately
under challenging conditions.19 One examination requires personnel to hit both stationary and moving doughnut-shaped targets with an inner and outer circle of three and
six meters’ diameter, respectively, as the targets move at varying speeds from multiple
axes to simulate pirate skiffs’ unpredictable movements.20 The exercise highlights the
imperative to target pirates urgently when they approach within seventy meters.21 Given
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Exhibit 2. PLAN Vessels Deployed in Gulf of Aden Antipiracy Operations
Vessela

Hull
Number

Class

Type

Full-Load
Displacement
(tonnes)

Builder

Wuhan

169

Luyang I
(052B)

Destroyer

7,112

Jiangnan Shipyard,
Shanghai

Haikou

171

Luyang II
(052C)

Destroyer

7,112

Jiangnan Shipyard,
Shanghai

Shenzhen

167

Luhai (051B)

Destroyer

6,096

Dalian Shipyard

Guangzhou

168

Luyang I
(052B)

Destroyer

7,112

Jiangnan Shipyard,
Shanghai

Lanzhou

170

Luyang II
(052C)

Destroyer

7,112

Jiangnan Shipyard,
Shanghai

Qingdao

113

Luhu (052A)

Destroyer

4,674

Jiangnan Shipyard,
Shanghai

Harbin

112

Luhu (052A)

Destroyer

4,674

Jiangnan Shipyard,
Shanghai

Huangshan

570

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou

Zhoushan

529

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Xuzhou

530

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou

Ma’anshan

525

Jiangkai I
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Wenzhou

526

Jiangkai I
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou

Chaohu

568b

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Yulin

569

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Yuncheng

571

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou

Yantai

538

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou

Yiyang

548

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou

Changzhou

549

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Hengyang

568

Jiangkai II
(054A)

Frigate

3,963

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai
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Laid Down

Launched

Commissioned

Home Port
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Task Forces
Participated In

2001

9 September 2002

18 July 2004

Sanya, SSF

1, 9

November 2002

29 October 2003

20 July 2005

Sanya, SSF

1, 10

July 1996

16 October 1997

4 January 1999

Zhanjiang, SSF

2

2001

25 May 2002

18 July 2004

Sanya, SSF

5

June 2002

29 April 2003

18 July 2004

Zhanjiang, SSF

6

January 1993

October 1993

March 1996

Qingdao, NSF

11

November 1990

October 1991

July 1994

NSF

14

2006

18 March 2007

13 May 2008

Zhanjiang, SSF

2, 13

2006

21 December 2006

3 January 2008

Zhoushan, ESF

3, 7

2005

30 September 2006

27 January 2008

Zhoushan, ESF

3, 7

December 2001

11 September 2003

18 February 2005

Zhoushan, ESF

4, 8

February 2002

30 November 2003

26 September 2006

Zhoushan, ESF

4, 8

2007

23 May 2007

30 June 2008

Sanya, SSF

5

2007

28 April 2009

1 February 2010

Zhanjiang, SSF

9

2007

8 February 2009

15 January 2010

Zhanjiang, SSF

10

2009

24 August 2010

9 June 2011

NSF

11

2008

17 November 2009

26 October 2010

Zhoushan, ESF

12

December 2009

21 May 2010

30 May 2011

Zhoushan, ESF

12

2007

23 May 2007

30 June 2008

Zhanjiang, SSF

13
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Exhibit 2. (continued)
Vessela

Hull
Number

Class

Type

Full-Load
Displacement
(tonnes)
2,286

Builder

Mianyang

528

Jiangwei II
(053H3)

Frigate

Kunlunshan

998

Yuzhao (071)

Landing ship

Weishanhu

887

Fuchi (903)

Replenishment

23,369

Guangzhou Shipyard
International

Qiandaohu

886

Fuchi (903)

Replenishment

23,000

HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Poyanghu

882

Fuqing (exFencang 615)

Replenishment

22,099

Dalian

Qinghaihu

885
(ex-NY953)

Komandarm
Fedko

Replenishment

37,000

Kherson (Ukraine)/
Dalian

18,500
(standard, not
full load)

Huangpu Shipyard,
Guangzhou
HudongZhonghua Shipyard,
Shanghai

Notes:
China’s Defence Today and online Chinese sources sometimes provide contradictory details. In case of discrepancies, Jane’s data
are used as a default.
a. Vessels are arranged in a two-tiered ordering system. The first filtering tier is vessel type and the second is first task force
participated in.
b. Chaohu was renamed Hengyang in 2012, www.sinodefenceforum.com/navy/054-series-frigate-thread-2-a-107-4149
.html.
c. Denotes limited duration of role.
Sources: Jane’s Fighting Ships; China’s Defence Today; “China Sends Escort Fleet to Somali Waters,” Xinhua, 29 February 2012,
www.china.org.cn/wap/2012-02/29/content_24762887.htm; “China,” World Warships, www.worldwarships.com/; “中国海军

three tries, sailors who hit at least two from thirty meters or at least one from forty meters
are deemed “outstanding” (优秀); hitting none from thirty meters constitutes failure.22 En
route training for escort forces has been institutionalized. For example, the seventh task
force held a first comprehensive training session in November 2010 after it departed for the
Gulf of Aden, with plans for “taking one road, practicing one road” (走一路, 练一路).23
Since English is mandated by the International Maritime Organization for all international communications at sea, another important component of predeparture training is
language instruction. PLAN crewmen are expected to possess baseline English communication skills to communicate effectively with foreign civilians, pirates, and counterpart
naval officials. For example, crew members of the ninth escort task force received bilingual Chinese and English study materials such as the hard-copy Blue Shield Bulletin (蓝
盾快报) and The Escort Voice (护航之声) radio broadcasts. Crew members also reportedly spend a good deal of time studying English.24 The recent emphasis on English training and on comprehensive education of task forces suggests that the PLAN may foresee
an increase in the number of foreign ships escorted. It also reflects the importance
that the Chinese government and military attach to their capabilities and image when
interacting face-to-face with other states, engagements that have grown in frequency
and substance. The twelfth escort task force had an on-duty translator aboard the frigate
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Laid Down

Launched

Commissioned

Home Port

Task Forces
Participated In

2003

30 May 2004

October 2004

ESF

14

June 2006

21 December 2006

13 November 2007

Zhanjiang, SSF

6

N/A

June 2003

April 2004

Sanya, SSF

1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 14

2002

29 March 2003

30 April 2004

Zhoushan, ESF

3, 4, 7, 8, 12

1979

Shanghai, ESF

5, 6,c 8, 10c

2 June 1996

SSF

9, 10, 13

January 1989
(Ukraine)

April 1992
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十批护航编队简介” [A Brief Introduction to China’s Ten Naval Escort Task Forces], Xinhua, 26 December 2011, news.xinhuanet
.com/mil/2011-12/26/c_122483096.htm; “Fuqing Class Fleet Oiler,” China’s Defence Today, updated 1 March 2009, www
.sinodefence.com/navy/support/fuqing.asp; “PLA Navy Holds Comprehensive Replenishment Training under Adverse Conditions,” Military Report, CCTV-7 (Mandarin), 1130 GMT, 15 October 2011; Liu Yiwei and Hou Rui, “PLA 8th Naval Escort Taskforce Conducts 1st Replenishment,” Liberation Army Daily, 1 March 2011; Wang Lingshuo and Li De, “‘Peace Ark’ Hospital Ship
Makes First Replenishment in Open Sea,” Liberation Army Daily, 9 September 2010; CCTV.com; www.sinodefence.com/special/
operations/anti-piracy.asp; id.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t781886.htm; eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china
-military-news/2011-07/01/content_4458702.htm; english.ts.cn/news/content/2012-05/08/content_6813662.htm; Qin Chuan,
Yang Qinghai, and Li Ding, “14th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Conducts Open-Sea Training,” People’s Daily, 27 February
2013, english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8144844.html.

Yiyang, though it is unclear whether all task forces have carried official translators.25 Additionally, according to a Chinese media article, during the first escort deployment the
destroyer Haikou was equipped with thirty laptops and a local area network that allowed
crew members to listen to music and watch movies. Each PLAN task force member receives four “pocket books” that cover the psychological aspects of deployment, security,
international law, and the application of international law to military operations. Also, in
preparation for meeting ships of other nations, a naval officer who specializes in international law provides full-time legal support to officers and crews.26
Organizing Operations
Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have included area
patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection.27 Wang Yongxiang, deputy commander of the
tenth escort task force, explains that the choice of modes depends on multiple factors:
“the schedules of the merchant vessels to be escorted, their characteristics, and how well
our warships have rested. We want to not only ensure the safety of our charges, but also
improve the efficiency of escort protection.”28 Area patrol—monitoring certain maritime
zones in and around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed by the PLAN.29
When China’s navy does engage in this type of operation, it typically maintains two base
points 550–600 nautical miles apart—one a hundred nautical miles north of Yemen’s
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Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of Aden Harbor.30
PLAN vessels travel between these points, typically taking two to three days to do so.31
As of July 2010, the fifth task force had begun adjusting escort rendezvous points in
response to geographic trends in pirate attacks.32 The commander of the fifth task
force, Zhang Wendan, stated, “We shall strengthen communication and contact with
our charges in light of changes in the weather conditions of these waters and the way in
which pirates operate. When the sea conditions are favorable, we shall extend the route
of escort cover toward the eastern part of the Gulf of Aden. When a single warship provides accompanying escort, we shall send other ships to the patrol area to provide area
escort.”33 Additionally, the PLAN has divided the main shipping lane into seven areapatrol zones, so as to secure the maritime region immediately east of the Gulf of Aden.34
PLAN task forces are also changing their training methods and placing emphasis on
emerging trends in pirate attacks.35 In late 2012 China Daily reported that pirates were
focusing more heavily on larger vessels carrying energy supplies, such as coal and oil,
rather than smaller, slower merchant ships.36 Task forces are improving communication
with escorted vessels, sharing information with foreign navies, and improving advance
patrols and warning.37 Broadcasting in English over very-high-frequency (VHF) radio,
which has been the universal hailing frequency for decades, Yuncheng, of the tenth escort
task force, announced, “All ships, all ships, this is the Chinese naval convoy. If you need
any assistance, please report to us on VHF channel 16. Out.”38 While the immediate benefits of enhanced communication between PLAN ships and commercial vessels include
improved escort provision, PLAN profits from these interactions transcend the specific
antipiracy mission set. Insights from antipiracy communication “best practices,” such
as managing rendezvous, working with merchant captains who do not take orders but
must be induced to listen, figuring out optimal formations for steaming, and accounting
for discrepancies in the speeds of various vessels, are all transferable to future wartime
scenarios that involve real operations, such as a “Malacca dilemma” contingency.39
PLAN crewmen are sometimes stationed aboard commercial vessels on routes with
relatively little traffic and that have therefore lower risk of coming under attack, to limit
wear and tear on warships; this is referred to as “on-ship protection.”40 This service is
usually provided by PLAN Marine Corps Special Operations Forces (中国海军特种作
战部队) with the assistance of helicopters that provide monitoring and, if needed, gunfire.41 A typical escort task force has between seventy and ninety of these elite soldiers,
who have received extensive land-based training.42 Special Forces (特战队) personnel
are transported by helicopter and rappel onto the decks of the civilian vessel.43 As of
2010, special operations units could comfortably escort seven commercial ships at a
time, deploying from five to seven personnel on the front and rear vessels in the convoy.
Special Operations Forces marines are armed with deck-mounted grenade launchers
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that can destroy pirate targets at two thousand meters.44 They also carry Type 56 assault
rifles, QBZ-95 automatic rifles, QBU-88 sniper rifles, and infrared night-vision goggles.
In extreme circumstances, civilian crewmen may be given weapons.45 Modern Navy reports that further efforts are required to use equipment more effectively: “With regard to
electronic armament deployment, escorts serve as an important long distance responsibility, [the PLAN] needs some experience to test whether [it] is using relatively effective
electronic armament to serve as set equipment [to] arm ships, including photoelectric
equipment, [Automatic Identification System] equipment, 12.7 mm machine guns,
high-power searchlights, high-power telescopes, portable night vision, and such.”46
In practice, most of the intense operations are performed during training exercises for
Special Forces units, often conducted during inclement weather or at night. As an article
in Modern Navy explains, “Escort task forces insist on ‘taking one road, practicing one
road, [and] researching one road (走一路, 练一路, 研究一路),’ [on] organizing helicopter groups; [on having] Special Forces crewmen perform maritime antipiracy training
deployment exercises, stressing training exercises using real weapons, [including] Special
Forces air mobile and ground level [training]; [and on having] helicopter patrol warning, maritime rescue and various other categories; [thereby] raising [the PLAN’s] ability
to complete all [requisite] tasks [comprehensively].”47
Examples include the Special Forces exercises during the third escort task force deployment, held in “complex weather conditions.”48 During such training sessions PLAN
units simulate combat operations to eliminate or disperse pirates. Reportedly, exercises
routinely last over nine hours.49 One report describes a training session that ran continuously for three days and encompassed all operational aspects of the PLAN antipiracy
mission.50 A 2012 training exercise demonstrated how Special Forces units adapt to
inclement weather such as rain, which makes decks slippery and blurs vision, often slowing reaction speed.51 While searching cabins during the training exercise, Special Forces
personnel crouched to lower their centers of gravity and moved more slowly to ensure
that their cabin checks were effective.52 They also practiced sign-language communication, simulated firing, cross-protection methods, and searches for targets.53 In a description of a similar exercise it was revealed that Special Forces commandos carried thirteen
kilograms of equipment, including a camera on each commando’s upper left chest that
transmitted video to the command post to enhance decision making.54
Of all the services provided by China’s antipiracy forces, escorting civilian ships is
the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in the Gulf of
Aden. Since the first task force, the two warships stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led
separate flotillas of merchant ships, sometimes in opposite directions, through an area
west of longitude fifty-seven degrees east and south of latitude fifteen degrees north.55
PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008. As a 2010 Liberation Army
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Daily article states, “From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th ship the Chinese
naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the 2,000th ship used over 220
days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only used over 180 days’ time. More and
more ships apply to enter only Chinese naval escort task forces, they believe firmly that
following the Chinese navy is safe, this type of dependence and endorsement originates
from the willingness of the Chinese navy to take on international humanitarian responsibilities, and comes from the 100% safety assurance of escorted vessels over the last two
years.”56 These impressive statistics could not have been attained without substantial
improvements in escort organization and capacity. During the first month there was
considerable organizational confusion, as a result of which commercial ships failed to
adhere to escort procedures.57 After the 2009 Spring Festival, therefore, the Chinese ministries and organizations involved began scheduling escort trips on the basis of the level
of traffic in various sections of the Gulf of Aden, using research provided by the PLAN
and MoT. Today, before the fifteenth of every month, the China Shipowners’ Association
posts detailed escort schedules. Ju Chengzhi of the MoT explains that escort scheduling
is not a simple task, as several factors must be considered: “Scheduling and coordination
of ships is very precise work. Slow ships need to increase speed, [while] fast ships need to
decrease speed; however, [ships] cannot wait in dangerous areas if they arrive before the
warships. At the same time, [one] must consider the Suez Canal issue, because the Suez
Canal gate opens at fixed times.”58 According to Liu Haitao, head of the eleventh escort
task force, task forces in early 2012 were publishing their schedules about one month
in advance.59 The PLAN generally requires merchant ships to work around the posted
schedule, but given at least a week’s notice, on a case-by-case basis it also accepts requests
for special provisions, such as for ships with speeds below ten knots.60
Escort Procedures
Convoy formations depend on the numbers of both escorting warships and commercial
vessels. One-column convoys arrange the merchant ships equidistantly, typically flanked
by one warship, which travels at a speed similar to that of the flotilla. For two-column
escorts, either a single warship steams between the columns or one takes station on each
side.61 Alternatively, as seventh escort task force commander Wang Xianzhong explains,
escorts may be “composed of three units. Escort warships are situated at the front left
and back right of the escort flotilla. In order to facilitate flexible maneuvering, both ends
look after each other, defending against pirate attacks.”62 Methods may be combined:
the third task force used four escort methods during one escort operation and, during
another separate joint escort operation with a foreign navy, was able to provide protection for twenty-five ships.63 Because of the variety of displacements and speeds of ships
applying for Chinese escorts, the eleventh task force began grouping convoys into lowand high-speed flotillas, each led by one warship.64
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Occasionally warships meeting each other with convoys from opposite directions trade
flotillas, as in a “relay race.”65 Reportedly the ninth task force emphasized placing commercial ships with lower freeboards in closer proximity to PLAN escorting ships.66 The
eleventh task force performed a textbook relay-style escort in 2012 while protecting
three commercial vessels.67 Yantai began a solo escort transit, handing off to the Type
052 guided-missile destroyer Qingdao when it reached a temporary replenishment area
in the central Gulf of Aden. Throughout, a PLAN helicopter provided aerial monitoring
and security.
Task force components detach as necessary. On 6 June 2011, when the merchant vessel
Hyderabad was threatened twenty-five nautical miles from an escort formation, the
escorting Type 054 frigate Wenzhou dispatched helicopters to disperse the pirates and
left its convoy to collect Hyderabad, deploying smaller craft to cover the merchant ships
until its return.68
Accommodations are made for ships with special requirements; PLAN warships remain
behind with them if necessary. On 18 March 2010 the Chinese MV Zhenhua 9 arrived
late at the rendezvous because of its “extremely low speed.” The replenishment ship
Weishanhu detached to provide an individual escort. Pirates converged on the easy
“prey,” and Weishanhu interposed itself, its Special Forces personnel manning heavy
machine guns. When the pirates neared to a mile and a half, Weishanhu fired two red
flares, to no effect. A second firing, this time of “explosive bombs and flash bombs” at
one nautical mile, likewise failed to deter the pirates. Thirty-four minutes after the first
firing, Weishanhu’s commander “ordered the sailors to intercept and shoot at the pirate
boats for warning.” Machine-gun fire roiled the water in front of the pirate boats, which
finally dispersed.69
Convoys, initially four ships at any given time, quickly expanded to as many as twelve.
According to Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo (Ret.), escorted flotillas in 2011 and 2012 sometimes
included twenty or thirty merchant ships.70 In March 2010 People’s Navy reported that
the fourth escort task force had broken the record for the number of ships escorted in
one convoy, arranging thirty-one ships into three columns.71 Li Shihong, commander of
the tenth escort task force, stated, “On the first escort assignment, there were only four
merchant vessels. Today, each batch includes 10 vessels or more on average. We have won
extensive praise from the international community and the trust of foreign merchant
vessels with safe and efficient escort operations.”72
Special Forces
This increase in vessels per escorted group reflects the valuable operational lessons
learned by the initial PLAN task forces, especially by the Special Forces personnel responsible for on-ship protection. Rather than deploying to all vessels in a flotilla, Special
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Forces teams now board the first ship, the ships on the outside of the convoy, and any
with low freeboards that make them especially vulnerable to skiff-based pirate attacks.73
In April 2012, the eleventh task force was deploying special operations units on commercial ships with low freeboards, low speed, and poor self-protection ability for three days
at a time.74 Jiang Jixiang, leader of the eleventh task force’s 1st Special Operations Squad,
remarked, “Before boarding the merchant vessel, we have drafted a detailed plan of action on the basis of her structure and characteristics. Our men are equipped with radios,
a variety of weapons, and advanced optical reconnaissance devices. There are seven Chinese and foreign-flagged merchant vessels in this convoy. They are general cargo ships,
bulk carriers, and oil tankers from China, Panama, and Germany.”75
In late 2011, PLAN special operations units conducted integrated training with commercial ships in which civilian seamen took up makeshift weapons and manned the sides
of their ships while PLAN forces used water cannons to fight off hypothetical pirates.76
Chen Jihong, commanding officer of the tenth escort task force’s Special Forces, commented, “The on-board escort operation can strengthen the antipiracy deployment of a
merchant vessel and enable her crew to acquire a greater antipiracy consciousness on the
one hand and, on the other, step up the exchange of antipiracy experience between the
military and civilians and enable [Special Operations Force] soldiers and crew members
to become familiar with each other’s antipiracy practices and processes.”77 By the end of
2011 over seven hundred commandos had participated in PLAN escort deployments.78
Additionally, helicopters now play a larger role than earlier in monitoring the seven
PLAN-identified transit zones in the Gulf of Aden, allowing earlier detection of potential
threats and thus earlier adjustments to escort flotilla organization, as required. Helicopters often patrol out in front of escort formations. “As the forward eyes, the helicopters
unit ensures that the escort formation can discover and discern the pirates early, and
make an early decision. . . . Sometimes, the crews on helicopters have to tackle . . . the
pirates single-handedly and fulfill the mission of driving them away.”79 Supply ships have
responded in instances where combat and monitoring capacity is perceived as insufficient, sometimes serving directly (like Weishanhu, in the incident described above) as
escorting ships themselves.80
The various adjustments made by the PLAN escorts have been lauded by Chinese
media as manifestations of the “scientific spirit” with which PLAN crews carry out their
deployments.81 The eleventh escort task force exhibited this spirit during a routine escort
of three ships in March 2012. After receiving notice that the COSCO merchant vessel Fu
Yuan would be unable to meet its escorts punctually at the rendezvous point, Qingdao
left with the two faster vessels that had arrived, while Yantai waited three hours to escort
Fu Yuan.82 These consecutive convoys reflected the PLAN’s flexibility in reacting to sudden schedule changes. Earlier, Special Forces units of the eighth task force had created
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antipiracy security guidance teams, an innovative service for commercial escortees in
which teams examined their security equipment, such as netting, security cabins, and
resources for deterring approaching pirates.83 It appears that while PLAN escort task
forces in general observe rigid convoy departure schedules, escort groups “often leave
one warship behind to wait for merchant ships that are late due to extreme weather.”84
According to an individual identified only as “Captain Liu” of Nanjing Ocean Shipping
Company, Ltd., this flexibility allows commercial companies to save thousands of dollars
as well as avoid the dangers of piracy.85
Foreign Vessels
At this writing, roughly 70 percent of ships escorted by China’s navy are foreign.86 In
terms of aggregate escorts over the four-year period of December 2008–December 2012,
roughly 50 percent of PLAN-escorted commercial vessels have been foreign flagged.87
People’s Navy reported in mid-2011 that China had provided escort services to ships
from over fifty foreign countries.88 People’s Daily emphasizes that escort services have
always been free of charge for both Chinese and foreign commercial ships.89 Other observers, such as Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and
Disarmament Association, assert that “China shoulders responsibility for foreign vessels
based on growing national strength and a friendly policy,” as many other states do not
send escort forces, because of limited interest and enormous cost.90 In Zhai’s opinion,
“Such international cooperation and exchanges also help the rest of the world to know
more about China and accept it.”91 Foreign civilian ships can apply online at the CSA
website to join a PLAN convoy. Presumably, Beijing began providing escort protection
to vessels of other countries after assessing that PLAN performance and experience were
sufficient, that domestic needs could be met at the same time, and that the political
benefits of escorting foreign ships outweighed the potential risks of refusing or failing to
protect them adequately.

Long-Duration Voyages: Meeting New Challenges
Additional operational challenges of the antipiracy mission include what are for the
PLAN unprecedentedly harsh conditions. The Gulf of Aden and surrounding regions
are marked by high temperatures, salinity, and humidity, factors that present formidable
problems for deployments lasting three or four months.92 Temperatures on the “control
deck” (甲板) of PLAN warships can reportedly reach 122° F (50° C). In one indication
of the trials of the environment, PLAN soldiers speak of their tanned faces as “black mirror” (黑镜) faces.93
These conditions test the quality and durability of equipment, and they stress PLAN
platforms considerably.94 For example, in August 2009 a helicopter fired signal flares
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at pirates near MV Zhenhua-4 in 39° C heat and force-seven (i.e., gale-force) winds.95
Another suggestion of the uniqueness of this deterrence operation is the fact that the
replenishment ship Qiandaohu, charged primarily with supporting destroyers and frigates, was tasked with establishing a temporary command center to direct helicopters.96
People’s Navy reports that the vessel did so in just twenty minutes, marking the first time
that Qiandaohu played a role in battle-like circumstances.97 Ordinarily, sailors on board
PLAN supply ships are often referred to as “provisions officers” (粮草官).98
In an indication that the Gulf of Aden mission may even be influencing Chinese naval
architecture and engineering, an article in Modern Navy suggests, “Because power
equipment frequently needs repair and maintenance during escorts, and [sometimes]
even needs [to] undergo overhaul and such, maintenance space needs to be considered
during the design [process].”99 Maintenance and spare parts are important: “With regard
to cabin supply, according to reflections on escort warships’ usage, because escort time
is long, carried spare parts and accessories are numerous and [the system] is insufficiently optimized. This results in the shortage of spare parts and accessories.”100 Specifically, “with regard to equipment reliability, during escorts, electromechanics, toilets, air
compressors fail most frequently, domestically produced equipment has the highest fault
rates, domestically produced equipment needs to undergo long term inspection before
being installed on ships.”101 As a result, “with regard to repair security, because systematic equipment faults are complex during long voyages, yet we do not currently allocate
adequate [physical] space for equipment maintenance and repairs, we need to make
improvements in these areas. Additionally, [we] need to supply an electronic manual
that can secure the needs of crewmen.”102
Operating in inclement conditions raises overall competence, and in fact China apparently considers it necessary to improve antipiracy capabilities in all conditions.
As Wang Min remarked in late July 2012, “At present, acts of piracy are still running
rampant. They are getting apparently industrialized and violent, with increased allweather piracy capabilities and expanding scope of attacks.”103 This may be evidence of
improved pirate capabilities, as assessed by the Chinese, and also of the PLAN’s own
growth and development.
Long deployments also challenge crews’ physical and mental endurance. Problems include the fact that while “raising crew members’ life security ability is an important way
to ensure war-fighting ability” at present “material and mental life [is] relatively arduous
and mundane.”104 PLAN specialists are studying health problems linked to long-duration
deployments and recommending countermeasures. According to one study, the five
most common ailments for PLAN crewmen on escort operations are respiratory infections, traumas, dermal diseases, digestive system disorders, and stomatological (mouth)
diseases.105 A similar study found that the most common medical problems for crewmen
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were respiratory diseases, dermatitis, and exercise-induced injuries. All female participants experienced menstrual disorders. To combat these health problems and thereby
better fulfill escort mission requirements, the authors suggest, “efforts should be made
on health care propaganda and education coupled with disease prevention and
treatment.”106
Another study found that rates of xerophthalmus, or “dry eye”—in which the conjunctiva and cornea desiccate abnormally—was more prevalent among PLAN escort sailors
than among ground troops. Task force–related factors include lengthy exposure to video
displays, air pollution, and marine wind.107 The seriousness of gum disease also increases
for crew members as they stay at sea longer, one study documents. That study’s authors
too suggest timely and effective propaganda and education for PLAN sailors.108 To improve sanitation and prevent disease during long voyages, another study advocates
•• Increasing training for reserve disease prevention
•• Strengthening the establishment of teams with specialized expertise
•• Strengthening the establishment of informatization for disease prevention
•• Expanding the disease prevention functions of warships and complementary sanitation ships.109
However mundane, seasickness too is a problem. One study shows that seasickness
and duration aboard vary inversely—the longer crewmen deploy, the less serious their
seasickness. The study suggests that older crew members need special attention and that
measures should be adopted to prevent seasickness and thereby improve quality of life.110
Other researchers suggest the following to prevent motion sickness for sailors on board
ship for long periods: build confidence, relax mentally, adjust eating habits, improve hygiene, enhance physical training, increase officers’ stamina, and expand medicinal treatments.111 PLA No. 425 Hospital has been assisting PLAN officers and crewmen of escort
ships.112 On board ships medical resources are limited, but officers and crews have access
to medical “teleconsultations” with hospital staff ashore.113 During an October 2010 Gulf
of Aden visit, the PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark held a joint medical training exercise,
Blue Sea Angel, with Weishanhu and the Type 052C destroyer Lanzhou.114 The exercise
simulated providing medical care to victims of pirate attacks, including coordinated
response, deployment of medical helicopters, and consultative contact with experts at
Navy General Hospital in Beijing.115 A more narrowly specialized study found that the
cognitive ability of helicopter pilots decreases as time at sea increases, especially “distinguishing special graph” (特殊图形辨认) ability. The authors suggested that aeromedical
measures be installed to ensure necessary cognitive and flying ability.116
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An embedded journalist reports that breakfast on board task force ships usually consists
of milk, eggs, porridge, steamed buns, bread, and two or three more dishes, while lunch
and dinner offer four dishes each.117 One study in Journal of Navy Medicine proposed
a new food scheme designed for long-distance voyages. The study created ten recipes
whose caloric content and nutrient composition were “reasonable”—that is, in accordance with the dietary requirements of a naval crew.118 In late 2010 CCTV-7 reported
that a PLAN support base’s logistics department had developed a vegetable preservation
technology for warships that encompassed picking, processing and packaging, loading,
onboard cold storage, and onboard management.119 The technology allows PLAN crews
to keep vegetables fresh up to forty days, from twenty-five.120 An SSF logistical crew
aboard Weishanhu developed a technology for vegetable preservation that preserves leafy
vegetables for forty days and root vegetables for sixty days, with a wastage rate of under
5 percent.121 This is important, as Chinese sailors eat vegetables with every meal.122
Morale is also a problem on prolonged voyages. One study found that while crewmen
are in high spirits predeployment, tests taken on the seventy-seventh day of escort
operations reveal that the psychological state of a crew has “degraded markedly,”
displaying “hostility and crankiness.” Tests administered on the 142nd and 204th days
revealed further-degraded crew psychology.123 Another study found that prolonged deployment reduced the mental health of female midshipmen.124 Psychological problems
among sailors were apparently especially prevalent during initial antipiracy deployments, before China’s navy had secured arrangements for resupply and replenishment
in foreign ports.125 Such problems as homesickness and conflicts among crew members
led the PLAN to bring psychiatrists aboard.126 Moreover, writes People’s Navy reporter
Zhu Hongliang, who accompanied PLAN escort forces to the Gulf of Aden, sailors’
shared berthing spaces are typically only ten square meters in size, and sailors must
awaken at 6:20 am every morning, sometimes after standing watch at night.127 Special
Forces personnel are expected to execute their responsibilities, in conjunction with
helicopter units, for eight to ten hours a day, not including unexpected action.128 “Getting salty,” as one active-duty U.S. naval helicopter pilot emphasized to the authors, is
an intangible element of long-term naval deployments that should not be overlooked.
China’s growing focus on the morale and health of Gulf of Aden sailors suggests that
the PLAN understands this concept.
To maintain morale, task forces often organize cultural activities, skill-building events,
and celebrations while at sea.129 A diary kept by a journalist while on board an escort
ship records that weekends are the “happiest” times for crewmen, because they are allowed to telephone family members then. They are also permitted to use the popular
Chinese instant-messaging program Tencent QQ for ten or fifteen minutes. Additionally,
ships are now equipped with CDMA telecommunications systems (i.e., that allow several
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users to employ one channel).130 Crewmen also have access, via satellite, to Liberation
Army Daily, the CCTV News Broadcast, and the CCTV Military Report.131 One People’s
Navy article reports that PLAN sailors commonly enjoy several types of on-ship activities outside of work, such as listening to music, watching TV, drinking coffee, exercising,
and surfing the Internet.132 As long as they are not preparing to discharge responsibilities
imminently or to replace others on watch, crewmen are free to engage in entertainment
activities.133 The article describes an “activity room” (活动室) boasting a “modern feel,”
various information outlets such as TVs, magazines, and Internet-connected computers;
European coffee; three treadmills; and two exercise bikes.134 An April 2012 Modern Navy
article profiled the various ways in which Chinese escort sailors get sufficient exercise
at sea.135 Because time and deck space are limited, sailors must select activities that conserve them. Popular fitness activities include running laps, jumping rope, long jumping,
sit-ups, and push-ups. The PLAN also provides Gulf of Aden crews vitamin packs and
other health products.
Challenges to the health of PLAN escort task force crewmen and the substantial amount
of coverage of this topic by Chinese scholars demonstrate how substantially the Gulf of
Aden mission has broadened the PLAN’s range of operational considerations.

Intranaval Coordination
Chinese antipiracy operations require considerable synchronization among military and
civil agencies. To mitigate inefficiencies stemming from vertical, asymmetrical information flows among various government and military agencies, China’s navy adopted for
this effort a flat command structure in which CMC orders can be passed directly to vessels on duty rather than through fleet and base command levels. This expedites decision
making in times of urgency.136 For example, in June 2012, while serving on the eleventh
escort task force, Yantai experienced a radar system malfunction. According to an article
in Science & Technology Daily, “the radar’s automatic plotting device suddenly ‘went on
strike’ one day. People in the ship formation checked repeatedly but could not find the
cause of the breakdown. So they activated the ‘ship’s equipment remote maintenance
and repair technical support’ group consultation system. Very quickly, people aboard
Yantai ‘invited on board’ technical experts at an electronic science and technology organization in Shanghai, and the problem was easily solved.”137
This coordination mechanism reportedly allowed the NSF task force to gain troubleshooting access to over four hundred naval and technical experts in Shanghai, reflecting PLAN efforts to ensure that its relatively inexperienced units are able to operate
smoothly in the Gulf of Aden.138 One exercise drill held by the tenth task force in
February 2012 suggests that the PLAN has recognized the need to regularize emergency
repair.139 During the exercise a repair team boarded a ship whose “navigation radar” had
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“failed” after a pirate attack and “repaired” it in twenty minutes while medical personnel
treated “injured” crew members.140
More generally, experience in coordination gained in Gulf of Aden operations has set a
standard for future instances in which Beijing needs to respond swiftly in the Far Seas or
other regions outside China. Given the PLAN’s enhanced role in safeguarding national
interests, Chinese authors Yang Jun, Zou Debin, and Xu Yanshan argue, China must
abandon the tendency to view naval development independently but should rather “include maritime material flow into the building system-of-systems of the whole military,
into the maritime material flow system-of-systems of the whole nation; and . . . build
according to the support thinking of ‘joint logistics in charge of general support, navy
in charge of special support’ under the overall planning of the nation and the General
Headquarters.”141

Encounters with Pirates
The first Chinese naval officer actually to encounter pirates in the modern era was
aboard a Chilean naval vessel participating in training exercises while circumnavigating the globe in August 2008. The pirates fled when the warship fired warning shots.142
In the Gulf of Aden, PLAN task forces are occasionally forced to contend with armed
pirates, whether in area patrol, on-ship protection, or escort operations. Antipiracy
operations can also involve encounters with unexpected personnel. In one such instance,
sailors on the Type 054A frigate Zhoushan discovered a ten-meter skiff carrying fortyfive unarmed stowaways, whom they subsequently inspected and released.143 Typical
PLAN responses to pirates involve launching signal flares, flash bombs, or stun grenades
either from the decks of warships or from helicopters, as well as warning by loudspeaker
that an organized military force is present and advising the pirates to withdraw.144
On 14 March 2009, for instance, the Type 051B destroyer Shenzhen was escorting
seven vessels in two columns. Suddenly, helicopters patrolling ahead reported eighteen
speedboats approaching from multiple axes. With the nearest support, the Type 054A
guided-missile frigate Huangshan, nine nautical miles away, Shenzhen approached the
pirates, as the helicopters circled closely and special operations forces took positions on
deck. At three nautical miles, pirates on each boat aimed bazookas and rifles periodically at Shenzhen and the helicopters. In response, Special Forces personnel “aimed at
the pirates . . . with the machine guns in their hands.” After a two-minute standoff, the
pirates fled.145
In November 2010, a crewman on board Le Cong sustained injuries after being attacked
by pirates.146 After sailing 2,300 kilometers to the scene in over thirty-seven hours,
Xuzhou sent medics on board to treat the victim’s wounds.147 On 20 November 2010,
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Special Forces responded to a situation in which the Chinese-flagged MV Taiankou (泰
安口) had been attacked and boarded by four pirates; the fate of the twenty-one crew
members was unknown.148 The cargo ship belonged to COSCO.149 Within minutes,
four Special Forces personnel were dispatched in a helicopter and eight more in two
speedboats.150 The helicopter-based forces used “photoelectric infrared” (光电红外) and
other means to survey the merchant vessel and surrounding waters. “Snipers targeted
the pirates on board, while other personnel launched flares, flash-bang and percussion
grenades as a warning and dropped hooks and shelf ladders.”151 Personnel from the boats
boarded and searched the vessel compartment by compartment. Within twenty minutes
they had rescued the crew from the security cabin, where they had been trapped for ten
hours.152 All twenty-one civilian personnel on board were unharmed.153
Yan Zhigang, a sailor on board the Type 054A guided-missile frigate Xuzhou, recounts an
experience involving Taiankou and a reported pirate attack in November 2010:
On the vast ocean, the warship, small boat, and Special Forces team members formed a
safety net, and wrapped “Taiankou” into it. When I heard the sound of Special Forces
transmitting over the intercom—“no pirates were discovered on the platform,” “the operating room is secure,” “the cabin is secure”—I was especially excited. Following 80 minutes
of fighting searches, after we confirmed that the merchant vessel was secure, 21 captive
compatriots exited the cabin consecutively. We then used the small boat to give supplies
such as food and medicine to “Taiankou.”154

The attack on Taiankou reportedly happened just two days after the crew of the Chinese
commercial vessel Le Cong successfully warded off pirates, which meant that its escort,
the guided-missile frigate Xuzhou, had to take Le Cong quickly to a secure point and then
rush to Taiankou’s location.155
In March 2010 Weishanhu fired warning shots from its heavy machine guns when
approximately 130 suspected pirate skiffs approached it during a solo escort of MV
Zhenhua 9.156 In December 2011, five pirate boats harassing merchant vessels in a PLAN
convoy fled naval and aerial pressure.157 In February 2011, shortly after the Chinese New
Year, helicopters sent from Xuzhou after a distress call fired warning shots and scared
away pirate skiffs that were chasing a South Korean merchant ship.158 In April 2012, an
eleventh task force escort convoy was surrounded by twenty-two suspected pirate skiffs,
toward which the escort fired stun grenades after they defied helicopters.159 This incident
was preceded by several smaller-scale contingencies the month before in which small
groups of suspected pirate skiffs approached eleventh task force convoys only to be repelled by a combination of helicopter pursuit and warning flares.160 Then, in May 2012,
approximately seventy suspected pirate boats began speeding toward a convoy under
escort of the eleventh task force, approaching the column on both sides.161 The pirates
continued the pursuit even after special operations personnel on Qingdao fired stun
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grenades and flash bombs.162 Special Forces men then fired machine guns into the water
in front of the skiffs as a warning, to which the pirate skiffs responded by turning toward
the starboard side of Qingdao.163 (Such deterrence by machine-gun fire has become fairly
common.)164 Special operations soldiers in helicopters fired warning shots until, after
four hours, the pirates finally sped off.165
Warning tactics employed during a training session of the ninth task force appeared
to be increasingly assertive; for instance, the guided-missile destroyer Wuhan used
high-decibel sound and strong light to deter pirates during the simulation.166 When
the simulated skiffs ignored warnings, Special Forces units manned machine guns and
evidence-acquisition officers boarded speedboats to approach the skiffs.167 During
another training exercise, in 2011, PLAN units practiced negotiating with pirates.168
PLAN warships also project English- and Arabic-language messages by loudspeaker
to suspected pirates. A broadcast from the tenth escort task force announced, “Warning, warning, warning. This is the Chinese navy. This is the Chinese navy. Go away, go
away.”169 In response, pirates usually retreat hastily. Most exchanges between the PLAN
and Somali pirates are of this type. Modern Navy reported in January 2011 that task
forces had warned away over a thousand “suspicious” vessels and thwarted hundreds of
attacks during the first two years of antipiracy operations.170
However, task forces are sometimes forced to engage pirates, those who either ignore
warnings or are already attacking a vessel when the PLAN arrives. As of April 2012, the
PLAN had reportedly “rescued” forty-eight vessels chased and attacked by pirates. It had
also escorted eight ships that had been released from captivity.171
In what may have been the PLAN’s most difficult, risky, and unpredictable operation in
its first four years of Gulf of Aden operations, in July 2012 its forces again received civilians who had previously suffered pirate attacks.172 This time Changzhou, of the twelfth
escort task force, took aboard twenty-six Chinese and foreign crew members from the
Taiwanese fishing vessel Shiuh-fu 1. The freed sailors, who had been held captive ashore
in Somalia for 571 days, were to be transferred to Tanzania, before returning home.
On the day Changzhou received them, high winds complicated the boarding.173 Wang
Mingyong, Changzhou’s commanding officer, explained, “The wind was too strong in
the area, so we employed a helicopter to get them. It took five flights and 65 minutes to
fly all 26 members back, safely.”174
The area was frequented by pirates, a factor that heightened the risks associated with
PLAN assistance.175 Accordingly, personnel involved conducted rapid, meticulous analysis.176 The task force commander, Zhou Xuming, and political commissar Zhai Yongyuan
received a flurry of preplans and plans including “Armed Forces Operations Plan and
Preplan” (兵力行动方案预案), “Political Work Orders” (政治工作指示), “Special
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Reconnaissance Proceedings Plan and Preplan” (特情处置方案预案), “Crewmen Arrangements and Life Security Plan and Preplan” (船员安置和生活保障方案预案),
“Escorting and Pickup Preplan” (护送和交接预案), and “Armament Supply Plan and
Preplan” (装备保障方案预案).177 Helicopter units of the twelfth task force apparently
faced in this operation the possibility of landing on Somali soil as well as confronting
pirates directly, the former a prospect that PLAN forces had never confronted previously.178 A People’s Navy article elaborates,
Facing a real situation in which helicopter groups, Special Forces members and small boat
drivers might [have to] land on the Somali coast, or even face pirates directly during the
pickup [and] escort process, the temporary Party Committee command preparation center
sent out political orders to mobilize. [It] called on all officers and sailors to dedicate themselves passionately to the pickup [and] escort, [while] facing a test of life and death, to not
fear hardship, [to] attack and overcome difficulties, [and to] use real actions to carry out
unlimited loyalty and devoted promises to the Motherland and the people.179

The hostage pickup brought PLAN assets closer to Somali territory, and potential pirate
bases, than ever before. Because of wave conditions, Changzhou was unable to get close
to shore, so it dispatched two dinghies with five Special Forces members and four sailors
to search the surf zone. The team found the released hostages but was unable to extract
them in the boats because of high waves near shore.180 As mentioned above, Changzhou
dispatched a helicopter to conduct the pickup, which also ran into trouble because the
wet, sandy beach was unsuitable for landing. The approach of nightfall would put the
freed hostages at risk of recapture. Two experienced Special Forces members were therefore sent to the beach to facilitate the helicopter’s landing, after which PLAN forces were
finally able to pick up the twenty-six hostages, separated into fives batches according to
height, weight, and other factors that affected their safe transport.
The above-mentioned “preplans” appear to have represented a twelfth-task-force innovation based on the experiences of the previous eleven task forces.181 Zhou Xuming
stated in a July 2012 interview with Liberation Army Daily, “Regarding the drafting of
plans and preplans, for instance, we borrow from previous experience, [and] analyze
the prevailing escort situation, [to] draft plans and preplans [for areas such as] escort
operations and logistical support, [we] make the greatest efforts to think meticulously,
completely and thoroughly about possibilities emergencies that may occur during escorts. Additionally, we have strengthened command training, and organized training to
strengthen basic capabilities for responsible teams.”182
In yet another instance, on 3 December 2010 pirates attacked the PLAN’s 275th escorted
flotilla. In a seventy-minute saga, “a pirate skiff pretending to be a fishing vessel suddenly initiated an attack on the Marshall Islands–flagged Nordic-Apollo [北欧－阿波
罗号]. After being deterred, [the pirates] again disappeared in the middle of the flotilla,
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subsequently attacking the vessel Safire-T [“萨菲尔－T”号].”183 Machine gunners
aboard Xuzhou as well as ship-based helicopters opened fire on the pirate skiff after it
hooked a ladder onto Nordic-Apollo.184
Even pirates who give up on attacks may cause problems for PLAN forces. In one instance during the seventh task force, for example,
In the process of fleeing, cunning pirates constantly adopted a zigzag approach [lit.,
“zhi-shaped approach,” i.e., in the shape of the character 之], making large turns in the opposite direction, and other methods, wanting to avoid [the Chinese navy’s] pursuit. Due to
pressure from the PLAN’s comprehensive power attack, pirates threw oil barrels and guns
into the ocean in the process of fleeing, continuing to flee at high speed. . . . At 1:59 pm,
after the pirate skiffs and warships circled around for forty minutes, while [PLAN forces]
consecutively shouted [at them] and firing warning shots, blocking [pirate] shooting, five
pirates were forced to stop their ship, raising their hands high and surrendering.185

On 15 May 2012, Liberation Army Daily reported that the eleventh task force had
“evicted” seventy suspected pirate boats.186 While the precise nature of these operations remains unclear, it appears that China’s navy envisions its level of engagement
with pirates as evolving gradually toward a more assertive and preemptive approach.
For example, May 2011 training simulated an on-ship assault on pirates who refused to
abandon a pirated vessel.187 Thus far, however, intimidation remains the core of PLAN
antipiracy action. During a solo escort of eleven vessels in August 2012, Yiyang repelled
numerous suspected pirate skiffs by speeding toward them.188 In October 2012 during
a night escort of five merchant ships, Changzhou of the twelfth task force identified via
radar three suspicious boats 7.2 nautical miles from the escort convoy. When the ships
approached within half a nautical mile, Changzhou fired signal flares and the skiffs
retreated promptly.189 This followed a similar incident in which Panamanian-registered
merchant ship Dehang, pursued by four pirate boats to within a hundred meters, placed
a distress call to Changzhou.190 Changzhou immediately pursued the boats and fired
warning explosives. The pirates subsequently abandoned their weapons and fled.
In an article in the Beijing-based journal Law and Life, reporter Meng Yan documents
the PLAN’s encounter with pirates who attacked a nearby commercial vessel during
escort patrols. On 13 July 2009, Huangshan received a mayday call from the Liberianflagged vessel Elephant while on a zone patrol. Ten minutes later Huangshan headed
toward the distressed vessel and dispatched helicopters, which flew within three hundred
meters of pirate skiffs and released warning flares. The attackers changed direction and
began pursuing the nearby Maltese-flagged commercial vessel Polyhronis. PLAN helicopters fired additional flares and explosives, and the pirates soon retreated. According to
Meng, the encounter lasted just over ninety minutes.191
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While Beijing’s official statistics depict its forces as antipiracy stalwarts, the degree of operational engagement of China’s navy with pirates is still much lower than that of other
navies. An illustration is Beijing’s recent policies on ransom payments, which reflect the
limits of Chinese ability and willingness to protect civilian ships militarily. The Dexinhai
incident remains a case in point. A Chinese-flagged bulk coal ship owned by a subsidiary of COSCO, Dexinhai was pirated on 19 October 2009 about seven hundred miles
east of the Somali coast.192 Though early rumors suggested that Zhoushan and Xuzhou
were racing to the rescue, it was soon revealed that the twenty-five-member crew was
being held hostage in Hobyo, a harbor town in central coastal Somalia.193 Chinese naval
officials explained that the PLAN warships were a thousand miles away and could not
have caught the pirates before reaching shore; in fact, Chinese press reports suggest that
Chinese leaders were collectively relieved that the pirates had taken the Dexinhai crew
ashore, which provided a rationale for military inaction.194 On 28 December 2009, a
four-million-dollar ransom payment was dropped aboard Dexinhai, and all twenty-five
Chinese crewmen were released. Interestingly, CCTV-7’s Military Report stated that on
20 October 2009 Xuzhou had been ordered to prepare for an armed rescue mission of
Dexinhai’s crew.195
In stark contrast to China’s willingness to make payoffs, since 2008 French, Indian, and
American naval forces have performed armed rescues to extract hostages without paying
ransoms.196 For example, in April 2009 U.S. Navy SEALs successfully rescued American
captain Richard Phillips of Maersk Alabama after using sniper rifles to kill three pirates
holding Phillips on a lifeboat.197 China’s central government is wary of potential embarrassment and domestic political damage from appearing weak and thus has done its
best to suppress news of ransom payments. The PLAN’s heavily publicized “100% safety
record” in the antipiracy mission should be viewed in light of the fact that PLAN operations are far more risk averse than those of counterpart navies.198 Moreover, appeasing
Somali pirates’ demands unilaterally without seeking the advice or assistance of nearby
navies is hardly conducive to fighting piracy in the long run; in fact, it risks encouraging
further piracy by offering incentives. The Dexinhai incident is a sobering reminder that
the extent of Beijing’s Far Seas maritime cooperation is limited by perceived domestic
and political liabilities.

Engagement with Other Navies
Of the many Chinese “firsts” achieved by the PLAN through the Gulf of Aden mission,
the first naval operation involving shipboard exchanges and information sharing with
foreign navies was particularly significant in the eyes of both Chinese and foreign observers.199 As Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), states, “In terms of international
engagement, the first decade of the 21st century should be divided into a pre-anti-piracy
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operations period and a post-anti-piracy period, because once the PLAN began to
conduct anti-piracy operations, the entire nature of its approach to international naval
engagement changed appreciably.”200 China has since made considerable strides in naval
engagement and diplomacy; interaction with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 has
today become daily routine in the Gulf of Aden. In December 2012 People’s Daily stated,
“[Over] the past four years, the Chinese naval escort task forces have [continued to inform] the outside [world about] the information they [possessed concerning] the activities of suspicious ships through network mailbox and radio station every day and shared
information resources with 50-odd warships of 20-plus countries and organizations.”201
During a port call in Djibouti, PLAN officers hosted a buffet reception aboard the
assault ship Kunlunshan and invited foreign naval officers.202 More substantively, in
February 2012 China’s navy hosted the first International Symposium on CounterPiracy and Escort Cooperation at the PLAN Command College in Nanjing. During the
symposium EU NAVFOR chief of staff Philip James Haslam remarked, “We work closely
together anywhere at [the] tactical level. . . . We have a common understanding [and] . . .
can generate that synergy between us.”203 Navy Military Studies Research Institute senior
researcher Cai Weidong states, “The Chinese navy hopes to build up a platform for
international cooperation that will allow naval forces of different countries to familiarize themselves with each other. I hope the platform well-serves our anti-piracy goals.”204
Modern Navy lists several barriers to more meaningful coordination that were explored
during the symposium, including the “piracy situation and intelligence information
work” (海盗形势和情报信息工作), “organization of maritime force operations” (海上
兵力行动组织), “escort law” (护航法律), and “escort provision” (护航保障).205
PLAN task forces continue to operate independently of multilateral organizations, but
Beijing has enhanced cooperation with counterpart navies in the Gulf of Aden through
shipboard exchanges, joint drills and escorts, and coordination through SHADE. See
exhibit 3 for a summary of exchanges to date. This exhibit surveys the rough frequency
of PLAN task force exchanges with traditional forces in the region.
Shipboard exchanges in the Gulf of Aden help establish simple but important relationships among China’s navy and foreign military units operating in close proximity. These
on-ship interactions are highly publicized by Chinese media as symbols of the PLAN’s
growing competence on the international stage and of China’s peaceful outward military
development. Chinese task forces have held exchanges with multilateral naval forces
operating under CTF-151, NATO, and EU NAVFOR. Such interactions have increased
considerably since the PLAN’s initial deployment. In 2011 Han Xiaohu, commander of
China’s eighth escort task force (Task Force 526), visited the NATO force’s flagship, a
frigate, in March; hosted the Singapore navy’s Rear Adm. Harris Chan, then commander
of CTF-151, on a PLAN warship in May; and hosted the EU NAVFOR force commander
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Exhibit 3. Selected Commander-Level Exchanges between PLAN and Multilateral Antipiracy
Maritime Security Forces in Gulf of Aden
Date

Counterpart

Activity

November 2009

CTF-151

Hosted CTF-151 commander aboard PLAN vessel

May 2011

CTF-151

Hosted CTF-151 commander aboard PLAN vessel

July 2012

CTF-151

Hosted CTF-151 commander aboard PLAN vessel

May 2013

CTF-151

Hosted CTF-151 commander aboard PLAN vessel

January 2010

NATO

Hosted NATO antipiracy commander aboard PLAN vessel

January 2011

NATO

Hosted and visited NATO antipiracy commander

March 2011

NATO

Visited NATO antipiracy commander on counterpart ship

January 2012

NATO

Hosted and visited NATO antipiracy commander

April 2012

NATO

Met with counterpart officials

July 2012

NATO

Hosted NATO antipiracy commander aboard PLAN vessel

August 2012

NATO

Visited NATO antipiracy commander on counterpart ship

January 2013

NATO

Visited NATO antipiracy commander on counterpart ship

February 2013

NATO

Hosted NATO antipiracy commander aboard PLAN vessel

November 2009

EU NAVFOR

Met with counterpart officials

February 2011

EU NAVFOR

Visited EU NAVFOR commander on counterpart ship

June 2011

EU NAVFOR

Hosted EU NAVFOR commander aboard PLAN vessel

July 2012

EU NAVFOR

Visited EU NAVFOR commander on counterpart ship

November 2012

EU NAVFOR

Hosted EU NAVFOR commander aboard PLAN vessel

Sources: This table draws on official Chinese media sources, primarily Liberation Army Daily, Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China
Military Online, as well as from the websites of PLAN antipiracy partners such as CMF, NATO, and EU NAVFOR. While it is
impossible to guarantee that all visits are covered, it is interesting that significantly fewer data concerning exchanges with CTF
appear to be available.

on board the frigate Wenzhou in June.206 The PLAN and Singapore navy had previously
conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010 in the Gulf of Aden, sending personnel
on board each other’s ships.207 China’s navy conducted more exchanges with CTF-152 in
July 2012 and with NATO in April and July 2012.208
PLAN task forces off the Horn of Africa too have been active in a variety of bilateral
exchanges with counterpart navies. People’s Navy reported that the PLAN and the Russian navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October 2009 in the Peace
Blue Shield 2009 (和平蓝盾－2009) exercise.209
Additionally, China’s navy held extensive joint exercises with Russian navy Blue Shield
units in May 2011.210 Scholar Lu Dehua has referred to Blue Shield as the inauguration
of a new “battle domain” (战场) of Chinese cooperative exercises with other navies.211
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Most recently, during comprehensive joint naval exercises in April 2012, Chinese and
Russian naval forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue joint training off
the coast of Qingdao.212
In addition to regular collaboration with Russia’s navy, PLAN military officials met
with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship inspections and exchanges in November
2009, and in 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with South Korean naval units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden.213 In May 2012 “Chinese and South Korean naval
escort task forces organized a joint military drill during which helicopters of the two
sides landed on each other’s warships for the first time.”214 In April 2011, Senator Mark
Kirk of Illinois paid a visit to the eighth PLAN escort task force in the Gulf of Aden and
held talks with the task force commander, Han Xiaohu.215 That same month, China’s
eighth escort task force sent Wenzhou and Qiandaohu to conduct joint antipiracy
exercises with the Pakistani guided-missile destroyer Khyber.216 The main components
of these exercises were “joint escorts” (联合护航), “communications exercises” (通信
演 练), “ship landings dispersed for maximum coverage” (交叉着舰), “joint visits” (联
合登临), and “search and rescue exercises” (搜救演练).217 These joint drills followed
the Pakistani-hosted Peace 11 multinational maritime exercises, which included naval
ships from, among other states, China, the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and
Pakistan.218 China sent frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan, as well as two helicopters and
seventy Special Forces commandos, to participate.219 In March 2013, China’s navy, as well
as the U.S. Navy, again sent forces to take part in Pakistani-hosted five-day international
antipiracy joint exercises, this time titled Aman-13 (Urdu for “peace”), which included
naval participants from thirteen navies as well as twenty other observer countries. China
has participated in all four Pakistani-sponsored antipiracy exercises held since 2007, and
sent the destroyer Harbin, the guided-missile frigate Mianyang, and the replenishment
ship Weishanhu to participate in Aman-13, assigning a total of two helicopters and 730
troops to partake in the exercise.220 Pakistan’s navy stated that the exercises are focused
primarily on “information sharing, mutual understanding and identifying areas of common interest.”221
Then in September 2012, Yiyang of the twelfth escort task force arrived in Karachi for its
second period of rest and replenishment, as well as seminars and other exchanges with
Pakistani counterparts.222 Later that year, Rear Adm. Zhou Xuming and members from
the twelfth escort task force met with Commo. Jonathan Mead, Acting Commander of
the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official visit during the task force’s journey home.
The Australian chief of navy, Vice Adm. Ray Griggs, remarked, “I welcome the continued opportunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange lessons
learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations.”223 Perhaps of even greater interest
to observers concerned about potential rivalries between China and other ascendant
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naval powers, recent evidence suggests that India too is open to Chinese nontraditional
security contributions in the IOR.224 “The footprint of the Chinese Navy has been
increasing as a result of [Chinese] economic development,” Vice Adm. Satish Soni,
Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of India’s Southern Naval Command, stated in
December 2012. “They are also contributing to antipiracy tasks. We hope as their Navy
develops, it contributes to the overall maritime security operations of the Indian Ocean
Region and its neighbourhood.”225
The Gulf of Aden operations also help to facilitate PLAN maritime engagement with the
countries themselves, in the region and beyond. People’s Daily reports that “since the second Chinese naval escort task force, the Chinese Navy has established a new mechanism
of organizing escort warships to pay friendly visits to foreign countries, and the Chinese
naval escort task forces have successfully paid friendly visits to more than 20 countries,
such as India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore.”226 Upon the
completion of their escort duties in the Gulf of Aden, the Type 052B destroyer Guangzhou and the frigate Chaohu visited Egypt, Italy, Greece, and Myanmar in succession
and also stopped in Singapore to resupply.227 During March 2011 PLAN Special Forces
engaged with civilian Tanzanian counterparts working for a marine company during
a joint training session that included training in individual tactics and coordinated
training. The two sides practiced infiltration at sea, the capture of enemy personnel, and
martial arts.228 PLAN Special Forces also performed hostage rescue and concealed rowing, among other challenging exercises.229 Along with Zhoushan, Xuzhou visited South
Africa on 4 April 2011 to conduct exchanges with the South African navy in Durban.230
In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives from eight African nations,
including Algeria, Gabon, and Cameroon, to participate in a twenty-day maritime law
enforcement program in Zhejiang Province.231 During its voyage back home from the
Gulf of Aden, the tenth task force paid an official visit to Mozambique, the first ever by
PLAN task forces, followed by an official five-day visit to Thailand.232
In summer 2012, the eleventh task force visited Ukraine, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria,
and Israel in succession.233 Previously, the fifth escort task force had stopped in Egypt,
Italy, Greece, and Myanmar.234 Similarly, the indigenously built destroyer Lanzhou
visited Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia upon conclusion of the sixth escort task
force’s deployment.235 Homeward bound following the conclusion of the ninth escort
task force’s escorting, Wuhan and the frigate Yulin stopped at Changi Port in Singapore
for replenishment; over three days their personnel interacted with Singaporean navy
counterparts and visited the Information Fusion Centre, which promotes maritime information sharing.236 They had previously stopped in Kuwait and Oman.237 These visits
demonstrate a growing tendency of PLAN task forces to use their departure and return
journeys as opportunities for overseas diplomacy.238
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The PLAN commander, Adm. Wu Shengli, visited Turkey in September 2012 to discuss
various forms of naval exchanges, including enhancing Sino-Turkish escort cooperation.239 Escort vessels have visited such destinations as Saudi Arabia and Australia, and
in March 2013 the thirteenth escort task force docked at Malta on 26–30 March, the first
such visit of Chinese escort warships to Malta.240 Of course, in addition to visiting other
countries the PLAN also hosts foreign navies in China. For example, French naval units
visited Zhanjiang, SSF headquarters, in June 2010.241 Such experiences have established
intermilitary dialogues between China and countries throughout the world, contacts of
varying strategic significance to Beijing.
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C HAPTER F IV E

Operational Trajectories

S

ince 2008 the PLAN has found that there is no substitute for experience. Over time,
China’s approaches to various aspects of antipiracy operations have evolved; however, its strategic direction for several aspects of PLAN antipiracy operations remains
debated.
This chapter examines trends and debates in PLAN approaches concerning such issues
as logistical support—international relationships, basing options, existing platforms—
and the potential impact of new platforms, such as China’s aircraft carrier.

Logistical Support Trends
From the outset, Chinese planners were seriously concerned about logistical challenges
associated with deployments to Somali waters. Since then, using experience, they have
gradually streamlined the logistical underpinnings of Far Seas antipiracy operations.
China’s navy has received considerable logistical support from other countries, from
various other Chinese military and governmental agencies, and even from China’s stateowned enterprises (SOEs) operating in foreign countries near the Gulf of Aden and IOR.
Most onshore support for the supplying and replenishing of escort task forces comes
from Chinese embassies and enterprises located in IOR coastal states.1
Sustained overseas deployments are difficult and require multiple skills that the most
advanced navies may consider routine but that the PLAN is learning incrementally. For
example, executing replenishment at sea is far more difficult than logistics that can be
planned in advance or ship handling and cargo transferring that can be simulated and
practiced in the Near Seas. It requires maintaining schedules, planning stores distribution, and exercising the supply system—repeatedly—as well as improvising, when, for
example, a “just in time” delivery to a transfer port fails to occur. Unlike during training
simulations in restricted Chinese waters, poor performance in the Far Seas generates real
consequences, often before the eyes of other navies or nations, as well as the public back
home.2
PLAN antipiracy task forces rely partially on underway replenishment to supply critical
fuel and stores. When task forces transfer escort duties, outgoing PLAN warships usually
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convey materials and equipment to incoming vessels. The PLAN is learning the craft of
blue-water at-sea replenishment, albeit gradually. One U.S. Navy helicopter pilot whom
the authors consulted has witnessed Chinese ships conducting at-sea replenishment
in the Gulf of Aden by halting and tying up. U.S. ships, by contrast, usually maintain
thirteen knots.
Refueling and maintaining ample stocks of high-quality water, food, and medicine on
board have been enduring challenges. Food supplies often spoil;3 innovative approaches
to that problem were discussed in the previous chapter. Water, too, is apparently a
particular problem. According to a June 2011 article in Modern Navy, in the PLAN all
drinking water for the duration of five or six months is obtained from shore, sometimes
via replenishment ships; water purified from salt water tastes bad and is used only for
bathwater.4 Potable water needs to be replenished monthly, but this is complicated by the
limited number of replenishment ships. An article in Journal of Navy Medicine examines
the risk of contamination in drinking water on board, which the authors see as a significant problem. They recommend that
•• Water storage compartments be cleaned thoroughly on a regular, set basis
•• Stored water be bleached on a regular, set basis, and the amount of bleaching powder
used be according to the amount of water being stored
•• Purification equipment be installed in water supply pipes throughout the ship, especially on pipes leading to the galley
•• Crew members be provided boiled water.5
In February 2012 People’s Navy ran a special report on securing fresh drinking water
for sailors in the Gulf of Aden.6 During the first deployment, in 2008, crewmen faced a
major dilemma in that regard:
Most maritime areas near the Gulf of Aden are desert-like zones lacking water [resources],
freshwater can even be sold for between fifty and sixty U.S. dollars per ton, over a hundred
times the price of water in Chinese cities. If warships want to replenish freshwater on the
coast, not only is the degree of difficulty great, [but, in addition, money] spent on foreign
exchange is extremely high. However, the warships’ costs for purifying salt water were
[also] extremely high. [Therefore, in performing] battle-ready shifts for hundreds of days
[at a time], [while facing] limited freshwater supplies, personnel did everything possible to
save water, often shaving their heads bald during the escort [mission].7

Bernard Cole sees these logistical challenges related to freshwater supply as evidence of
the PLAN’s grossly inadequate distilling plants and water-management practices. He
states, “Any ship that cannot depend on its onboard distilling plants for freshwater supplies for all purposes is hampered severely.”8
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Operating in high temperatures and saltwater environments is especially dangerous for
helicopters, which face the risk of “high-salinity crystallization” (高盐颗粒结晶) and resulting exterior corrosion. Helicopters must therefore be washed after every flight. More
generally, in the early deployments freshwater scarcity created problems for entire crews;
some sailors even developed skin diseases. People’s Navy suggests that the main cause was
that the vessels deployed to the Gulf of Aden had been designed for Near Seas operations and thus did not have the water-purification equipment needed for longer voyages.
In September 2009, managers and technicians of Qinghuang Dao Mountain Heavy
Industries Machinery Company, Ltd., began researching the problem.9 By May 2010 the
problem had been largely solved by the installation of new purification equipment, and
sailors on escort warships enjoyed a constant supply of freshwater for cleaning, laundry,
showers, and other maintenance of personal hygiene.10 The article adds that
crewmen use 5–10 liters of water and roughly 20 liters of water daily for drinking and
washing, respectively. At this rate a crew of 200 would require 5–6 tonnes every day.
However, various operational machinery and equipment on board requires high amounts
of freshwater, including diesel engine generators in “closed cooling systems” (闭式冷却
系统), “high-pressure compressors” (高压空气压缩机), and “charging storage batteries”
(蓄电池补充). Large-scale steam-powered ships that require large amounts of water to
refill boilers place particularly large amounts of strain on freshwater supply. Relying solely
on on-ship stores of freshwater cannot even come close to meeting these demands, and as
such, medium- and large-scale ships have all installed high-production saltwater purification equipment to supply backup water for crewmen and equipment, and to ensure the
persistent escort ability of ships.11

In late 2010 People’s Navy reporter Liang Qingsong outlined several logistical innovations made by PLAN escort task forces. They had
•

Strengthened safeguards according to the integrative methods of system support and
follow-on ship, specialized support and general support, intramilitary support and local support, domestic support and preassistance support. [They] gradually established
various support capability systems such as crew member–level ability; and strengthened their ability [to perform] follow-on [support], long voyage technology repair
assistance support, domestic assistance support, [and] foreign emergency support.

•

Established types of support methods such as obtaining supplies from passing commercial ships, transferring supplies hand to hand, foreign purchases, airborne shipping, multichannel backup supplies [and] emergency delivery mechanisms, ensuring
that task force equipment could be discarded promptly if accidents occurred, [and]
guaranteeing that living materials are supplied promptly.

•

Established a mechanism for foreign port resupply reliably and emergency health and
sickness rescue and delivery. [They] borrowed from the experience of foreign escort
task forces. Through research [they] offered suggestions such as condensing the
replenishment period on relying on foreign ports by comprehensive replenishment
ships, [and] establishing foreign comprehensive support points, [thereby] improving
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the strength and completeness of long-term, high efficiency mechanisms for foreign
logistical support.12

At sea, antipiracy task forces rely on a combination of underway replenishment and port
visits for fuel and stores. When escort duties are handed off to an incoming task force,
the outgoing group transfers “materials, equipment and spares” to its reliefs, such as in
the twelfth/thirteenth task force handover.13
Wang Weiyuan of PLA Naval Engineering University catalogs several problems with the
PLAN’s current refueling strategy in the Gulf of Aden:
Because of continuous escort duration limits for escort warships, [PLAN escort ships]
must undergo refueling every three weeks on average, but comprehensive supply ships
typically require three days to load supplies (including oil fuel, freshwater and provisions).
This means that the only comprehensive supply ship in the escort task force must frequently rush back and forth between port and the escort ships. Not only [does this make]
the work intensity for comprehensive supply ships high, [but it also] severely restricts the
escort ships from fulfilling their responsibilities.14

One major trend in logistical support has been the PLAN’s growing reliance on foreign
ports where its ships can moor temporarily for maintenance. For example, during the
inaugural antipiracy deployment, only supply ship Weishanhu made two brief stops, for
replenishment, at Aden Harbor, while destroyers Haikou and Wuhan received only at-sea
replenishment and made no port visits, apparently because Chinese decision makers
were concerned about the possibility of local opposition.15 This unusual initial approach
surprised some American naval observers with whom one of the authors spoke, who
had expected that the destroyers would certainly enter port repeatedly.16 Warships within
escort task forces are now, in contrast, relying increasingly on overseas ports for supply
and replenishment, a major reason why some Chinese scholars are calling for a more
systematic overseas replenishment mechanism for PLAN escort operations.17 One reason
for this trend is the extended duration of recent operations—the inaugural task force
was at sea for 124 days, whereas the most recent deployments have averaged roughly
half a year away from their home ports, as discussed above; the eleventh deployment
lasted nearly seven months. Of course, an underlying, pragmatic rationale for increasing
the frequency of PLAN port calls is that Beijing uses the antipiracy mission to pursue
broader diplomatic objectives along the IOR littoral and in the Middle East, such as
enhancing bilateral ties with important energy suppliers. Since 2011 the “normalization” (常态化) of PLAN port calls has occurred rapidly; warships in recent escort task
forces have stopped in foreign ports an average of once per month, typically staying in
port for five days.18 While on land in other countries, crews often participate in collective shopping, sightseeing, and other group activities. A third option for resupplying task
forces in the Gulf of Aden has been to rely on Chinese SOEs whose vessels operate out of
coastal-state ports. COSCO, the PRC’s biggest shipping company, has working relations
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with husbanding agents and suppliers in most foreign coastal states.19 Apparently a
COSCO subsidiary, COSCO West Africa, Ltd., has become the PLAN’s largest partner in
procuring supplies for escort ships.20 According to COSCO’s website, at the close of fiscal
year 2011 the company operated a fleet of 157 vessels, which were active at 159 ports in
forty-eight countries.21 These preexisting relationships have helped facilitate coordination between PLAN ships at sea and suppliers in littoral states. They also embody the
PRC’s growing comprehensive overseas presence in regions viewed as critical to China’s
future economic and energy security.
In May 2009 the COSCO ship Taicang supplied Weishanhu with twenty tons of
Chinese-made products, the first transaction of its kind and a new form of PLAN
logistical support in which Chinese commercial vessels transport supplies from China
directly to the navy.22 Indeed, Liao Xilong writes that to date PLAN refueling and replenishment in the Gulf of Aden have relied primarily on Chinese overseas commercial
enterprises, in what Liao views as a successful instance of civil-military integration.23
In an interview shortly after the initial task force deployment, Senior Capt. Shen Hao
(沈浩), director of the Operations Department in PLAN Headquarters, explained,
“[Logistical support] is based on self-provision, and will, according to needs, in accordance with the ways of other relevant countries, actively expand relevant cooperation
with any relevant coastal states in the maritime region [in order to] properly resolve
logistics and supply problems.”24
Of course, China’s Gulf of Aden civil-military relationship is not one-sided. Vessels
owned by COSCO and other SOEs regularly take advantage of the safety of PLAN
escorts. According to Xu Minjie, by the end of October 2011 the PLAN had escorted
COSCO ships 685 times, with 100 percent safety.25
Above-noted scholar Wang Weiyuan highlights two problems associated with this civilmilitary supply coordination:
First, this type of purchasing model relies on the COSCO Group (state-owned) to a very
high degree. The navy has to no way to control information safety at every segment of the
buying process. [It also] has no way to ensure that it can initiate effective supervision and
control during each segment. Second, the implementing of oil security is not sufficiently
standardized. [It] lacks guiding laws and documents, the security process has a high degree
of unpredictability, [and] elements of employee uncertainty are numerous.26

Some logistical challenges for China’s navy are neither routine nor predictable. In August
2009, for instance, Weishanhu’s starboard engine failed. A severely damaged gearbox required heavy repairs. To minimize loss of time, the PLAN dispatched a small team to the
port of Djibouti, where Weishanhu was allowed to call for six days of extensive maintenance.27 This independent repair capability represents a tremendous improvement over
what was available in the PLAN’s first-ever global circumnavigation in 2002. During that
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cruise the destroyer Qingdao’s diesel engines failed in the Mediterranean, and the crew
was unable to fix them. Technicians from Germany’s MTU Corporation, the manufacturer, had to be flown in.28
PLAN task forces have also experienced situations in which vessels under escort encountered problems that forced warships to react on the fly.29 For example, in November
2011 Russian-flagged fishing boat Powei, with a crew of seventy-six Chinese citizens,
was crossing the Gulf of Aden for the first time.30 A slow ship with a low freeboard and
no security cabin, Powei fell behind the convoy, whose escort was led by Yulin, and was
specially accompanied by Qiandaohu.31 In September 2009, a PLAN sailor aboard a task
force vessel suffered an acute attack of appendicitis; his condition became too severe for
shipboard treatment. In the first real-life test of the PLAN’s Far Seas medical emergency
support system, the sailor was airlifted to Salalah Royal Hospital in Oman.32 Two years
later, in response to a request by radiotelegraph, the ninth escort fleet provided basic
medical treatment to a British crew member of the foreign vessel Orion Trader (猎户贸
易者) who had torn his calf open on barbed wire that had been strung to protect against
pirate attack.33
In both cases, to obtain the necessary assistance the PLAN relied on the effective
coordination systems often supported by other PLAN agencies, such as the Armament
Department. Experiences such as these will undoubtedly shape the future development
of China’s Far Seas logistical systems and practices as well as emergency-response coordination mechanisms within the military. Relatedly, and regarding speed of response to
piracy threats, Wei Jianhua, director of an ESF division’s political department, stated in
December 2012 that PLAN task forces had, after over a thousand tests, lowered “decision
time” to ten seconds and “antipiracy deployment” time to two minutes.34 These statistics
and the enormous sample size that was used to generate them reflect a heavy emphasis
on improving emergency-response capabilities.35

Effectiveness of Logistical Support in Practice Absent Formal Basing
Agreements
Despite notable logistical innovations and resulting efficiency gains since 2008, Chinese
planners are keenly aware of the great expense of sustaining the Far Seas antipiracy mission. While responding to a query following his speech at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., in May 2011, PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde suggested
that China’s navy might not be able to support the Gulf of Aden mission much longer.
Referring to deploying naval power to protect the maritime commons, Chen acknowledged that “if the situation continues like this, it will create great difficulties for us to
continue with such operations. Although the development of the Chinese PLAN has
come a long way in recent years and we have developed a number of new ships . . . we
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are not that strong yet.”36 He continued, “Then we have this dilemma: on the one hand,
if we continue to build new ships we will [face the] constraints of [the] national defense
budget. And what is more, it will lead to the issue of hype of the ‘China threat’ again
because of our growing capabilities. On the other hand, if we stop building those new
ships, we will not only be unable to send more ships to Gulf of Aden, but we will find
it even difficult to protect and maintain our own maritime interests. So I think we still
need a long-term solution to that.”37
At the time, Chen’s authoritative speech seemed to suggest a scaling-back or even an
imminent end of China’s Gulf of Aden presence. Yet as this study went to press, China’s
naval operations in the Gulf of Aden were going strong, as the fifteenth task force executed its antipiracy escort duties. The fourteenth task force comprises slightly older naval warships, which could perhaps signal the start of a gradual scale-back. The fifteenth
task force, however, is composed of newer platforms: guided-missile frigate Hengshui,
amphibious dock landing ship Jinggangshan, and comprehensive supply ship Taihu.
Regardless, one thing is clear—the PLAN has maintained a robust antipiracy presence in
the Gulf of Aden well after Chen’s speech in Washington.
Given the immense logistical and operational benefits obtained during the first four
years of escorting, it is understandable that Beijing was initially willing to pay a premium
to send forces to the Gulf of Aden. After all, absent these operations there would have
been virtually no other near-term opportunities to project military power outside China’s immediate maritime periphery.38 However, while logistical and operational efficiency gains continue to accumulate, the PLAN’s learning curve has flattened progressively.
High-ranking PLAN officials are quickly becoming proficient in shipboard diplomacy,
and China’s navy has a growing list of completed joint exercises and antipiracy operations with foreign navies. All of this raises the larger questions: Do the benefits of future
escort task forces outweigh the costs, and, if so, to what extent, using which metrics?
The most obvious direct costs of the mission include fuel, food, and health supplies,
and the ammunition and equipment used in training exercises and live fire, as well as
depreciation of PLAN vessels and equipment. Additionally, Chinese naval planners are
surely calculating the opportunity cost of deploying supply and landing ships to the Gulf
of Aden when these ships could be preparing for more regionally based operations, such
as a potential Taiwan contingency or, even more likely, a militarized South China Sea
dispute or an escalation in the East China Sea. Some basic operational procedures applicable to the Gulf of Aden mission may be transferrable to these hypothetical regional
initiatives, but amphibious vessels like the Yuzhao-class Type 071 landing platform dock
(LPD) could derive more strategic benefits from specialized training in regional waters.
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This strategic reality has long been on the minds of such Chinese strategic planners as
Liu Jiangping. Referring to the PLAN’s evolving Near Seas active defense strategy shortly
after the first task force deployment in 2009, Liu stated that the benefits of the mission
include not only experience fighting against pirates “but also an experience for the navy’s
capability to conduct Far Oceans quasi-combat operations” (还是对海军执行远洋准作
战能力一次经验).39
That said, Beijing may view its Gulf of Aden cost structure quite differently from what
has been outlined above. For example, the PLAN may well desire to continue to spread
experience and operational gains from the Gulf of Aden mission farther through its
ranks. That would help explain the NSF’s deployment of the eleventh escort task force
in early 2012, and it would also suggest that task forces may continue to be deployed for
some three to five more years to expose additional destroyers and frigates to Far Seas
operations. China is clearly using its Gulf of Aden mission to provide learning experiences for its most advanced surface vessels. For example, as of October 2012, 79 percent
of all frigates deployed off the coast of Somalia had been Jiangkai II air-defense ships,
currently the PLAN’s most advanced frigate platform. Similarly, 57 percent of PLAN destroyers used in the antipiracy mission have been members of the Luyang I and Luyang
II classes, the PLAN’s leading area-air-defense ships.40 Viewed in larger perspective, the
emphasis on sending elite ships to the Gulf of Aden becomes even clearer.
The Gulf of Aden mission has provided tremendous opportunities for operational gains
for China’s small number of advanced replenishment ships. For example, CCTV-7’s
Military Report program stated in May 2012 that Weishanhu had broken several replenishment records while serving in the Gulf of Aden, using a variety of methods, including
“abeam replenishment, vertical replenishment, and lighterage.”41
Alternatively, perhaps China’s navy wants to continue to derive benefits incrementally
by adjusting and adding features to its current missions. One area where value might be
added is the Z-9 helicopter; the Gulf of Aden mission could provide more opportunities
for testing Chinese-made platforms. Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo (Ret.) believes that helicopters
are central to raising escort forces’ productivity and dynamism, because the extended
coverage range they provide makes operations more efficient and allows the PLAN to
respond more effectively to nontraditional attacks.42 By making its escort operations
more dynamic, the PLAN can continue to make modest operational discoveries that will
be applicable in other areas of PLA modernization.
For example, a 2012 issue of Chinese journal Aviation World recorded the experience
of Guo Xichun, deputy commander of the Seaborne Aircraft Division of the seventh
escort task force, as a naval aviation commander in the Gulf of Aden. In May 2010, Guo’s
division performed live-fire training exercises a thousand meters above the sea. This
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training exercise was the first in which PLAN ship-based helicopters fired .50-caliber
machine guns in the Gulf of Aden.43 In March 2011, helicopter units began nighttime
training to raise combat readiness against the possibility of a pirate attack during the
night, including “blackout procedures” (灯火管制), in which pilots were hard-pressed
to distinguish precisely the sea surface. They had to rely on dim lights of PLAN vessels to
discern their locations in relation to the flight decks.44 In another example, the eleventh
task force conducted its first “day-into-night ship-aircraft training exercises” in March
2012. Commenting on the training, helicopter group commander Ma Lei stated, “When
we fly under dark night conditions at high seas, there are no reference features whatsoever. From the moment you take off from the deck, what you see ahead of you is the
black bottom of a wok. You cannot make out anything visually. You have to rely entirely
on instrumentation to judge the altitude, velocity, and all other statuses.”45

Guo further remarked, “The Gulf of Aden airspace is a stage for navies of the world to
display their level of ship-based helicopters. As the ‘national team’ of China’s ship-based
helicopter field, we are representing our country’s helicopter division’s image and actual
capabilities. In front of foreign militaries, we certainly want to strive to be number one,
achieving the ‘gold medal, strive for our mother country’s honor.’”46 The enhanced role
of helicopter units is thus recognized as an important component of the PLAN’s image
and abilities manifested in the Gulf of Aden. For example, the PLAN’s first ship-based
aircraft unit commander, Qi Xianglong, remarked: “Practice proves that ship-based
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helicopters in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters executing antipiracy operations and
rescue operations for hijacked ships displayed uses irreplaceable by other equipment.”47
The sixth escort task force appears to have been the first task force to utilize “ship-boathelicopter” escort methods during its time in the Gulf of Aden, reflecting how helicopter
use allows for escort innovation.48
Ultimately, the costs and benefits of PLAN antipiracy operations must be considered
in light of logistical alternatives. China’s navy could deploy other platforms to Somalia
or pursue some form of basing agreements with a state or states in the region, both of
which would lower logistical costs substantially but would likely carry heavy political
baggage. Chinese scholars continue to debate the best approach. North Sea Fleet commander Wang Dengping has questioned the current underpinnings of PLAN logistics,
suggesting that during the next five years PLAN deployments should continue to improve logistical support in the Far Seas through practice and exploration.49

Utilization of Different Platforms
Considering the lack of other opportunities to deploy naval platforms in the Far Seas,
it is understandable that the PLAN is eager to send its most advanced platforms to
the Gulf of Aden. While not all PLAN destroyers and frigates are modern, all PLAN
task forces to date have employed a combination of one or two Type 052 Luyang-class
destroyers or Type 054 Jiangkai-class frigates. The largest platforms used in China’s
antipiracy operations have been those performing supply and replenishment functions.
Thus far, the PLAN has dispatched Type 903 Qiandaohu-class replenishment ships as
the base platform throughout its escort operations. Weishanhu served during the initial
deployment and has since participated in the second, fifth, sixth, and eleventh task
forces. Qiandaohu, meanwhile, has served in various capacities during several escort task
force deployments. With displacements of twenty-three thousand tons, Type 903s were
the PRC’s most experienced replenishment ships at the outset of the antipiracy mission.
In 2007 Weishanhu participated in the Sino-British Friendship 2007 and Sino-French
Friendship 2007 exercises.50
Three Yuzhao-class Type 071 LPDs, the PLAN’s largest vessels aside from the recently
commissioned aircraft carrier Liaoning, remain the most formidable platforms available
for supporting PLAN antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.51 The Type 071 flagship Kunlunshan participated in the sixth escort task force. It was deployed to the Gulf
of Aden in 2010, shortly after being commissioned in late 2007, reflecting the PLAN’s
eagerness to deploy its best platforms in the Far Seas. On 28 August 2010, as part of the
sixth task force, Kunlunshan helped to repel three different pirate groups. Having itself
discovered the first group, it brought special operations personnel into position and dispatched helicopters before intercepting the pirates at full speed. It repeated this process
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with a second wave of pirates.52 In each case, when pirate skiffs approached the PLAN
escort column, Kunlunshan-launched helicopters circled above the suspects, eventually
firing concussion rounds and causing them to retreat.53
Jinggangshan, a two-hundred-meter-long Type 071 commissioned into the South Sea
Fleet in October 2011, engaged in joint training with PLAN helicopters in February 2012
and is likely to participate in future task forces.54 It cost $300 million to build, comes
equipped with four hovercraft vehicles and two Z-8 helicopters, and requires a crew
of roughly eight hundred. As several analysts have noted, Type 071 ships, in addition
to supporting the PLAN’s current antipiracy mission, move China’s navy closer to an
ability to assemble a comprehensive carrier group.55 Type 071 LPDs provide antipiracy
task forces with unprecedented capacity—one ship can hold fifteen to twenty amphibious armored vehicles, a number of landing craft, and helicopters for extended voyages.
As Dennis Blasko points out, these features give the PLAN “its first true ‘blue water’
amphibious capability.”56
The deployment of Type 071 LPDs has allowed China’s navy to test smaller platforms
during Far Seas operations as well, such as an air-cushion vehicle, hull 3320.57 During
September 2010 the hovercraft was deployed from Kunlunshan and conducted patrols in
the Gulf of Aden, successfully identifying a benign target six nautical miles away.58 This
is in addition to the indigenously developed speedboats that Chinese LPDs carry, boats
that are very maneuverable and suitable for chases.59 Moreover, helicopters deployed
from Kunlunshan have been shown to play important roles in deterring suspected pirates, especially when flotillas include a large number of ships.60
One observer has suggested that China’s Gulf of Aden mission reflects the need for more
warships capable of operating for extended periods in the Far Seas. The PLAN entered
the international fight against Somali piracy to protect national interests, and executing
this Gulf of Aden mission has utilized a large portion of China’s most advanced warships. If similar threats to China’s economic security arise in other regions throughout
the world, they could impose excessive demands on China’s existing Far Seas–relevant
inventory.61
At least some PLAN vessels tasked to the Gulf of Aden mission appear to have propulsion systems optimized for such long-range voyages. For instance, Type 052C Luyang II
area-air-defense destroyers reportedly use a combination of two QC-280, twenty-eightmegawatt, aero-derivative gas turbines (reverse-engineered Ukrainian GT2500 marine
gas turbines) and two six-megawatt diesel engines.62 While reliability remains unproven,
no significant propulsion problems have been reported. This dual arrangement, known
as combined diesel or gas, enables warships to enjoy maximum speeds significantly
faster than their cruising speeds. It gives vessels the best of both worlds. Marine gas
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turbines offer a number of tactical advantages over diesel power plants, including a high
power-to-size ratio that allows powerful units to drive small ships without occupying
much space; rapid start-up, acceleration, and maneuvering; and minimal low-frequency
mechanical noise, although cavitation from ships’ screws tends to be the most important
factor in acoustic detection.63 Diesels, for their part, are far more efficient than fuelhungry gas turbines, particularly at low speeds.
If the PLAN adopts gas turbines widely and conducts extensive high-speed operations,
it will require additional oilers, the exact number depending on the scope of operations
envisioned. China is already building one or two new replenishment ships, but this is far
from sufficient to support substantial out-of-area operations. On a related note, submarines need nuclear propulsion to engage in such long-distance operations efficiently, but
China only has a total of five operational nuclear-powered attack submarines at present,
and they remain relatively noisy.64

Prospects for New Platforms, Such as Aircraft Carriers
The commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, on 25 September 2012,
coupled with the present lack of overseas bases, raises the question whether the PLAN
might eventually use that carrier to support antipiracy efforts and collect experience in
the process. 65 A PLAN officer told one of the authors in 2011 that the naval platforms
China then possessed were “still not enough” to achieve its security goals: “The majority
of our ships are small, and can’t navigate on the high seas. Even the Gulf of Aden task
groups had a very hard time. In the future, China will have three or four carrier groups,
with one operating at a given time.” Similarly, Chinese naval expert Li Jie believes China
should possess a minimum of three aircraft carriers “to accomplish sea combat missions
and fulfill international obligations.”66 The same article suggests a greater role for larger
PLAN warships in future nontraditional security operations, such as antipiracy: “As a
responsible major power and one of the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, China will shoulder more international responsibility in various fields
such as disaster relief and combat against terrorism and piracy. Therefore, the country’s
naval force, particularly large warships, will become more and more useful.”67
Initial Chinese scholarly reactions view China’s first aircraft carrier, the 990-foot-long
then-Varyag, purchased for $20 million from Ukraine in 1998, as a necessary step in
China’s self-defense-based military modernization and not primarily as a resource for
winning bilateral regional disputes.68 Chinese carriers may add substantially more value
when deployed abroad for contemporary noncombat operations, such as peacekeeping,
disaster relief, and antipiracy, at least in the near term.69 Indeed, when Liaoning was delivered to China’s navy, People’s Daily noted the carrier’s importance for developing Far
Seas cooperation and the nation’s ability to respond to nontraditional security threats.
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Even so, deploying a carrier out of area would not simply entail “showing the flag” but
reflect China’s arrival as a blue-water naval power.70
Regarding the value added by deploying a carrier near the Gulf of Aden, CASS researcher Wang Hanlin wrote in 2009 that “the rotation of warships sent to the region has
also revealed the necessity of an aircraft carrier for China. . . . It will be much easier for
an aircraft carrier combat unit to safeguard merchant vessels in such a remote area.”71
Similarly, a China Daily op-ed stresses the relationship between carrier deployment and
nontraditional security: “The increasing threat from nontraditional elements like terrorism and piracy also require China to have its aircraft carrier to ensure the security of its
transportation in the sea.”72 Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo (Ret.) echoes this sentiment, suggesting that deploying a carrier should enhance, not detract from, the global fight against
common security threats in nonsovereign waters. According to Yin, “[Seeking] harmonious oceans, with aircraft carriers, it will be even more possible to implement our aim of
harmonious oceans.”73
Of course, rather than as simply enhancing global maritime security, CCP and PLA
officials may view this option as a convenient way eventually to gain invaluable operational experience under the legitimate mandate of promoting SLOC security and
making an even greater contribution to the fight against regional piracy. For example,
Modern Ships editor Cui Yiliang views the accumulation of experience as the foremost
function of China’s first carrier.74 Current Chinese operations in the Gulf of Aden have
limited air coverage, because they rely solely on shipborne helicopters.75 The relatively
brief endurance of these airframes has been identified as a shortcoming of PLAN
antipiracy operations.
As China fields a fixed-wing, carrier-deployed aircraft such as the J-15, or if it fields a
capable carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle in significant numbers, in operating it
Liaoning will provide the Chinese antipiracy mission with much greater aerial coverage,
in addition to alleviating the constraints imposed by limited deck space of other surface
vessels. Additionally, antipiracy operations could also represent excellent opportunities to learn important lessons on logistics, training, and operations. Relatively low-risk
missions against pirate crews could serve as effective training. Carrier crew members at
all levels would benefit substantially from participation in PLAN efforts off the Horn
of Africa.76 Already, Gulf of Aden deployments allow experimentation with PLAN task
group composition, as will be necessary when new vessels enter the fleet, particularly in
preparation for a carrier group.77
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Type 081 LHD Landing Ship
Although Liaoning has dominated Chinese and international media coverage of China’s
naval modernization, the reported development of the Type 081 landing helicopter dock
(LHD) provides another advanced platform suitable for Gulf of Aden and other antipiracy missions. Chinese analysts such as Ye Qi have suggested that further development
of amphibious ships would make a great contribution to antipiracy operations.78 As was
revealed at the International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference in May 2007,
China is developing an LHD landing ship.79 A Global Times article reported that the
ship was identified as the rumored Type 081 and that it will be comparable in displacement and size to the Type 071 LPDs, which carry helicopters and transport and deploy
ground forces, but with a flat, or “flush,” helicopter deck.80 The same article, citing Jane’s,
suggests that the Type 081 will possess greater aviation capabilities than its Type 071
predecessor and that the PLAN may construct from three to six of them. Reportedly, the
Type 081 will be able to transport twelve helicopters and a crew of over a thousand uninterruptedly for approximately one month.81
Many observers believe that Type 071 and Type 081 amphibious ships between them
provide substantial utility and are suited for nontraditional operations beyond the
Near Seas, as opposed to regional missions.82 Large deck space is conducive to militaryto-military exchanges and other peacetime naval activities, and the dynamic ability of
amphibious ships to deploy ground, air, and sea support in a short time is particularly
suitable for rescue and emergency situations outside China.83 Chinese scholar Chen
Chuanming asserts that China’s future amphibious platforms need to upgrade from
“traditional beachhead warfare” (抢摊登陆作战) to amphibious assault vehicles and to
incorporate such modern weapons technology as amphibious transport docks, helicopters, and unmanned aircraft.84
There is no open opposition to continued deployments to the Gulf of Aden of the
PLAN’s most advanced amphibious platforms, such as newly commissioned Type 071
LPDs, though efficiency concerns are emerging. You Ji finds that the large PLAN vessels
currently tasked to the Gulf of Aden are inflexible, ill suited to the antipiracy mission,
and extremely expensive to operate there.85 Perhaps, as part of a global pattern whereby
navies are shifting missions to smaller and smaller ships, the PLAN may increasingly
search for opportunities to balance its desire to adapt to this trend while still providing
operational experience for some of its major platforms. For example, You Ji writes, “Rear
Admiral Yin Zhuo (尹卓) raised the idea of building simplified Type 054 frigates to cater
to IHA [international humanitarian assistance] and antipiracy operations. These frigates
would have smaller displacement of three thousand tons, fewer weapons systems—
such as missiles—and enhanced special equipment for HA [humanitarian assistance]
and other NTS [nontraditional security] tasks. In order to cut cost, their construction
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standards could be set as half military, half civilian.”86 Yin has also stated that antipiracy
operations have “shown the Navy’s equipment is not particularly suited to blue water
operations . . . [and] our equipment, our technology, especially our level of information infrastructure and communication means, as well as our blue water deployment
capabilities . . . still have a relatively long way to go to catch up with that of the Western
countries.”87
The notion that China’s navy needs more efficient ships to perform new missions such
as antipiracy operations may be gaining acceptance in Beijing, as evidenced by the commissioning in early 2013 of four hulls of the Jiangdao-class Type 056 corvette. According
to Xinhua, “The new [light] frigate requires only one-third of the crew needed by its predecessor, the Type-053, and it is expected to be deployed primarily for escort missions
and antisubmarine operations.”88
The entrance of larger and more advanced PLAN naval platforms into the fight against
piracy would be a significant event in Chinese naval modernization. Navy planners
simultaneously face an even more significant decision—whether China should use antipiracy operations, which have continued uninterrupted for five years and have no end in
sight, as a rationale for pursuing military basing arrangements in other countries. There
are strong opinions among Chinese observers both for and against basing. Proponents
assert that China’s global interests are too large to ignore anymore, while advocates of
the status quo stress the ideological contradiction between basing and China’s traditional stance of noninterference.

Basing Prospects for Antipiracy Missions
Modern naval platforms can improve the efficacy of PLAN antipiracy operations markedly. However, resource constraints limit investments in large naval platforms, including
carriers and landing ships, and thereby the PLAN’s ability to project force in the Far Seas
in the long term. Without permanent bases as platforms for the antipiracy mission in
the Indian Ocean and off the Horn of Africa, PLAN escort forces must refuel at sea or
during official port calls arranged well in advance. Carriers, modern landing ships, and
auxiliary vessels are simply unable to provide the same services as would permanent onshore basing facilities.89 This section examines the potential for China to pursue basing
arrangements to bolster its antipiracy operations.
As of May 2011, PLAN escort forces had completed port calls in nineteen countries
to refuel and replenish, as well as to enhance bilateral military ties through joint drills
and other onshore exchanges. PLAN vessels have called primarily in ports in countries
surrounding the Gulf of Aden, such as Djibouti, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. They
have also stopped in countries such as Pakistan and Seychelles, the ports of which have
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increasing strategic importance both for combating pirates willing to attack ships far
from the Gulf of Aden and for enhancing China’s broader presence in the IOR. While
the frontispiece depicts the locations and purposes for which China’s antipiracy task
forces have visited, Exhibit 4 compares their respective escort statistics.
Exhibit 4. PLAN Gulf of Aden Escort Statistics by Task Force, 2008–12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Time at
Sea

Task Force

26 December 2008–28
April 2009
(124 days)

2 April
2009–21
August 2009
(142)

16 July
2009–20
December
2009 (158)

30 October
2009–23
April 2010
(176)

4 March
2010–11
September
2010 (192)

30 June
2010–7
January
2011 (192)

2 November
2010–9 May
2011 (189)

Escorts

212

393

582

660

588

615

578

Batches

41

45

53

46

41

49

38

Sources:
1–8. “中国海军十批护航编队简介” [A Brief Introduction to China’s Ten Naval Escort Task Forces], Xinhua, 26 December 2011,
news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-12/26/c_122483096.htm.
9. 郭丹 李德 肖德伦, “海军第九批护航编队凯旋,” 湛江日报, www.gdzjdaily.com.cn/zjnews/zjpolitics/2011-12/25/
content_1435956.htm.
10. Gao Yi and Tang Zhuoxiong, “10th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Returns to Base,” Liberation Army Daily, 8 May 2012,
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7810913.html.
11. “Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Ensures Safety for 4.640 Ships,” NavalToday, 14 May 2012, navaltoday.com/2012/05/14/
chinese-naval-escort-taskforce-ensures-safety-for-4-640-ships/; Chen Dianhong and Mi Jinguo, “11th Chinese Naval Task Force
Returns Home after Visiting Israel,” Liberation Army Daily, 21 August 2012, english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7918352.html;
“11th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Leaves Gulf of Aden,” Liberation Army Daily, 25 July 2012, english.peopledaily.com
.cn/90786/7886530.html; 第十一批护航编队回到祖国怀抱 [11th Escort Task Force Returns to the Embrace of the Mother Country], Qingdao Finance Daily, 6 September 2012, qd.wenming.cn/syjj/201209/t20120906_345091.html.

In early December 2011, the foreign affairs minister of Seychelles, a small island nation
situated strategically in the southern Indian Ocean, formally invited China to establish
a base for refueling and replenishing warships involved in antipiracy operations in the
region. As an article written by an author from the PLA Border Defense Academy (中
国人民解放军边防学院) explains, in March 2012 China confirmed that it planned to
establish a presence on Seychelles to contribute to its antipiracy mission.90 The invitation
came after China donated two Y-12 twin-engine, turbo-prop reconnaissance and utility
aircraft to Seychelles earlier in 2011.91
The Chinese were defensive about Seychelles’s offer, insisting that use of Seychelles’s
ports for logistical and supply purposes would in no way be tantamount to establishing
a military base.92 China’s Ministry of Defense stated on its website, “According to escort
needs and the needs of other long-range missions, China will consider seeking supply
facilities at appropriate harbors in the Seychelles or other countries.”93
Sino-Seychellois military ties had been initiated in 2004, when a military cooperation
agreement sent roughly fifty Seychellois soldiers to China, but they have since grown
over the years.94 China’s Peace Ark hospital ship visited Seychelles in November 2010,
and two Chinese frigates called in April 2011.95 In May 2012 the two countries finalized
an agreement to allow China’s navy to transfer detained suspected pirates to Seychelles
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for further legal proceedings.96 In July 2012, Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of staff of
the General Staff Department of the PLA, visited President James Michel in Victoria to
discuss implementation of defense programs and to enhance bilateral cooperation.97 By
2011, logistical support for PLAN efforts in the Gulf of Aden must have been seen as the
natural next step. Accordingly, notwithstanding China’s firm refusal to establish a long8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Total

21 February
2011–28
August 2011
(189)

2 July
2011–24
December
2011 (175)

2 November
2011–5 May
2012 (188)

27 February
2012–September 2012
(191)

3 July
2012–19
January
2013 (201)

9 November
2012–23
May 2013
(196)

16 February
2013–28
September
2013 (225)

4+ years

507

280

240

184

198

166

181

5,000+

46

41

40

43

45

36

63

500+

12. Cheng Bijie and Hou Rui, “12th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Returns Home after Visiting Vietnam,” China Military Online,
15 January 2013, english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8092041.html; Cheng Bijie and Hou Rui, “Twelveth and Thirteenth Chinese
Naval Escort Task Forces Conduct Mission Handover”; 12th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Returns Home,” China Military
Online, 22 January 2013, english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8101766.html;
13. Zhu Shaobin and Xiao Jiancheng, “Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Arrives in Gulf of Aden”; Guan Lei and Xiao
Delun, “Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Escort Task Forces Conduct Mission-Handover,” China Military Online, 15 March 2013,
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8168363.html; “China’s 13th Escort Fleet Returns from Somali Waters,” Xinhua, 23 May 2013,
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/23/c_132404107.htm.
14. “Chinese Flotilla Sets Sail on Escort Missions,” Xinhua, 16 February 2013, eng.mod.gov.cn/HomePicture/2013-02/16/
content_4432892_4.htm; Zhang Tao, “14th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Returns Home,” China Military Online, 29 September 2013, eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2013-09/29/content_4468919.htm

term military base in Seychelles, Victoria’s offer spurred internal debates on how best to
supply an increasingly global PLAN. Remarks have come against a backdrop of suspicion
from India, whose southern coast lies just three thousand kilometers from Seychelles.
Official Chinese responses to the offer in 2012 essentially deflected the notion that China
is beginning its military expansion into the Indian Ocean. One official remarked, “It
is common practice for all navies of the world to seek supplies in nearby international
ports while carrying out long-distance missions.” He refused to discuss the potential
nature or details of the agreement.98 Chinese responses more generally have defended
a potential PLAN base at Seychelles as both legal and rational, pointing out that the
United States and India already have permanent military presences there.99 Chinese media have also noted Japan’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti to fight piracy.100
Pan Chunming, a deputy director of a political department under a division of the SSF,
notes that China’s basing arrangements as of 2012 were far inferior to, and could even be
negatively influenced by, those of other navies.101 Pan states, “Once we coordinated with
a foreign port to berth for three days. However, the port later only allowed us to stay for
one day, because a Japanese ship was coming.”102 Pan Zhiqiang, of the ESF, also cites Japan’s relatively advanced basing presence abroad as motivation for reconsidering China’s
conservative approach.103 Pan remarks, “China has invested a large amount of money
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in Djibouti, and helped the country build its infrastructure. However, our influence
over the country cannot compete with that of Japan[;] . . . maybe it’s time to adjust our
strategy to reverse the passive position.”104 In March 2013, Djibouti reportedly invited
China to establish a military facility there, where PLAN antipiracy task force vessels have
docked more than fifty times over the past four years.105
At least one Chinese observer, Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo (Ret.), has lobbied, on the basis of
existing logistical deficiencies in the PLAN antipiracy mission, for fixed port access along
China’s vital sea lifelines.106 Most nations around the Gulf of Aden being Muslim, there is
essentially no supply of pork, critical for feeding a Chinese crew of eight hundred affordably. Essential fruits and vegetables also have to be shipped long distances. Yin further
argues that current refueling and replenishment arrangements are inadequate in the
long run and need to be replaced by port agreements that allow large PLAN warships to
moor alongside, shut down their engineering plants, and receive proper inspection and
maintenance.107
Others have also promoted a more global PLAN presence to protect all of China’s
overseas interests. Chen Chundi advocates a Chinese naval presence in what he terms
the “‘Islamic Crescent’ of Chinese Transport” (中国国运的 “伊斯兰弧带”), a band of
largely Muslim states, encompassing a quarter of the world’s countries, running from
Southeast Asia through South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, to North Africa.108
Chen maintains that this zone contains two-thirds of global petroleum reserves and is
one of its most politically and socially unstable regions. Chinese assets based in “Islamic
Crescent” nations are not only critical for economic growth and energy security but
also potentially the most vulnerable to disruption. For example, Chen argues that China
should use its good relations with “Islamic Crescent” states to establish mutually beneficial port-call agreements. Such arrangements would mitigate serious logistical challenges
that Far Seas antipiracy operations create for the PLAN, and they would show respect for
the sovereignty of China’s littoral hosts.109 That said, even Chen’s modest policy recommendation might unnerve many of China’s trading partners, as he calls for destroyers
and frigates to be deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bay of Bengal, and
the Arabian Sea.
The notion of establishing “Far Oceans footholds” (远洋立足点) in relative proximity
to vulnerable maritime regions has been supported by multiple PLA scholars, including
retired PLA general Peng Guangqian, who argues that such footholds are fundamentally
different from military bases. The former are bilateral, mutually beneficial access agreements that have no effect on the host nation’s sovereignty.110 These fixed access points
would ensure that PLAN task forces have access to supplies and emergency support. Reflecting a slightly different perspective based on a review of the escort operations to date,
scholars Xu Ge and Zhu Qianwang of China’s Naval Engineering University suggest that
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given the rapid and unpredictable nature of issues arising at sea, future missions require
better overall planning.111 Solid preparation is needed with respect to equipment. To
ensure effective responses to challenges that might conceivably arise, the authors argue,
reliance on coastal bases and ports may be needed for comprehensive support.112 In their
opinion, perhaps the most significant revelation of escort operations over the past three
years has been the need for fixed supply access.
Other Chinese observers are more explicit in their advocacy of some form of bases or
“places.” Ni Lexiong has suggested that Seychelles would become a basing location if
China’s navy determined that a permanent presence closer to the Gulf of Aden was
needed to continue antipiracy operations.113 Fudan University professor Shen Dingli
agrees that China should establish overseas bases to protect its many economic channels,
stating that such bases would contribute to regional security in the Indian Ocean and
global security as a whole, rather than escalating interstate tension.114 Mounting unrest
in Oman, for example, provides a material incentive to look for new ports in which to
refuel and replenish supplies for operations that contribute to maritime security.115
Similarly, PLAN scholar Jing Aiming argues that the PLAN’s future Far Seas development will rely on three levels of “support points” (支撑点). First, on the most basic level,
the PLAN should rely on ports such as Djibouti, Aden, and Salalah for routine refueling
and resupply. In these areas, China’s navy could meet its supply needs using commercial
standards. The second class of support points would include such ports as Victoria, Seychelles, that can support relatively fixed schedules of PLAN ship supply, routine air-based
reconnaissance operations, and replenishment stops. The third level of support relies on
longer-term contractual agreements that would permit China to perform more comprehensive supplying, replenishment, and large-scale repairs of shipboard weapons. Jing suggests Pakistan as a likely third-level support point that would primarily use mid-to-longterm agreements for supply, replenishment, and large-scale warship and weapon repair.116
The need for various levels of overseas maritime support, according to Jing, is the
result of the PLAN’s current status of “Three Lacks and One Without” (三无一没有),
a reality that many Chinese analysts see as stifling the PLAN’s Far Seas development.117
This phrase refers to “lacking fixed supply points” (无固定补给点), “lacking rest and
replenishment bases” (无固定修整地), “lacking fixed-wing aircraft support” (无固定翼
飞机支援), and “being without a large-scale equipment supply and maintenance center”
(没有大型装备修理中心).118 A system such as the one Jing articulates would ensure
for future task forces stable access to replenishment and combat supplies, not just in the
Gulf of Aden, but throughout much of the IOR. That prospect may provide Beijing with
sufficient incentive to seek basing arrangements that, if realized, would certainly improve
the PLAN’s effectiveness in and around the Gulf of Aden.
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While Beijing has been mute on its plans for overseas bases, there are, as mentioned
above, several littoral states with port facilities that could potentially add value to antipiracy and other PLAN Far Seas operations. As Chinese analyst Wang Zhongsheng noted
shortly after China’s first task force deployment in 2009, China needs to enhance research
on overseas basing and facilities, particularly in regions close to areas where China’s navy
is likely to be charged with future “diversified tasks.”119 Exhibit 5 examines ports along the
IOR and near the Middle East that have received Chinese attention in recent years.
Exhibit 5. Ports for Potential PLAN Overseas Access and PLAN Visits Thereto
Port

Country

Quality of Repair Facilities

# PLAN AntipiracyRelated Visits since
28 December 2008

Nature of Visits

Salalah

Oman

Only small craft facilities currently
available.

15+a

Replenish/overhaul

Aden

Yemen

National Dockyard Company offers
range of limited facilities, services.
Workshops, large lathes, electrical,
casting, refrigeration, other repair
shops; in-water repair services. Two
ﬂoating docks.

8+

Replenish/overhaul

Djibouti

Djibouti

Multiple foreign naval/military bases;
China reportedly invited to establish
its own military facility. Small repairs
possible; container terminal phase 1
construction completed; can berth two
large container vessels together.

11+

Replenish/overhaul

Gwadar

Pakistan

500-acre shipyard two 600,000 DWT
dry docks planned. Very large crude
carrier + ultra large crude carrier
construction planned. Expansive
second phase of the port was supposed
to be completed in 2010 but has
not yet begun construction. Further
development to include fifteen to
twenty berths, ship cargo handling
equipment, port machinery, and
warehouses; not commercially viable
at present. China contributed $198
million of initial $250 million port
investment. China Overseas Ports
Holding Company Limited assumed
port management control on 23 May
2013, with China Communications
Construction Company as project
contractor. Nineteen million tonnes/
yr. capacity oil refinery planned. b

N/A

N/A

Karachi

Pakistan

PLAN’s preferred Indian Ocean repair
facility. Two dry docks available;
18,000/25,000 DWT; development of
bulk cargo, deepwater container terminals, and other expansion under way,
including 18 m container terminal.

4+

Hambantota

Sri Lanka

Ship-serving capabilities planned; port
to be constructed in four stages over
fifteen years. Phase 1 accommodated
first vessel in 2010; general cargo
berth of 610 m; handles vessels up to
100,000 DWT; phase 2 initiated.

N/A

Friendly visits/joint
drills

N/A
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Exhibit 5. (continued)
Port

Country

Quality of Repair Facilities

# PLAN AntipiracyRelated Visits since
28 December 2008

Colombo

Sri Lanka

Multiple aﬂoat repair berths. Dry
docks available up to 120,000 DWT;
deep-water port opened in 2012;
Colombo South Harbor Development
project will increase depth to 18 m,
then 23 m; phased development of
four new terminals with three to four
berths each.

N/A

N/A

Trincomalee

Sri Lanka

Minor repairs possible. Slipways for
naval, commercial vessels.

N/A

N/A

Chittagong

Bangladesh

Private repair yards available. Dry
dock available for vessels up to 16,500
DWT. New collocated port to be
completed in three phases by 2015;
will increase capacity from current 1.1
million to 3 million TEU for container
traffic, and 30.5 million to 100 million
tons for bulk cargo.

2

Replenish/overhaul/
joint drills

Sittwe

Burma

Available; Kyaukpyu deep-sea port on
Maday Island by Thanzit river mouth;
initiated in 2009, project will produce
ninety-one berths, accommodate
300,000-ton oil tankers.

1

Friendly visits

Victoria

Seychelles

Limited repairs. Divers, underwater
welding equipment available. Dry
dock shipways available for vessels
<300 gross tonnage.

1+

Friendly visits

Singapore

Singapore

Excellent; one terminal, nine subports;
military ports.

1

Replenish/overhaul/
friendly visits

Bagamoyo

Tanzania

Not yet built. Announced in March/
April 2013 that China plans to fund
Bagamoyo port with capacity of 20
million TEU/year to be completed by
2017. China to commit 800 billion
Tanzanian shillings ($500 million) in
2013 for starting port construction;
remainder of Chinese financial aid
package will follow in 2014–15; $10
billion total Chinese investment; will
include the building of new 34 km
road joining Bagamoyo to Mlandizi,
65 km railway connecting Bagamoyo
to Tanzania-Zambia Railway and
Central Railway.

N/A

Nature of Visits

N/A

Notes
a. Plus signs indicate the possibility that not all port calls have been included. For more information on possible PLAN overseas
access points, see Andrew Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” in Strategic Asia 2012–13:
China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), pp.
89–91; “Djibouti Welcomes China to Build a Base”; Deodatus Balile, “Tanzania and China Sign Port Development Package,”
Sabahi, 27 March 2013, sabahionline.com/.
b. “China Takes Over Operational Control of Gwadar Port,” Pakistan News Service, 24 May 2013, paktribune.com/.
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Trends and Best Practices in Operational Thinking
In the absence of overseas basing agreements and radically new platforms, at least for
the short term, the PLAN has focused on executing missions with limited resources essentially unchanged since late 2008. At the two-year anniversary, in December 2010, of
the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden mission, top-level naval officials met to discuss breakthroughs
made, lessons learned, and challenges remaining.120 Starting with the departure of the
eleventh task force in February 2012, China’s navy has increased its focus on training
special operations troops. Dozens of such soldiers have joined each task force and have
actively conducted a variety of training drills, including live-fire exercises, climbing, and
“helicopter gliding.” A growing emphasis is also being placed on dispelling pirate attacks
at night and in the rain (a logical precaution, given seasonal Indian Ocean monsoons),
including how to coordinate between helicopters and shipboard officers to ensure
proper landings.121
Specifically, “equipment support” (装备保障), “maritime intelligence” (海上情报), and
“telecommunications support” (通信保障) have been identified as major challenges for
China’s blue-water operations.122 This is a problem not just of technology but also of
personnel. According to one article in Modern Navy, “With regard to systems integration,
in order to facilitate utilization and decrease manning, various types of information
integration must be on display. Currently, the degree of integration among various types
of information is insufficient, equipment is dispersed, [and] the number of operating
personnel is high.”123
China has learned that it can study the equipment, tactics, and operations of advanced
navies in the Gulf of Aden. Task forces reportedly enjoy access to information on foreign
intelligence, telecommunications, and radar signals;124 they are even able to turn foreign
surveillance into countersurveillance opportunities. You Ji asserts that
the Chinese fleet has been followed by “unidentified spy planes, surface ships, and submarines” throughout the journey from Chinese waters to the Gulf of Aden. These vessels
try to pick up the PLAN’s communication signals, the pattern of coordination between
ships in the formation, and their contact-management behavior. In fact, to Chinese naval
officers the escort mission itself can be viewed as quasi electronic warfare, ASW warfare,
and air-defense warfare.125

For example, the PLAN has observed trends concerning U.S. unmanned aircraft and
satellites and has begun to develop similar capabilities to address maritime intelligence
shortcomings.126 A Liberation Army Daily article from June 2012 hinted that the eleventh
task force had benefited substantially from upgraded satellite systems.127 Xu Guangjin,
communication officer of the task force, told reporters that “the convenient satellite
communication network has played a crucial role in expeditious handling of emergencies and successful accomplishment of escort missions. This drill has once again verified
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that the communication network system of the task force can meet the needs for the
implementation and successful completion of escort missions.”128
Just as the U.S. Navy has been building up its Broad Area Maritime Surveillance capabilities with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), so too are the Chinese beginning to look at
their own.129 There is also recent reporting from the Chinese press about use of UAVs
for maritime domain awareness (MDA) patrols in the Yellow Sea and perhaps also in the
East China Sea. According to a detailed Project 2049 Institute study,
The PLAN appears to have an unidentified UAV regiment. Its ship-based systems possibly
include the V750 unmanned helicopter. The PLAN has conducted research on utilizing
ship-based UAVs as communications relay platforms for over-the-horizon missile strikes
on shore targets. This body of PLAN sponsored research has included using helicopters
as a guidance platform for long range missile strikes. The PLAN’s South Sea Fleet began
training on the use of fixed wing UAVs for battlefield communications support over long
distances in 2011. . . . The PLAN has also utilized target drone UAVs in air defense drills
used to train destroyer squadron commanders.130

China may apply its burgeoning UAV, and even perhaps some form of unmanned
underwater vehicle (UUV), capabilities to the Gulf of Aden when it is confident of its
ability to use them successfully and to avoid embarrassing mistakes in front of foreign
militaries and observers.131
One of the most valuable aspects of the Gulf of Aden mission is the PLAN’s commitment to exposing officers and crewmen to the irreplaceable crucible of unpredictability.
Less certain is the extent to which training and procedures enable effective responses to
truly challenging events. Official media reports in 2012 reflected the growing level of difficulty in PLAN escort task force training. One video showed Special Forces sailors conducting a “real-battle” exercise composed of rappelling from a helicopter, live firing on a
ship’s deck, and performing in-cabin search and rescue under pitch-dark conditions.132
A February 2012 helicopter training exercise required special operations personnel to
communicate via sign language owing to loud rotor noises as they fast-roped down from
helicopters to ships’ decks.133 After landing, they boarded skiffs—apparently small PLAN
rigid-hulled inflatable boats—and practiced firing at floating targets from the skiffs.134
Yuan Xinyuan, commanding officer of the Special Forces of the tenth escort task force,
declared, “Live-ammunition firing from a skiff is an essential skill of SOF soldiers for
maritime patrol, investigation, and chasing away of suspects. It has to be strengthened
and enhanced on an ongoing basis as an important part of training.”135
Special Forces had previously practiced live sniper-rifle shooting in windy conditions in
a December 2011 exercise, firing a total of sixty rounds at balloons twenty centimeters in
diameter approximately 150 meters away.136 Aboard Haikou, Yuan Xinyuan commented,
“In today’s fire drill, the sea current, sea wind, and the movement of the ship posed a
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significant challenge. Three snipers hit 54 balloons with 60 rounds. This is consistent
with our intended training result.” Of course, PLAN officials value other aspects of livefire exercises, especially ones that require team coordination in simulated emergency
situations. Such aspects arose in ninth task force exercises in August 2011 that involved
live firing and boarding of vessels.137 Zhao Zhenfeng, an instructor in the ninth task
force, stated, “This is not simply a matter of marksmanship skills. It is an issue of coordination between the tactical teams. Through this exercise, our targeted drills can be used
in the event of an armed rescue situation.”138
A video clip aired on CCTV-7 in April 2012 showcased helicopter training exercises
by the eleventh task force, scenarios that included “battle alert switch for ship and
helicopter, night-time coordination between ship and helicopter, and coordination
among helicopter and [special operations forces] soldiers.”139 Ma Lei, commander of the
eleventh task force helicopter group, was quoted as saying, “When scrambling for Level
One emergency deployment, we hardly have any preparation time. Therefore, we have
to know all the conditions in a given sea area like the back of our hand in advance and
memorize all the contingency plans. This is the only guarantee that every takeoff we perform is swift and timely and that we can accomplish our mission safely and effectively in
compliance with the intentions of the formation command post.”140
This commander’s focus on memorizing contingency plans rather than learning how to
react to the unexpected raises a distinct possibility that Chinese personnel have difficulty handling events for which they have not rehearsed detailed responses. In a possible
example of this centralized approach, ninth escort task force commander Guan Jianguo
insisted, “We have prepared ourselves for all manner of difficulties and challenges. We
have revised and perfected our escort contingency plan, with focus on the strengthening
of various types of targeted training. We have the confidence and competence to successfully accomplish the ninth escort mission.”141
Rote training constitutes an important aspect of learning to perform new missions in
new environments, but there is no substitute for thinking effectively on one’s feet. PLAN
officials are certainly aware of this reality and are working to address it—at least to some
extent. This awareness was reflected during an August 2011 training session of the ninth
escort task force.142 To ensure that “program” (报幕) had no “script” (节目单), during the drill commanders sent no “advance orders” (预先号令) to crewmen. When the
alarm sounded, crews reportedly were unaware whether they were participating in a drill
or there was an actual pirate attack. As People’s Navy reporters Li De and Li Gencheng
document,
measuring the actual power [of a naval force], often lies not in the theatrical troupe’s
brilliant performance of the existing script, but [rather] how [they] sing and dance to
a few impromptu sound tracks live without prior rehearsal. This exercise, the guiding
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adjustment group adopted a “point-play” [点戏] method tailored to the actual situation
of increasingly concealed and intense pirate attacks. It emphasized anticipating “sudden outbreaks” [突发], composed test questions based on “emergency response” [应急],
gave no advance notification for any “situational scenarios” [情况想定], did not allow for
prerehearsal. [This] really tested the task force’s rapid-reaction and emergency response
ability.143

The tenth task force likewise conducted training geared at improving rapid-response
capability.144 Relevant exercises emphasized training topics like “maritime verification”
(海上查证), “joint ship-aircraft deterrence” (舰机联合慑阻), and “flying under complex conditions” (复杂条件飞行).145 As previously mentioned, in April 2012 the eleventh task force also conducted training designed to boost emergency response capabilities and carried out “rappelling, live-fire shooting on the deck of a maneuvering vessel,
and conducting search-and-rescue mission in cabins in pitch darkness.”146 In mid-May
2012 the eleventh task force also carried out exercises along Gulf of Aden escort routes
designed to improve rapid response.147
Earlier, in November 2010, the sixth escort task force conducted a drill attempting to
simulate real-time conditions.148 Simulated pirates in two speedboats attacked a ship and
boarded despite antipiracy measures. The vessel’s crew shut off the engines and retreated
to a safety compartment. Amphibious assault ship Kunlunshan dispatched helicopters,
air-cushion craft, patrol boats, and Special Forces (舰艇, 直升机, 气垫艇, 巡逻艇以及
特战队员).149 Despite pirate resistance, the crew was rescued without casualties.150 This
raises the question of how realistic this exercise actually was and the extent to which
conditions are simulated in which things go wrong.151
En route to the Gulf of Aden in July 2012, the twelfth escort task force conducted in the
South China Sea a day-into-night helicopter training exercise designed to simulate the
stormy and windy conditions typically experienced off the coast of Somalia. A CCTV
video mentions the difficulties of such conditions, particularly at night: “It is much
harder to take off and land while at sea. The pilot has to overcome turbulence and the
erratic movement of the deck. At night, in the absence of lighting on the ground, it is
easy to misjudge heading, velocity and altitude by relying only on visual indicators. It is
even harder to establish the deck landing approach at night. A slight lapse may lead to
unforeseen consequences.” This statement further underscores the difficulties of dealing
with “unforeseen consequences” when training has not progressed beyond “memorization” to deal with “contingencies.”152 PLAN escort task forces en route to the Gulf of
Aden, leaving the South China Sea, transit such maritime choke points as the Strait of
Malacca.153 PLAN forces prepare for their passages through this potentially treacherous waterway. Tenth escort task force command team leader Liu Haitao remarked, “The
shipping lanes in the Straits of Singapore and the Strait of Malacca are rather complex,
heavily trafficked, and periodically plagued by pirate activities. In view of this situation,
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we drafted very detailed plans to respond to various emergencies. We demanded that all
vessels organize their navigation in strict accordance with the rules, keep a close watch,
and strengthen duty shifts, to ensure that our formation can pass through this area safely
and smoothly.”154
Besides consistent emphasis on Special Forces and helicopter training, such PLAN warships as Wuhan have used the Gulf of Aden mission to foster their own unique training
methods and cultures.155 Almost weekly, Wuhan holds asymmetrical training that pits a
“Blue Force” of experienced officers against a less experienced “Red Force.”156 Referring
to the Blue Force’s role in the training exercise, Wuhan’s Communications Department
commander Wang Min stated in January 2012, “Actually we play the role of a ‘whetstone’; and yet we are no ordinary ‘whetstone,’ because we know the weaknesses of our
opponents. That is why we are often able to hit them where it hurts.”157 The exercise
is preceded by simulations and followed by playbacks and stocktaking; there are also
weekly methodology seminars focused on the newest combat and training methods.158
Chen Yueqi, Wuhan’s SSF destroyer flotilla commander, lauded the ship, commenting,
“Our high-quality officers and men ensure the level of quality to which our missions are
accomplished. It is fair to say that Wuhan is a benchmark for our flotilla’s development.
It is a sharp knife that the commanding officers are confident about and not hesitant to
use, to win battles.”159
Additional aspects of PLAN special operations training in the Gulf of Aden are probably
designed to prepare for rescuing captured ships and crews in the future, which suggests that Beijing is eager to join the ranks of the most capable military powers and to
demonstrate a capacity to conduct high-intensity rescues. A successful mission of this
sort could end the humiliation of having to pay pirate ransoms. Training events have
therefore begun to incorporate moving-target shooting, long-range blocking and attacking, and other rescue-related exercises.160 Additionally, the PLAN has begun to categorize
antipiracy mission requirements and train to them systematically. In March 2012 an
ESF flotilla organized thirty ships of various types to “comprehensive assistance support
exercise in adverse weather conditions using scenario-based tactical subjects.”161
Clearly, China’s navy is ensuring that it spreads the “fruit” gained from the Gulf of
Aden mission throughout its ranks through systematic training. This is a good first step
toward achieving the foundational expertise necessary to deal with the many routine
tasks that antipiracy operations require. However, there is less evidence to suggest that
Chinese naval officers and sailors are being trained to think through on their own how
to deal successfully with unexpected conditions.
Regardless, the PLAN clearly hopes to introduce lessons learned in the Gulf of Aden
service-wide. Chinese analysts express the opinion that China’s navy must use its
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antipiracy experience to diversify China’s operational abilities for military operations
other than war. They state, “The Navy should, through summing up the experience of
the escort actions in the Gulf of Aden, explore the ‘task-oriented’ force organizational
form that is suited to independent operations, joint operations, and nonwar military
actions at sea.”162
Under the PLAN’s current antipiracy framework, adjusting the rules of engagement is
likely the most pressing issue, but it is one that can be mitigated with adequate preparation over time, without fundamentally changing the mission’s nature. While a more permissive approach would open up a broader range of operational possibilities, the PLAN
is unlikely to adopt a more aggressive “shoot first, ask questions later” approach, as some
observers describe the Indian navy as having done in encounters with suspected pirate
vessels.163 That said, some observers seem skeptical about Chinese restraint in actual
practice, and there is always the possibility that PLAN antipiracy rules of engagement are
looser in reality than in doctrine. The PLAN is tactically aware and may be quite aggressive in specific situations. There could indeed be a scenario in which PLAN forces would
be willing to shoot whereas the “three forces” may be unable to do so because of more
stringent restrictions.164
If this is indeed true, there are several possible explanations.165 First, as for any military
force, incentives and local objectives could outweigh written guidance and influence
behavior in contingencies at tactical levels. Second, some of what actually occurs at the
operational level may not be reported back to higher authorities or be noticed by the
outside world, leaving room for improvisation. Third is the possibility that a departure
from official doctrine could be an intentional move at the service level—the PLAN may
be beginning to think more like other navies, which tend to exercise relative autonomy,
and less like an adjunct of the PLA. Common characteristics of navies include independence in action and thought, willingness to act with initiative, and addressing
circumstances creatively—all without openly violating instructions but perhaps not fully
complying, either. A final possibility is that Beijing is purposefully instructing the PLAN
to pursue more aggressive rules of engagement than official statements may imply, so as
to exploit a divergence between strategic communications and operational necessity that
is largely invisible to outsiders and thereby achieve the “bonus without the onus.”
China’s navy is also concerned with taking advantage of best practices from industry. For
example, in July 2012 thirteen Chinese sailors on board Taiwan fishing boat Shiuh-fu 1
were released from pirate captivity along with the vessel’s Taiwanese captain and twelve
Vietnamese shipmates, after being captured in late 2010.166 In response to such incidents, Chinese scholar Sheng Qingbo has examined the possibility of installing “security
cabins” (安全舱) on commercial vessels that would allow seafarers to avoid capture
while awaiting naval rescue forces. Sheng cites the Russian navy’s successful rescue of
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twenty-three crewmen from the oil tanker Moscow University as an example: The “Moscow University oil tanker sent out a danger warning after being attacked by pirates, all of
the crew hid inside a safe place, which is crucial for a navy to have a successful boarding
rescue mission. It is critical that ships install ‘security cabins.’”167 It will be interesting to
see whether Chinese government organizations attempt to encourage such measures to
reduce the need for the PLAN to render assistance after the fact.
While successful cases of civilian defense against pirates, such as the case of China’s
Zhenhua 4, have been lauded as heroic acts, MoT official Ju Chengzhi has suggested that
self-defense alone remains insufficient. Naval support is necessary to ensure the safety of
Chinese civilian vessels: “I think the ‘Zhenhua 4’ example is a case with larger significance, but is not typical [or universally applicable].” Further, “This ship constantly maintained close contact with support elements, using INMARSAT [international maritime
satellites] to call them [with updates] once every five minutes. [This] made the support
elements very clear of the ship’s movements, [and allowed for] effective command.”168 Ju
described described how Zhenhua 4 worked with Malaysian naval forces to thwart the
pirate attack:
I think “Zhenhua 4’s”escape hinged on more than the abilities of its crew alone. If warships
and aircraft had not arrived in time, it is very difficult to say what the outcome would have
been. At the outset of being attacked, the captain contacted Malaysia’s Antipiracy Center
in Kuala Lumpur, [and] coordinated the dispatch of a [nearby] helicopter, [which] sank
a pirate boat, and forced the pirates on board “Zhenhua 4” into one corner of the ship’s
deck. But the helicopter was running low on fuel after 20 minutes and had to return for
refueling, when our support elements received information, the helicopter has already
returned. We again contacted the Antipiracy Center urgently. Fortunately, a Malaysian
warship was in nearby waters, and [could] rush to the site of the incident within an hour
and a half to two hours. Moreover, additional dispatched helicopter(s) could arrive within
half an hour.169

Ju asserts that Zhenhua 4’s brave crew relied on both its own courage and ability as well
as the support of naval forces, but he also admits that even as navies polish their antipiracy operations, commercial sailors must remain vigilant:
Looking at the actual situation of the first escort convoy, it was effective. I dare say there
were no major problems, it’s just that we need to make improvements in adapting and
perfecting operations. Additionally, it must be emphasized [that] just because we have
warships it does not mean that everything is all right. This maritime region is 550 nautical miles long, which is 1,020 kilometers. The maritime region is [thus] immense, [and]
warships certainly cannot take care of all of it. It therefore remains necessary for ships to
continue doing a good job of “self-protection, self-prevention” [自防自救].170
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Trends in Engagement with Other Navies
Since its first deployment in 2008, China’s navy has cooperated with other navies and
international organizations in various capacities. Most recently, the aforementioned symposium hosted by the PLAN in late February 2012 assembled naval officials from twenty
countries with experience in antipiracy in the Gulf of Aden.171 At this symposium it was
revealed that the PLAN provided each participant nation with its detailed escort schedules and planned to serve as the reference point and coordinator for navies in the region
performing escorts.172 Also at the symposium, PLAN officials lauded EU NAVFOR’s
Mercury Information Technology information-sharing system but also expressed the
need to make further improvements to the e-mail-and-data-transmission-based platform. Mercury is used by China’s navy to interface with commercial vessels applying
for Chinese escorts.173 In late 2012 Wang Fanchun, on-duty translator for the twelfth
escort task force warship Yiyang, lauded the PLAN’s use of Mercury.174 He told Liberation
Army Daily, “MERCURY Net is a web-based information platform where international
antipiracy forces can communicate with each other; exchange piracy related unclassified information, and is also an important bridge and window of military diplomacy.
As active users of the MERCURY Net, the Chinese naval escort task forces have been
outstanding in terms of the quantity and quality of its shared information and intelligence on it.”175 Moreover, Zhang Jianhua, “leader of the commanding group” of the
twelfth escort task force, states, “Based on the MERCURY Net, the task force will expand
the space for military exchanges and disclose more information on piracy, take-off and
landing of helicopters and escort situations. On the private chat channel, the reporters
also saw some records of communications and liaison between commanders of Chinese
and foreign naval escort task forces on their invitation to meet with each other.”176
PLAN captain Hu Weibiao asserts that Mercury cannot guarantee sufficiently timely internavy communication to thwart pirates that are expanding their range of attack. Here
it is worth revisiting a statement of Du Jingchen, commander of the first Gulf of Aden
task force, after visiting CTF-151 and EU NAVFOR flagships: “First the construction
of [their] intelligence information security systems merits our study. Foreign militaries
have a complete, strict and tight intelligence security system, including satellite methods.
[They] can carry out surveillance for the entire Gulf of Aden maritime region. We are
still awaiting strengthening of development and usage in this regard.”177

Achievements in Practice
The aforementioned decline in piracy attacks worldwide reflects the collective success of
the international community in combating piracy. The year 2011 was the first in which
Somali pirate attacks declined since the international community first deployed naval
vessels on a large scale to the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters.178 In mid-2012 the
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New York Times reported that pirate attacks worldwide had “plummeted,” due largely to
the efforts of many nations’ navies.179 According to the International Maritime Bureau,
there were no pirate attacks off Somalia for the entire month of July 2012.180 The PLAN’s
efforts to fight piracy since 2008 contributed significantly to this reduction and should
be recognized for their positive contribution.
Moreover, in the context of China’s antipiracy mission, by their own calculations PLAN
task forces have achieved various improvements over the past four years. Most noteworthy is that the PLAN rose from its previous character as a regional navy to the stature of
one with meaningful blue-water reach. The initial, 2008–2009 deployment—a task force
of two destroyers, Wuhan and Haikou—established several new “firsts”:
•• “The first time multiple naval service arms, including surface vessels, seaborne aircraft, and Special Forces, were organized to cross the ocean and execute operational
tasks.”
•• “The first long-term ocean task execution that did not include port calls throughout its entire course, breaking records in continuous time under way and sailing
distance of a PLAN vessel formation and in flight sorties and flight time of seaborne
helicopters.”
•• “The first execution of escort tasks with the navies of multiple countries in the same
sea area and holding of shipboard exchanges and information cooperation.”
•• “The first sustained, high-intensity organization of logistical and equipment support
in unfamiliar seas far from coastal bases, accumulating comprehensive ocean support
experience.”
•• “The first organization of base-oriented logistical support using commercial methods
in a foreign port.”
•• “The first time civilian vessels delivered replenishment materials for a distant sea
formation.”
•• “The first all-dimensional examination of multiple replenishment methods, including underway, alongside connected, helicopter, and small vessel replenishment.”
•• “The first long-range video transmission of medical consultations and humanitarian assistance such as medical care for casualties from other vessels conducted on the
ocean.”
•• “Finally, this first escort formation set a record of 61 days for the longest sustained
support of a formation at sea, without calling at port for replenishment, and also set
a record for the longest number of days of sustained support of a combatant vessel at
sea without calling at port.”181
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More broadly, the PLAN Gulf of Aden escort mission represented the following:
•• “The first time that the Chinese Navy organized warships, shipborne aircraft and special operations to carry out trans-oceanic missions engaging combined service arms,
defended national strategic interests effectively and displayed to the full the resolution
and capabilities of the Chinese Navy to accomplish multiple military missions.”
•• “The first time that the Chinese Navy carried tasks for long period in the ocean
without docking for the whole voyage. The convoy formation set new records for
continuous sailing time, farthest voyage, flight sorties of ship-borne aircrafts, and
flight hours.”
•• “The first time the Chinese Navy organized rear services and equipment support and
accumulated experience of synthesis support in the ocean.”182
Other “firsts” achieved by task forces to date include
•• “Executing integrated military operations with warships, aircraft and Special Forces”
•• “Executing prolonged Far Seas operations without relying on ports”
•• “Discharging responsibilities in a maritime region with other navies”
•• “Sustainably organizing high-intensity logistics and equipment supply”
•• “Executing joint escorts with foreign navies.”183
Long-Distance Communications
A particular area of operational achievements yielded by the Gulf of Aden mission is
that of telecommunications. Utilizing cutting-edge communications platforms was an
operational priority from the time of the genesis of China’s Gulf of Aden mission, as
evidenced by demands from the PLAN commander, Adm. Wu Shengli, and PLAN political commissar Adm. Liu Xiaojiang for “comprehensive coverage, all-time linkage, and
full-course support” in advance of China’s December 2008 deployment to the Gulf of
Aden.184 The notion that the PLAN was eager to equip its escort warships with the latest
satellite capabilities is underscored further by an interview with Ju Chengzhi of the MoT.
During the interview published in January 2009, shortly after the inaugural deployment,
Ju stated, “In terms of technology, we have adopted cutting-edge world-class communications methods—ship movement tracking systems. The Ministry of Transportation
has maritime satellite ground stations; once escort information is confirmed, [we] can
instantly track a ship, and can connect [with it] through video.”185 According to People’s
Navy, the PLAN Political Department, PLAN Headquarters Communications Department, and State Information Center worked to provide a communications platform that
integrates a land base information collection and transmission system, an information
integration and distribution system, a shore-to-ship information wireless transmission
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system, and an information terminal receiving system. They also sent technical personnel
to Sanya [on Hainan Island] to conduct satellite receiving equipment debugging, system
installation, and personnel training on the three combat ships that were about to set sail
for escort operations. Moreover, they specially developed and improved a total of seven
information processing software programs, which can send text, images, as well as video
and audio documents quickly.186

The PLAN Control Center (海军指挥中心) and MoT’s China Maritime Search and
Rescue Center (中国海上搜救中心) now track all relevant Chinese merchant ships,
on board which the MoT has installed devices to support a “maritime satellite-based
ship movement tracking system” (船舶动态跟踪系统). Supported by newly developed
software, this architecture permits “all-dimensional tracking” (全方位跟踪) and
video-based communications “at all times.”187 Beijing’s ability to locate PRC-flagged
vessels clearly benefits from the China Ship Reporting system, which requires “all
Chinese-registered ships of gross tonnage (GT) over three hundred tons engaged in
international routes” to report a daily position to the PRC Shanghai Maritime Safety
Administration.188
In April 2009, General Political Department Director and CMC member Li Jinai praised
China’s navy for “active exploration of the new ‘shore and ship integrated’ political
work mode.” This entails a shift from transmission of political materials via “plain
code telegraph” (明码电报), a process that once took as long as an entire day during a
month-long deployment, to more sophisticated satellite communications. The deployment witnessed many other communications firsts, including “a communication satellite
[being] used to provide 24-hour coverage for the oceangoing formation[,] . . . shipborne
helicopters [being] used to provide surveillance on battlefield situations, and . . . the
formation [being] connected to the Internet.” A web-based Internet protocol network
was developed to allow crew members to call any landline or cell phone in mainland
China.189
The PLAN’s satellite use for the Gulf of Aden mission exemplifies the PLA’s gradual realization of the “scientific development” component of China’s military modernization. As
of June 2012, escort deployments used a satellite communications network for “organizational command” (组织指挥), “intelligence acquisition” (情报获取), “information
sharing systems” (信息共享系统), and “logistics and supply security” (后勤和装备保
障). Moreover, task force commander Yang Junfei states that communication systems
now allow escorting ships to exchange information with commercial escortees.190
A major reason these improvements in satellite usage could be made is that deployed
units rely on services provided by China Transport Telecommunications and Information Center (CTTIC), a company formed in 1989 by various Chinese ministries and
commissions and now considered a “first-level organization unit” (一级事业单位) of
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the MoT. CTTIC handles a variety of tasks, including “communications for the transportation industry” (实施交通运输行业通信), “navigation” (导航), “wireless and informatized management technology policies” (无线电和信息化管理的技术政策), and
“technology standards” (技术标准). Among its other duties, CTTIC represents China in
the International Telecommunication Union of the United Nations and in related IMO
activities. CTTIC is responsible for Chinese international maritime satellites and establishing a search-and-rescue satellite system and thus works closely with PLAN escort task
forces in the Gulf of Aden.191
According to CTTIC’s website, information support to the Gulf of Aden mission is provided primarily for the Escort Activities Command Department (护航行动指挥部), the
China Maritime Search and Rescue Center, and PLAN escort warships and commercial
ships applying for escort. Principal services include “regulating the process of examining
and approving escort applications” (主要内容包括规定护航申请审批流程), “shipto-ship and ship-to-command center audio and visual communications” (船舶与船
舶及船舶与指挥部之间的语音和视频通信), and “comprehensive platforms for ship
monitoring and control command management” (船舶监控指挥管理综合平台). This
comprehensive system, based on “international mobile satellite” technology, offers PLAN
vessels global audiovisual and locating and surveillance, making deterrence of piracy far
more effective and efficient. Since CTTIC also provides services for China’s commercial
sector, PLAN use of satellites during Gulf of Aden deployments demonstrates effective
application of dual-use space technology as part of China’s military development.
Additionally, Beidou, China’s budding positioning, navigation, and timing system, is
playing an important role. Beidou offers PLAN surface vessels deployed to the Gulf of
Aden real-time positioning and the ability to plot vessel locations accurately. Unlike
its GPS counterpart, Beidou includes a “two-way short digital message communications function” that facilitates intership communication. Zhao Huashu, the destroyer
Qingdao’s observation and communication chief, states, “The Beidou system is highly
secure, sends messages rapidly[,] . . . can satisfy general message and communications
needs [and] has greatly reduced our communications time.” Apparently the entire NSF
has been upgraded with Beidou systems that complemented NSF surface vessels’ “Far
Seas training needs.”192 By flattening intership information flows and arming PLAN vessels with accurate maritime surface location capabilities, Beidou is quickly raising PLAN
antipiracy operational performance.
Information Sharing to Support MDA
Related to the PLAN’s enhanced long-range communication ability is its capacity to
develop and share relevant tactical information to enhance MDA. As the PLAN’s reliance
on satellite communications for Far Seas operations grew, such Chinese researchers as
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Zhou Youliang and Xu Xiaoming of the PLA Naval Engineering University explored
ways in which China’s navy could improve its intelligence operations during antipiracy
operations. They suggested that PLAN deployed units should
first, positively strive [to] provide civilian satellites and military reconnaissance, satellite
information support, [and] use satellite surveillance advance warning methods for nearreal-time long-distance advance warning intelligence support for military operations. Secondly, [the PLAN should] fully display ship-based helicopter reconnaissance advantages,
adopt the linking of planned flight surveillance and emergency takeoff verification, take off
quickly [as needed], and ensure and verify that commanders have control of conditions on
the ocean surface while passing through high-risk maritime regions.193

Overseas Crisis Response
A final area of operational advancement is the ability of China’s navy to respond to
incidents overseas and thereby for the first time to add a military component to China’s
efforts to protect its interests. In March 2011, the seventh task force responded to the
crisis in Libya, making its presence felt, however symbolically, during the evacuations of
Chinese citizens from Libya. On 24 February, Type 054A Jiangkai II–class guided-missile
frigate Xuzhou (hull 530) was ordered to depart the Gulf of Aden for the Mediterranean.
On 1 March 2011, it escorted a chartered civilian vessel transporting Chinese evacuees in
the PLAN’s first noncombatant evacuation operation overseas.194 Wei Jianhua, director
of the political department of an ESF division deployed in the task force, stated, “If we
hadn’t been on an escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, it would have taken at least three
weeks for us to get there from a Chinese port.”195 According to official Chinese media
reports, Xuzhou provided support and protection for commercial vessels evacuating
Chinese citizens from Libya.196 Reportedly 4,200 Chinese citizens were evacuated to the
island of Crete, Greece, on two Greek passenger ships chartered by China’s embassy in
Athens. Two thousand more Chinese citizens were shipped to Tunisia and another 2,100
to Malta.197
The task force was later cited for having made five breakthroughs—only one of which
was related to the assistance it provided to noncombatant evacuation operations in
Libya:
•• “The first long-distance rescue of commercial vessels under pirate attack” (首次千里
驰援接护遭海盗袭击船舶) (of Taiankou, described in chapter 4)
•• “The first armed rescue of a commercial ship boarded by pirates” (首次武力营救遭
海盗登船袭击船舶)
•• “The first successful thwarting of consecutive pirate attacks on commercial ships in a
PLAN escort flotilla” (首次成功挫败海盗对我被护商船编队发动的连续袭击)
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•• “The first armed comprehensive training exercise rescuing vessels held hostage by
pirates at night” (首次进行夜间武力营救被劫船舶综合演练)
•• “The first evacuation escort of endangered Chinese citizens overseas” (首次为撤离我
国驻海外受困人员船舶护航).198
“It is important to note that the PLA naval ship was on a mission to solve a humanitarian crisis and not a ploy by China to wield political and military influence in the Middle
East,” writes Cai Penghong, director of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ APEC
Research Center. Nevertheless,
The Xuzhou mission is an example of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
implementing its new mission to maintain Chinese overseas interests. . . . The action has
upgraded and expanded the navy’s mission to a new level in line with President Hu’s emphasis for it to be prepared for contingencies in distant regions to protect China’s national
interests. This is not simply a naval mission but more importantly is a rising power’s strategy to use military assets to respond to its citizens’ needs. It serves to demonstrate how an
independent country is confident enough in its capacity to protect its nationals overseas,
action which also builds a positive image.199

Clearly, the PLAN has achieved breakthroughs in preparation and operations. Yet despite
these encouraging developments, the piracy problem remains unsolved: the area is vast,
pirates are hard to identify in advance of their piracy attempts, and the sources on land
of their activities remain largely unaddressed. As previously mentioned, both Chinese
and other naval experts are prepared for potential increases in Somali pirate activity,
which is poised to remain as a nagging security threat to SLOCs for the foreseeable
future. It comes as no surprise that China’s navy, like other navies, has recognized the
seriousness of piracy, by sending no fewer than thirteen escort task forces to the Gulf of
Aden during the period covered in this study (2008–12). With no end to the mission in
sight, China’s navy is poised to accrue further benefits, the scale of which depends on
China’s choices regarding various operational aspects of these deployments.
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系, 协调了一架直升机, 击沉了一艘海盗船, 并
把 ‘振华4号’ 甲板上的海盗逼到了角落. 但20
分钟后直升机没有油料补给只能返航, 我们后
方接到信息的时候, 飞机已经返航了. 我们再
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C HAPTER S IX

Lessons Learned and Implications for Global Maritime
Governance

W

hat is the larger significance, the legacy, of China’s Far Seas antipiracy mission
thus far? MoT official Ju Chengzhi encapsulates what China’s initial task force
deployment has meant for the Chinese strategic mind-set:
This instance of China’s dispatching warships to escort Chinese commercial ships has
brought us a new concept: as a government, in order to ensure that Chinese commercial
ships are able to perform regular seaborne transportation overseas, facing some suddenly
erupting situations, appropriately adhering to international common practices, [and]
adopting more effective measures. This is a transformation in thinking [思路上的转变].1

Over four years later, what specifically has Beijing learned from the PLAN’s experiences
in the Gulf of Aden thus far, and what lessons will it seek to apply in the future? Given
the opportunities and challenges documented in this study, what are the prospects for
Chinese engagement in future nontraditional security missions? What are the implications for global maritime governance, particularly with respect to Sino-American
relations? This final chapter will address these important questions and suggest possible
implications and future prospects.

China’s Antipiracy Experience and Future Nontraditional Security Missions
By and large, Beijing will surely take away more positives than negatives from its experience in the Gulf of Aden during the period from December 2008 to December 2012. In
2011 a former PLAN official told one of the authors of this book that he was “very satisfied with the performance” of China’s antipiracy operations: “Long-distance operations
offer good lessons for us,” such as “how to coordinate well with foreign navies, conduct
joint operations with other navies, and exchange views with foreign navies regarding
approaches.”
For the foreseeable future, it is not difficult to envision a trend in which China’s national
strategic interests continue to impel more substantive PLAN contributions to maritime
stability operations in the Gulf of Aden and other places where nonstate actors are disruptive. Indeed, as Ju Chengzhi, MoT, asserts:
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As a rapidly developing economic power, China should interact with other countries and
engage in trade. Looking from a long-term perspective, the government must establish
an effective long-term mechanism to safeguard China’s overseas economic and security
interests. [The] Somali escorts should not just be an isolated, short-term event; rather [we]
should regard this as a regular, ongoing practice.2

These situations conveniently marry China’s own security interests—such as enhancing its economic, political, and military influence in regions critical to China’s energy
security—with its interest in contributing to the broader well-being and stability of the
global commons. As demonstrated by Beijing’s tendency to exploit the pre- and postoperational movement to the Gulf of Aden to accomplish diplomatic exchanges, China
is eager to derive maximum political benefits from its antipiracy mission.
Chinese leaders have certainly learned valuable lessons that will guide the ways in which
Beijing formulates policy on other issues involving substate actors. While a combination
of domestic and international pressures originally catalyzed China’s involvement in the
Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations, it is worth noting that to date all of China’s substantial international, military, noncombat, operational deployments have occurred in
areas deemed vital to its national security and for specific material reasons, as opposed
to the more abstract, normative ends that the United States and other Western powers
sometimes pursue.3 Similarly, future Chinese decisions about participation in international maritime security efforts will likely seek to balance, on one hand, the expectations
of China’s domestic audience and the international community that China will make
increasing contributions against, on the other hand, the direct strategic relevance of the
issue or region in question to China’s concrete national interests. As American policy
makers in the future seek ways to cooperate with China and benefit from its participation in larger initiatives, they will have to search for such potential areas of intersection.

Chinese Thinking about Nontraditional Maritime Security Operations as a
Function of Maritime Strategy
Nontraditional maritime security operations will likely become, collectively, a larger
component of China’s overall approach to maritime operations and strategy. Rear Adm.
Yin Zhuo (Ret.) stated in early 2011 that “the Chinese people occupy two large areas of
both land and sea, so we must develop a national maritime strategy as soon as possible.”4
China’s millennia-old strategic posture as a continental power with significant maritime
potential was permanently altered as a result of the naval wars from 1839 (Opium War)
through 1945 (the Second Sino-Japanese War / World War II), which ensured that China
would refocus its strategic attention on the sea. It was given particular geographic focus
by the Chinese Civil War, in which Nationalist forces led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek) fled to the island of Taiwan.5 Subsequently, the PLA has gradually become more
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maritime oriented, particularly since the Soviet Union’s collapse and the surfacing of
Near Seas territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.
These factors, plus Taiwan’s increasingly assertive push for independence during the
1990s and early 2000s and the growing intimacy of U.S.-Taiwan relations in the same
period, compelled the PLA to redirect its focus to China’s maritime periphery. The
PLAN’s antipiracy efforts largely complement the navy’s transition from a Near Seas
counterintervention force to one increasingly capable of addressing nontraditional
security threats and protecting China’s interests farther afield. In the process, China is
increasingly becoming a continental and maritime power, as opposed to the solely continental power that it was in the past. Wu Chao and Li Daguang of Modern Navy assert
that antipiracy operations are a manifestation of this shift: “Escort operations in the Gulf
of Aden and [off the coast of] Somalia already are behavior of a maritime state. Maritime states require that their navy protect overseas interests and ‘maritime lifelines’ that
affect the national economy and the people’s livelihood, and [whose mission] is not just
limited to ‘preventing imperialists from invading [its] continental territory.’”6
Amid the push for a more maritime orientation, various Chinese scholars are calling for
a greater emphasis to be placed on the legal framework of maritime security. Hainan
University Law School professor Zou Ligang argues that poor domestic laws on maritime defense are accompanied by an inadequate research system and the absence of a
comprehensive maritime security strategy.7 From a perspective that highlights China’s
continuing sense of vulnerability from the sea, Zou contends that China’s peaceful development in the twenty-first century relies directly on Beijing’s ability to achieve maritime
security.8 Chinese scholar Feng Xinhua has written that in the post–Cold War international system, such nontraditional security threats as piracy, maritime terrorism, and
“accidental channel jams” (海峡航道的意外堵塞) have become the main threats to the
security of strategic international SLOCs.9 An article by Xin Jingping in People’s Daily
called on the central government to take three steps in protecting overseas Chinese citizens. First, it should send police attachés to countries where local forces are incapable of
effectively protecting Chinese citizens living there. Second, China should deploy armed
convoys in accordance with international law in regions plagued with piracy and drug
smuggling. Finally, China should create a “risk-assessment” system to gauge the security
of its periphery and overseas regions.10
Regional counterintervention centered on Taiwan and other disputed Near Seas areas
remains the cornerstone of China’s military modernization. But under both Jiang Zemin
and Hu Jintao, the PLA has also been called on to sharpen its ability to win nontraditional wars under modern, high-technology circumstances. As China’s commercial
interests and activities become ever more enmeshed in the global economy, China’s
navy will increasingly be charged with protecting China’s interests beyond the nation’s
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immediate nautical borders. Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations exemplify this trend,
but they also highlight the sensitivity for Beijing of military operations beyond China’s
periphery. While China has been cautious in institutionalizing a strategy of protecting its
national interests in the Far Seas, PLAN antipiracy operations to date demonstrate that
China’s national security strategy is evolving to allow China’s armed forces to be increasingly assertive abroad. On the basis of this principle, PLAN officers like Zhang Huachen,
former ESF deputy commander, assert that their service should integrate systems, ideas,
and practices from its Near Seas and Far Seas operations, especially as capabilities in the
latter fall far short of what is required to protect China’s overseas interests.11
More broadly, the rationale for protecting vital SLOCs helps to propel a larger PLAN
focus on critical international, commercial waterways. Deployments off the Horn of
Africa help secure the Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, western Indian
Ocean, and East African coastal regions. But China’s heavy SLOC-security dependence is
certainly not limited to these crucial maritime zones. Goods and services flow into and out
of China to and from every direction, transiting vital international waterways. Even after
safely traversing the zones just mentioned, commercial vessels en route to China typically must transit the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Singapore, and the South China Sea.
China relies on stable SLOCs also for trade in goods and services with countries and
regions in the Western Hemisphere, such as the United States, Canada, Mexico, Central
America, and South America.12 It is conceivable that China will broaden its perspective
on maritime stability operations accordingly. As Zhao Yang writes,
Escorts have allowed China’s navy to liberalize its mentality; it did not just go out of the
first Island Chain, but also rid itself of the inner, self-designed line of defense. And China’s
open-mindedness and undertakings put an end to preexisting international suspicion.
. . . As a permanent member of the UNSC, China’s dispatching [of] warships to participate
in escorts near Somalia is more the embodiment of actively participating in global public
governance. A nation’s authority is not just decided by the size of its power, but also by
whether it is willing and able to take responsibility.13

The PLAN’s escort mission has been described by Chinese media as that of a “strategic,
comprehensive and international armed service” (战略性, 综合性, 国际性军种), one
that has changed Chinese naval philosophy fundamentally. Now many sailors fully understand the concept of “being at home at sea and a guest on land” (海上为家, 陆上做
客).14 Furthermore, escorting has transformed China’s military thinking fundamentally
from “maintain an army for a thousand days to use it for an hour” (养兵千日, 用兵一
时) to “maintain an army for a thousand days to use it for a thousand days” (养兵千日,
用兵千日).15
Beyond all this, antipiracy escorts have furthered China’s strategic and doctrinal shift
from a purely land-based power to an oceanic power, in part by fostering maritime
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culture in and through the PLAN. When PLAN escort task forces cross “China’s traditional maritime boundary” on their way to the Gulf of Aden, the ships’ crews each
reportedly conduct a solemn ceremony of taking and signing pledges.16 Indeed, many
Chinese view escort operations as only the beginning of a larger process in which
China’s military development will increasingly mirror its rapidly expanding national
interests.17 If indeed this proves true in practice, decades from now China’s Gulf of Aden
mission will be seen as the genesis of the nation’s ascent as a global maritime power.
Indeed, at a symposium in Beijing in January 2012 to mark the three-year anniversary of
China’s Gulf of Aden mission, Adm. Wu Shengli remarked that escort operations were a
landmark event in the historical development of China’s navy.18

China’s View of the Proper Role of State Power in Achieving Global
Governance
PLAN antipiracy missions since late 2008 mirror larger developments in Chinese
military foreign policy. Thus far, as has been seen, Beijing has proceeded with caution.
Official PLAN statements constantly reiterate that while China will increase its presence
and influence throughout the global commons to protect the world economy, it is firmly
opposed to “gunboat diplomacy” and will project naval power only to secure shipping
lanes, conduct search and rescue, and carry out disaster relief.19 During times of peace,
the PLAN is viewed as the only means for China to protect “overseas interests” (海外
利益) that are actually “national interests abroad” (境外的国家利益).20 The PLAN can
extend into the international public domain and perform operations like armed deterrence, crisis management, humanitarian assistance, antipiracy activity, and preventive
defense.
China’s overseas economic interests are increasingly perceived as vulnerable to external
shocks triggered by a myriad of possible disturbances, including political turmoil in
other states and their economic ramifications. For example, an article in Modern Ships
asserts that fifty Chinese projects in Libya were halted during the Arab Spring uprisings
in February 2011, resulting in an aggregate loss of nearly $20 billion.21 The same article
also emphasizes the enormous economic and strategic value to China of the “Islamic
Crescent,” characterized as it is by high levels of both intrastate and interstate political
conflict.22 More broadly, it is revealing that as of December 2012 roughly 60 percent
of PLAN-escorted merchant vessels had been “connected with China’s international
trade.”23
But if Beijing still adheres steadfastly in official statements and publications to its noninterference policy, China’s foreign policy is subtly but definitely shifting toward interactions beyond China’s periphery. There has been at least some evidence for this claim
since the start of the twenty-first century, such as China’s initiative to lead the Six Party
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Talks in 2003. Many observers now believe that more intervention overseas by China is
inevitable as it seeks to protect its growing interests.24 China has an estimated 5.5 million citizens living abroad at any given time, a nearly 40 percent increase since 2005.25
Strongly connected to the PRC in most cases, they, like their compatriots back home,
have rising expectations of governmental protection in times of crisis. As Yang Rui,
the bureaucratically well-connected, fiercely nationalistic host of the CCTV program
Dialogue, stated in a February 2012 broadcast, “China has been cautious but determined
to send its own fleets on different overseas missions as our global economic stakes and
the safety of Chinese workers could become easy targets of international terrorism. The
military buildup enjoys the backing of a majority of Chinese taxpayers to define and
defend our growing national security interests the world over.”26
By “buildup” Yang meant China’s rapidly increasing military spending. Following this
political line, during the 2013 annual meetings of the NPC and the CPPCC—referred
to in China colloquially as “the two meetings” (两会), because of their policy importance—China revealed its latest official defense budget: a projected 10.7 percent nominal
increase to 720.2 billion yuan (U.S.$114.3 billion) for 2013;27 this sum is thrice that of
India and second only to that of the United States. Thus, in future crises China’s populace will watch any misfortunes afflicting fellow citizens overseas more closely and with
more expectation that the Chinese government will respond. Since the state is perceived
to have the means, military and otherwise, to come to their aid, Beijing will not be able
to sit idly by. Chinese leaders will be expected to employ the new tools they have purchased
to help Chinese citizens affected by such critical, if ideologically inconvenient, events.
Beyond China’s own expanding interests, the key variable is Beijing’s perception of its
appropriate contributions to the international community, particularly in the security
realm. As Ju Chengzhi of China’s MoT explains, China is also aware of how other states,
such as the United States, perceive its global contributions:
Americans have [the following critical] opinion: “For many years, China’s overseas economic interests have been protected by others; now China is a responsible great power,
[so] it [should] protect its own ships.” This is indeed a tremendous change. I handled the
entire escort issue, [and] deeply understand the whole process. The reform and opening
up policy has given our government considerable inspiration; this is an excellent example
of what a service-oriented government should do.28

Robust debate continues in Chinese scholarly and policy circles concerning how Beijing
should conceptualize and fulfill its global responsibilities, particularly in light of foreign
encouragement and pressure. There is widespread concern that U.S. and other Western
efforts to encourage Chinese contributions do not serve Beijing’s interests and may even
be designed specifically to constrain China’s rise by tricking it into assuming overambitious burdens that in fact further parochial Western objectives.29 A more politic and
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positive expression of such concerns may be found in the remarks of Le Yucheng, assistant minister of foreign affairs, who acknowledges that “some have criticized China as
a ‘selective stakeholder’ [选择性的利益攸关方], one that speaks of itself as an ‘elephant’
or an ‘ant’ as needed, and hope that China can become a ‘comprehensive stakeholder’ [全
面的利益攸关方].” What they must understand, Le counters, is that while Beijing contributes where it can, such as in the Gulf of Aden, “China’s ‘limitations’ remain numerous, [and it] is both unwilling and unable to assume more international obligations and
play the role of a major power.”30
More encouragingly, however, a growing school of thought suggests that China should
increasingly contribute public goods in proportion to its overall national power. “With
increasing national strength, China’s international standing has been in constant ascendance,” Zhang Ming maintains. “Its international influence has continuously expanded
and is increasingly expressed in the area of ‘global commons’ security governance.” Citing the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden deployments as a key example, Zhang adds, “China must
not only participate proactively in discussions on ‘global commons’ security governance;
it should actively work to maintain the security of the ‘global commons.’”31 This approach is given official, if qualified, sanction in a State Council white paper insisting
that Beijing is already “actively living up to its international responsibility” but allowing
that “China will assume more international responsibility as its comprehensive strength
increases.”32

Prospects for Leading Operations and for Continued Participation Otherwise
As China’s interests, capabilities, and presence grow in key SLOCs, its naval forces will
of necessity interact with other nations’. This prospect raises important questions as to
what shape such interaction should take. China’s previously noted reluctance to subordinate itself to a higher multilateral maritime authority initially constituted an obstacle
for those desiring to see China’s navy assume a leadership role in the Gulf of Aden. To
Beijing’s credit, however, the PLAN has made an effort to coordinate with various navies
the better to integrate its antipiracy efforts with those of others, as was underscored by
the aforementioned support that PLAN commanders contributed to the SHADE process. The signals are currently mixed as to whether Beijing wants to play a leadership role
in the international antipiracy mission.33
One issue is the evolution of operational approaches to countering Somali pirates. While
China has been at the forefront of innovation and collaboration concerning escort-based
operations, other navies in the region are slowly adopting more assertive approaches,
such as land-based preventive measures.34 The PLAN is less forceful in its antipiracy
tactics than most naval counterparts; unless China undertakes significant changes in its
international-relations strategy, it is unlikely to participate directly in operations ashore.
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Moreover, as others have contended, and from a purely practical standpoint, current
PLAN command and control (C2) capabilities likely limit the extent to which China
would be able to lead an international contingency representing tens of navies. As You Ji
explains, “The warships participating in the PLAN’s Somalia operations are all capable
of real-time vertical and horizontal communications—that is, with headquarters and
among themselves—a key criterion for their selection for the mission.”35 But international leadership requires even more advanced C2 capacity, which means that China’s
navy would have to invest heavily in new systems. As Zhang Ming writes,
We must work hard and provide a solid foundation for China’s taking part in “global commons” security governance. In terms of capability, there is a certain threshold in technologies and capabilities for the exploitation and security governance of the “global commons.”
. . . At the present stage, so as to heighten China’s situational awareness in all “global
commons” areas, for force projection, and for conducting nonmilitary humanitarian aid
and disaster relief missions, it is necessary to build as quickly as possible a complete space
infrastructure and network infrastructure as well as a mighty air force and blue sea navy.36

Given these enduring realities, China is likely to continue antipiracy operations, while
limiting overt leadership, even avoiding it outright when it cannot be arranged on Beijing’s terms. China’s prospects for cooperation with other major parties have certainly
brightened since the announcement of Sino-Indian coordination of Gulf of Aden
merchant escorts and the conduct of PLAN on-ship exchanges with the U.S. Navy. When
the twelfth task force left China for the Gulf of Aden on 5 July 2012, its commander (and
East Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff), Zhou Xuming, stated that he planned to increase the
intensity of exchanges and cooperation with international antipiracy forces.37 Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that China’s navy will continue to carry out task force operations independently.

Success and Deficiencies: U.S. and PRC Perspectives
Beijing is likely satisfied with the PLAN’s quasi-leadership position among the navies
committed to fighting piracy. It has technically assumed a leadership position within a
multilateral antipiracy mechanism without having to subordinate itself to the U.S. Navy
and other traditional forces in the Gulf of Aden. These two major sources of Chinese
pride—antipiracy participation and its leadership position, however limited—are
viewed as great contributions to the stability of the global trading system. A Xinhua
article embodies this perspective: “Despite some ideological differences with the West,
China has increasingly integrated in the international system by accepting its rules
and practices rather than trying to build a new one, and is now interacting positively
for the world’s peace and stability.”38 In particular, Chinese media perceive the Gulf of
Aden mission to date as a bright spot for greater cooperation between China and the
international community: “Since its first naval escort mission four years ago, the Navy
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of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undertaken extensive and in-depth
cooperation and exchanges with the naval escort forces of various countries through
varied means including intelligence information sharing, mutual visits, joint naval drills
and international naval escort seminar.”39
That said, statements from high-ranking military officials, such as Vice Adm. Ding
Yiping, suggest that China’s leaders see ample room for improvement. Ding remarked
on China National Radio in July 2012, “Clearly, China will have to assume the duties of
a responsible power.” He added, referring specifically to blue-water naval operations,
“For a navy that aspires to reach farther, it must solve a series of problems, such as its
capabilities in surveillance and early warning, secured communications, guiding and
positioning, logistics and so on, in waters far away from home.”40 It is clear that China’s
leadership remains focused on using the piracy problem to bolster credibility with the
Chinese public. Xu Zuyuan, China’s vice minister of transport, announced in June 2012
that “China will provide better security for its seafarers through international communication, and speed up the preparation work to ratify the Maritime Labor Convention
established in 2006.”41
Examining the PLAN’s dichotomy of choices between independent escorts and international cooperation, Li Ruijing used the April 2012 Iranian rescue of the Chinese-flagged
Xianghuamen as a case in point. Li underscored the need to
understand clearly the relationship between “independent undertakings” [独立担当]
and “international cooperation” [国际合作]. Even if in the future China’s navy realizes
a global presence, [selfishly focused] escorts in the way of “only sweeping one’s doorstep
of snow” [自扫门前雪] will inevitably result in many corners “beyond the reach of one’s
power” [鞭长莫及]. This time the Xianghuamen was hijacked, we also achieved successful rescue by contacting Iranian warships. Because of this, strengthening international
cooperation in the field of international security is in line with China’s interests. Not only
can we use the world’s “security resources” [安全资源], [and thereby] lower the national
burden, we can also build trust and reduce strategic misunderstandings while cooperating
with other navies. Of course, international cooperation also implies duty, [and] China’s
naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden are one show of carrying out international duties.42

According to Modern Navy, China’s eleventh task force engaged in significant information sharing with other navies and commercial vessels throughout its deployment:
“Through methods such as [employing] the Internet and even intership high-frequency
correspondence, [the PLAN has] proactively established hotline connections with each
navy and commercial vessel, formed a mechanism for regularized multinational maritime escort power information sharing and official meetings among commanders.”43
People’s Daily provides details on this mechanism: “The escort task forces of the Chinese
PLA Navy have established an effective information network with over fifty warships
from more than twenty countries and organizations through information resource
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sharing in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast. They also specially
set up e-mail [inboxes] on the Internet to initiate hotline connections with navies and
merchant ships from various countries and send circulars through their online mailbox
and radio stations about suspected ships’ activities they mastered.”44 This mechanism,
combined with a “commander meeting mechanism,” suggests that China’s navy shares
nonsensitive information systematically through routine daily channels, as well as
through high-level exchanges with other navies in the region, including those represented in CTF-151, NATO, and EU NAVFOR.45
From Washington’s perspective, Beijing’s willingness to interact with other naval forces
in the region and constructively discuss the issue of subnational piracy is certainly a
welcome sign.46 In some of the most positive language attributed to a U.S. government
official to date in this regard, David Sedney, a former deputy chief of mission at the U.S.
embassy in Beijing, has been quoted as stating, “The Chinese naval escort task force exerts a lot of influences in the waters off the Somali coast. The Chinese naval sailors are in
command of amazing tactics and in close cooperation with the navies of other countries
including the U.S.”47
That some Chinese scholars, like Huang Yingying, stress that China must provide more
public goods, such as antipiracy resources for protecting SLOCs, commensurate with
China’s great-power aspirations is also a positive development.48 This is especially the
case for those who have criticized China for free riding on U.S.-provided public goods,
such as stable SLOCs. Washington would like to see the PLAN play a substantial leadership role in antipiracy operations, so long as it respects international law and does not
abuse the mission for ulterior purposes.

Opportunities for Sino-American Maritime Relations?
While on official visit to the United States in May 2011, Gen. Chen Bingde declared,
“The Chinese and U.S. militaries will keep high-level contacts, institutionalized dialogues, and professional exchanges in addition to greater cooperation in nontraditional
security fields including [humanitarian assistance / disaster relief] and counterpiracy.” He
added, “Right now we are working together with each other very well, and we will continue to do so and make it better in the future. As I agreed with Admiral Mullen, the two
navies will also hold a joint exercise in Gulf of Aden in order to boost our cooperation.”49
Subsequently, during a visit to Beijing in 2011, Adm. Michael Mullen, then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his counterpart, General Chen, agreed on several military
exchange accords, including joint antipiracy drills.50 Mullen’s visit laid a foundation for
expanding joint antipiracy operations; the two sides reportedly signed multiple collaboration agreements, despite fundamental differences with regard to South China Sea
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issues. Further, in May 2012, during Liang Guanglie’s visit to the United States, the sides
agreed to hold antipiracy joint exercises before the end of 2012.51
In mid-September 2012 Leon Panetta, then Secretary of Defense, engaged Chinese counterparts during a three-day visit to China.52 His trip coincided with the peak of Chinese
and Japanese tension over the highly contentious Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. As if
the U.S.-Chinese military meetings were not already sufficiently overshadowed, photos
of a new Chinese stealth aircraft prototype appeared online just before the visit.53 Yet
despite these obstacles, it was reported during Panetta’s visit that the United States and
China finally conducted their first-ever joint antipiracy operations.54
This historic joint evolution took place on 17 September 2012 in the midwestern section
of the Gulf of Aden.55 The visit, board, search, and seizure exercise consisted of a U.S.
naval ship, the guided-missile destroyer Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81), acting as a vessel
overtaken by pirates. The Chinese missile frigate Yiyang also participated, and a team of
American and Chinese crewmen carried out a simulated rescue mission. There was also
a joint boarding for inspection.56 The U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet announced, “Executing the
boarding side-by-side as a combined U.S.-Chinese team, the team successfully searched
the vessel and provided assistance to the role-playing mariners.”57 People’s Navy reported
that eighteen American special operations personnel boarded Yiyang to take part in
the exercise, which in addition to boosting bilateral cooperation contained elements of
spirited competitiveness.58
Secretary Panetta lauded the exercise, saying, “We noted that the United States and
China just this week participated in a very successful counterpiracy exercise in the Gulf
of Aden. . . . These exercises enhance the abilities of our navies to confront the common
threat of piracy.”59 Similarly, Xinhua described the exercise as “conducive to increasing
mutual understanding and trust between the two navies.”60 The fact that this exercise
occurred during heightened Chinese nationalism reflects the unusual opportunities that
nontraditional maritime-security operations provide for cooperation amid competition.
Referring to the larger issue of security, Panetta further remarked, “We won’t achieve
security and prosperity in the twenty-first century without a constructive U.S.-China relationship, including a stronger military-to-military relationship.”61 Also during his visit,
Panetta toured the North Sea Fleet missile frigate Yantai, which had recently returned
from antipiracy duties in the Gulf of Aden.62
Chinese commentators likewise lauded the secretary’s visit and the unprecedented U.S.Chinese naval cooperation off the coast of Somalia. Ni Feng, deputy director of CASS’s
Institute of North American Studies, declared, “With increased strategic game between
China and the United States, communication and exchanges between the armed forces
of the two countries should be conducted routinely; and topics such as how China and
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the United States can undertake positive interactions in the Asia-Pacific region should be
discussed with an open mind. This will help the two sides reduce misjudgments.”63
Moreover, Secretary Panetta’s September 2012 China visit was highlighted by the announcement that the United States had invited the PLAN to send a warship to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 exercises, the world’s largest joint naval
exercises. “Our fundamental goal is to build a U.S.-China military-to-military relationship that is healthy, stable, reliable, continuous and transparent,” Panetta stated then. It
was reported in late March 2013 that China had accepted the invitation and is set to join
the U.S.-led exercises during summer 2014.64 Beijing had felt snubbed when excluded
from RIMPAC 2012; Secretary Panetta’s announcement demonstrates American desire
to improve maritime relations with China. “I hope that they bring a ship, and I hope
that they bring a crew ready to learn and to be interoperable,” remarked Adm. Samuel
Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. “I think they will be welcomed by the rest
of the international community in the Asia-Pacific as a productive security partner.”65
As Secretary Panetta emphasized during his visit, the United States does not want China
to misunderstand the intentions of its Asia-Pacific rebalancing, which is in part “about
creating a new model in the relationship of our two Pacific powers.”66 Shortly after the
secretary’s official visit to Beijing, the United States and China held in Qingdao their annual meeting pursuant to the U.S.-Chinese Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.
Both sides agreed to strengthen bilateral nontraditional security cooperation, including
in the field of antipiracy operations.67
The wave of encouraging news continued in mid-October 2012 when Brig. Gen. Mark
M. McLeod, U.S. Air Force, announced that the U.S. Navy and PLAN were considering
sharing logistical resources—including fuel, food supplies, and possibly parts—when
undertaking joint antipiracy and humanitarian operations.68 Rear Adm. Yang Jianyong
deemed the American proposal to engage the PLAN on logistical cooperation “a good
area for future discussion [and] cooperation.”69 McLeod noted that the Chinese were
“reaching out and starting to perform . . . more joint missions . . . [so] we thought this
was an opportunity for us to enter into an agreement with them to share resources.”70
Such an arrangement, if implemented broadly, consistently, and over time, would not
only address the major logistical issues attached to the PLAN Far Seas operations discussed in this study but would also represent an unprecedented level of Sino-American
military cooperation.
In November 2012, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus met with Minister of Defense
Liang Guanglie in Beijing to discuss maritime security.71 This was the first visit by a
Secretary of the Navy in twenty-eight years and occurred just two days after China’s navy
successfully completed its first takeoffs and landings on the newly commissioned aircraft
carrier Liaoning.72 Mabus and Liang discussed Sino-American antipiracy cooperation.73
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The deputy director of the Navy Military Studies Research Institute, Zhang Junshe,
perceived the treatment of Mabus during his visit as displaying “China’s sincerity to
improve military ties with the US” and asserted that the arrangement made by China
“reflects the increasing transparency of the Chinese navy, and its growing confidence.”74
Ultimately, Mabus’s visit proved another positive step in U.S.-Chinese antipiracy efforts,
as both sides agreed to increase antipiracy cooperation and joint exercises.75
Of course, while these announcements set an optimistic tone, they remain relatively
small developments within a much more complex, multilayered U.S.-Chinese strategic
maritime relationship. Nonetheless, in a speech in Washington at the close of a visit to
the United States in February 2012, Vice President Xi Jinping described the U.S.-Chinese
relationship as “an unstoppable river that keeps surging ahead.”76 Xi’s high-profile trip
was interpreted by many as a preview of U.S.-Chinese relations under China’s next
paramount leader. Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations comprise closely intertwined social,
economic, political, and military dimensions, all of them capable of impacting significantly many aspects of the bilateral relationship. Antipiracy cooperation on the Far Seas
is merely part of a larger strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing, and it will
certainly not define U.S.-Chinese relations in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the
level of successful cooperation attained by both sides in other layers of the U.S.-Chinese
relationship will influence the degree to which the U.S. Navy and PLAN are able to
cooperate meaningfully in the Gulf of Aden during antipiracy operations. The two sides
will engage each other only to the extent that U.S.-Chinese cooperation is perceived as
beneficial to their respective larger national-security objectives. That said, neither side
should underestimate the significance of building habits of cooperation or the stabilizing power that such practices can bring, especially during periods of political change.
Indeed, in a 2012 article in MoFA’s official journal, Chen Zhirui and Wu Wencheng
examine global governance cooperation in the context of international piracy.77 They
conclude that the foundational importance of cooperation between great powers for
addressing transnational security issues such as piracy is currently underestimated.
However, Chen and Wu also contend that great-power cooperation alone is insufficient
to eradicate nontraditional global-security problems. Participation by other nations,
nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral institutions, they contend, is also
indispensable for effective governance.78 Beijing’s perspective on great-power relationships is evolving alongside perpetually changing twenty-first-century security threats. Of
course, Chinese leaders still recognize the centrality of major bilateral relationships, such
as that between China and the United States, in addressing modern security challenges.
In this regard, any cooperation against piracy is seen as beneficial in both Washington
and Beijing. But China also increasingly values the efforts of other actors in the region,
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efforts that it perceives as critical for maintaining international stability in today’s global
society.79
Notwithstanding the promise offered by high-level dialogues for what will be the most
important bilateral military relationship in the early twenty-first century, events in 2012
provided somber reminders that Chinese cooperation concerning nontraditional and
transnational security issues hinges on other areas of U.S.-Chinese relations. For example, Beijing canceled combined exercises with the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Aden scheduled for late 2011 after Washington announced new arms sales to Taiwan in September.80
Furthermore, it was reported in late February 2012 that China had withdrawn from a
two-day conference on piracy and associated maritime concerns in the Indian Ocean.81
While many states are eager to build strategic trust with China through antipiracy cooperation, this behavior reflects the fact that such operations are ultimately subordinate to
Beijing’s larger national-security interests. Additionally, the PLAN’s somewhat cooperative practice in the Gulf of Aden has unfortunately not been mirrored in waters closer
to China. Chronic flare-ups with Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, among others, in
recent years suggest that Beijing values territorial and resource claims more than cooperation with neighboring states. It is readily apparent that Chinese maritime power must
be viewed through the lens of distance. Beijing’s antipiracy experiences have not changed
its concerns regarding American intentions, or even vis-à-vis the U.S. cooperative maritime strategy of 2008 or the “global maritime partnerships” envisioned therein. Indeed,
on the whole, China still views a growing American presence in East Asia, highlighted by
the announcement of a rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific beginning in late 2011, as a
pernicious grand strategy designed to contain China’s rise.82
Nevertheless, progress in Far Seas cooperation might gradually translate into progress in
the Near Seas. While helping its allies to resist Chinese pressure and coercion in the Near
Seas and to maintain freedom of navigation there, Washington must endeavor to cooperate with Beijing in Far Seas nontraditional security operations. China reached out to
ASEAN counterparts in mid-2011 when it offered to cooperate in escorting commercial
ships of ASEAN states across the Gulf of Aden. China has a larger navy than any ASEAN
state and would likely play a commanding role in these escort operations, of which “the
ideal area of operation would be as far as Oman’s waters in the north, Madagascar’s
waters in the south and all coastal areas in the western part of the Indian Ocean.”83 By
reaching out to its ASEAN neighbors, Beijing revealed a belief that Far Seas operations
can in fact pay dividends regionally and help to improve international relations in the
Asia-Pacific.
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Most Promising Areas for U.S.-Chinese Cooperation and Confidence Building
While there are certainly no indications that Beijing is planning naval expansion on a
global scale anytime soon, the PLAN will encounter a mature U.S. military presence
in any area that it attempts to enter in coming years. This includes the western Pacific,
South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Middle East littorals, Caribbean Sea, and Arctic Ocean.
Professor Liang Fang of Chinese National Defense University identifies the eastern
Pacific, the northwestern Indian Ocean, and parts of the Atlantic Ocean as zones where
China is likely to prioritize strategic maritime access in the future.84 If that is the case,
mistrust between Washington and Beijing is likely to increase as the United States
reorients its national security strategy toward the Asia-Pacific and as Chinese military
development unfolds both regionally and internationally.85 In view of this strategic mistrust, it is absolutely critical that naval officials on both sides take maximum advantage
of the window for military and strategic confidence building that antipiracy operations
represent. American and Chinese naval officers would do well to establish proactively
a bilateral mechanism that facilitates rapid communication in the event of a crisis or
incident. It is conceivable that the Chinese and American naval forces operating in the
Gulf of Aden could develop such an agreement and apply it to maritime East Asia once it
becomes operable.
Finally, China and the United States concur that piracy stems from deficiencies in
governance ashore. The biggest contribution that Washington and Beijing could make
to a solution would be to establish dialogues with the objective of developing aligning
approaches toward Somali reconstruction.
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Conclusion: No Substitute for Experience
In dispatching fifteen antipiracy task forces to the Gulf of Aden from since December
2008, an uninterrupted period of nearly five years, China’s navy has discovered that there
is truly no substitute for experience. Select PLAN personnel have sharpened their skills,
improved coordination mechanisms, and tested new technologies and platforms. In four
years of active Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations, China’s navy has accrued know-how
and lessons that it could not have gained otherwise. It has implemented them, and
thereby realized operational and procedural improvements, with impressive speed and
resourcefulness. Addressing these issues is increasing PLAN capabilities and confidence.
The most important organizational impact of the mission has been to make the PLAN
assume unprecedented responsibility and initiative in coordinating operations with
such civilian agencies as the MoT. This marks a coming-of-age in which geographic
and operational exigencies may increasingly allow the PLAN to emerge from under the
PLA’s shadow and come into its own as China’s most externally focused military service
and a growing tool for Chinese policy makers. Realizing the PLAN’s full potential in this
regard will hinge in part on attendant improvements in real-time interservice, interagency, and civil-military coordination, none of which China’s governmental structure
is optimized to support. Certainly the rapidity and scale of the PLAN’s rise in autonomy
should not be exaggerated; the PLA’s bureaucratic apparatus remains ground force–
dominated. Yet antipiracy and related operations can spur needed improvements and
even serve as a test bed for their realization.
Operationally, a core contribution of these deployments may be imposing experience
with unscripted, unpredictable situations on what might otherwise remain an unwieldy
and risk-adverse service. They represent the PLAN’s most intense operational experience
in recent years. PLAN forces in the Gulf of Aden continue to learn intangible operational
lessons that enhance China’s broader naval competence. Viewed holistically, PLAN
achievements in the Gulf of Aden represent far more than an amalgamation of antipiracy best practices. Beyond the Gulf of Aden and its surrounding bodies of water, they
provide a broad foundation to support future capabilities. At the tactical level, many
fundamental skills that the PLAN is learning from its antipiracy operations transcend
naval-warfare domains and missions. The U.S. Navy refers to these as “mission-essential
tasks”; for instance, a helicopter crew for a maritime special-forces mission must be
proficient in taking off from and landing on a ship at night. The PLAN is developing
core skills for Far Seas operations, many of which may prove to be applicable and useful
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beyond the scope of antipiracy. Maintenance procedures and even ship design may be
influenced as a result, with benefits that are already being applied in other areas, such as
training in the Near Seas. A Modern Navy article encapsulates this dynamic:
China’s escort task force through . . . practice, [has] accumulated beneficial experience, optimized escort methods, [and] raised escort efficiency. In summary, for the Chinese navy,
Gulf of Aden and Somali escorts are just the first step in facing continuously expanding
national maritime interests. Under the framework of international law, protecting the
safety of China’s strategic sea-lanes, carrying out protection and evacuation for overseas
Chinese, participating in maritime arms control, [and] accepting the responsibilities of a
great power will become the future focus areas for China’s noncombat naval operations in
the era of peace.1

As this quotation suggests, China’s process of gaining Far Seas experience is not simply
one of increasing operational naval capabilities—it is far broader. Antipiracy operations
conveniently enable China both to respond to internal and external pressures to act on
the international stage and to raise significantly the overall ability of its increasingly
powerful navy. The Gulf of Aden has challenged Beijing to adjudicate among multifarious, often contradictory, domestic and international forces. As the first major window
into China’s Far Seas operations and its approach thereto, it foreshadows how Beijing
will take its place in the world as its interests expand and its actions impact others more
strongly.
In this light, the PLAN’s experience in the Gulf of Aden should pay dividends for China’s
leadership as Chinese overseas interests proliferate. As China’s economic interests sprawl
further beyond its continental borders, the costs of security failure will grow, especially
in a “fishbowl” environment where domestic and foreign audiences observe China’s behavior intently. Beijing’s leaders will likely need to make more decisions about how best
to protect China’s national interests, and they can now use the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden mission as a foundational guide for how to address economic, political, and military factors
simultaneously to solve complex challenges to the security of China’s overseas interests.
While PLAN antipiracy operations to date have succeeded operationally, at the strategic
level they have also illuminated a growing gap between Chinese and Western perceptions of China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. By contributing useful public goods the operations offer China increased global maritime influence;
nevertheless, they remain insufficient in degree or scope to earn Beijing the status that
it covets. As this study demonstrates, China, while conceding that there is ample room
for improvement, portrays itself as an increasingly responsible actor in the global commons—yet some Western audiences are increasingly concerned about Beijing’s lack of
integration into, and perhaps subtle rejection of, the existing international structure.
Driven by both domestic and international interests, the Gulf of Aden mission brings
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China into a more rewarding yet more difficult environment in which expectations are
rising in both dimensions.
As China becomes a truly global stakeholder in coming years and seeks to protect its
overseas interests more effectively, Chinese and American interests overseas will intersect to an unprecedented degree. Never before have the two great Pacific nations been
powerful simultaneously. Substantive cooperation between the two sides will thus be
indispensable not only for U.S.-Chinese relations but also for the stability of the global
commons. An open and cooperative relationship will be required in a variety of maritime regions, particularly in areas where the U.S. and other militaries are already well
positioned to restrict Chinese access and development. Just as China’s navy has found
naval operational experience in the Gulf of Aden invaluable, China’s civilian leaders will
find the same to be true about public goods generally as they seek to increase their nation’s global status and influence. The international and interconnected nature of such
nontraditional security contributions makes cooperation with, and understanding the
perspectives of, the United States and other participating nations essential for China. At
the same time, the United States and other nations will have to understand better Beijing’s own equities and limitations, which are unlikely to change dramatically anytime
soon. China’s evolving approach to antipiracy operations and larger maritime issues will
likely take a tortuous, if increasingly positive, course in the Far Seas.

Note
1. Wu Chao and Li Daguang, “Maritime Shipping
Lanes Related to China’s Development,” pp.
50–52. Original text: “中国护航编队通过两年
多的实践, 积累了有益经验, 优化了护航方式,
提高了护航效率. 总之, 对于中国海军而言, 面
对日益扩展的国家海上利益, 亚丁湾, 索马里

护航仅仅是第一步. 在国际法框架下, 维护国
家海上战略通道安全, 实施护侨撤侨行动, 参
与海上军备控制, 承担大国责任, 将成为未来
中国海军和平时期非战争运用的重点领域.”

Appendix: Notional PLAN Order of Battle by Fleet
Platform
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Diesel-powered attack
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3
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[58–59]
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(0)

18 (23)
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+?a
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[2b]

[2]
c
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1
8
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8 [10d]

1c
26 [33d]

(24)

53 (65)
[62–65e]

44
(26)

Subtotal of above ships
Large amphibious
ships
Medium amphibious
shipsg
Small amphibious
ships
Large missile patrol
craft
Smaller fast-attack
and patrol craft
Mine warfare ships

48 (57)
[57a]

140 (158)
[164–67]
2

28 [30f]

26

5 (9)

18
(51)

(27)

[186i]

[186]
19 (20)

(35)

67

(40)

Major auxiliaries
Minor auxiliaries and
service/support craft

40
(27)
50 l
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86 (95+)
[92–93+j]
[141k]

[141]
(7)

23 (87)
[52h]

(10)

[46]
40 (44)
50 l
250+

Notes:
Parentheses indicate that data come from Institute for International Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012 (London:
Routledge, 2012). While not as authoritative as the baseline U.S. government sources listed above, it offers breakdowns by fleet
that none of them have offered since the 2009 Office of Naval Intelligence report. Brackets indicate that data are compiled from
Andrew Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” in Strategic Asia 2012–13, ed. Tellis and Tanner, pp. 98–111, and updated with selected latest Jane’s estimates.
a. Figure excludes uncertain number of Romeo Type 033 SSs in process of being retired and includes twelve Type 041 submarines,
all of which are apparently based in ESF. “Yuan Class (Type 041),” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 12 February 2013, www.janes.com/.
b. Figure includes Golf (Type 031) test submarine and new “Qing (Type 043)” with large sail launched but apparently not yet
commissioned.
c. Aircraft carrier Liaoning was projected to become operational in 2012 and demonstrated its first public aircraft takeoff and landing in November 2012.
d. Figure includes two 052D destroyers commissioned in January 2013 and based in SSF. “Luyang III (Type 052D) Class,” Jane’s
Fighting Ships, 11 March 2013, www.janes.com/, and Qian Xiaohu, “‘Changchun’ Warship Commissioned to PLA Navy,” Liberation Army Daily, 4 February 2013, english.pladaily.com.cn.
e. Figure includes four 056 corvettes. “Jiangdao (Type 056) Class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 12 February 2013, www.janes.com/.
f. Figure includes LHDs and LSTs but not smaller LSMs, LCUs, and LCACs.
g. The Military Balance uses the term “Medium Landing Ships” to designate this category.
h. Figure includes LSMs but not LCUs or LCACs.
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i. Figure includes smaller LSMs, LCUs, and LCACs.
j. Figure does not include smaller 037-IIS, 037, 062C, 062/1, 037-I ships.
k. Figure includes smaller 037-IIS, 037, 062C, 062/1, 037-I ships, as well as three “unknown” ships on p. 104.
l. Five are fleet AORs.
Sources: Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” pp. 89–91; U.S. Department of Defense,
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, annual report prepared for Congress (18
May 2012), p. 31; O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization, pp. 44–45; The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with
Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, Md.: Office of Naval Intelligence, July 2009), pp. 13, 18, 20, 45.
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China National Television
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China Transport Telecommunications and Information
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gross tonnage
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IMO

International Maritime Organization

IOR

Indian Ocean region

IRTC

internationally recommended transit corridor

LHD

landing helicopter dock

LNG

liquefied natural gas
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landing platform dock

MDA

maritime domain awareness

MoFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoT

Ministry of Transportation

MSCHOA

Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa

MV

motor vessel

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVCENT

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

NDU

National Defense University

NEO

noncombatant evacuation operation

NPC

National People’s Congress

NSF

North Sea Fleet

OAP

Operation Allied Protector

OOS

Operation Ocean Shield

PLA

People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF

People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN

People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC

People’s Republic of China

RAPPICC

Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence

		

Co-ordination Centre
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RIMPAC

Rim of the Pacific

ROE

rules of engagement

SASS

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

SHADE

Shared Awareness and Deconfliction

SLOC

sea line of communication

SOE

state-owned enterprise

SSF

South Sea Fleet

TFG

Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UN

United Nations

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UUV

unmanned underwater vehicle

VHF

very high frequency
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